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Private Farms, Public Power: 





It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy production 
include substantial protection of animals’ interests—that in some 
way the state is regulating the treatment of farmed animals and 
protecting them against the worst excesses of their owners’ self-
interest.  In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada and the United States, 
the standards governing farmed animal protection are not established 
by elected lawmakers or appointed regulators, but are instead 
primarily defined by private, interested parties, including producers 
themselves.  As scholars of animal law have noted, this has 
contributed to weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests 
of farmed animals.  The present study will focus on a distinct, though 
related, difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of 
standard-setting authority to animal industries.  Not only does this 
delegation result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode 
crucial public law values, such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality.   
This limitation of public law values poses a deep structural 
threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’ particular 
dependence on public law for their protection.  Animals are excluded 
from private law protections, and from direct access to conventional 
means of legal and political participation, leaving them without legal 
avenues to press their interests as individuals.  Effective animal 
protection therefore requires that the human beings who advocate for 
animal interests have meaningful access to standard-setting 
processes.  Such meaningful access is facilitated where public law 
values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decision-
making.  For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority 
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law 
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context.  This 
 
* Jessica Eisen is an Assistant Professor at the University of Alberta Faculty of 
Law.  The author extends her sincerest thanks to her co-editors on this volume, 
Erum Sattar and Xiaoqian Hu, for their energy and enthusiasm throughout this 
project, and for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  Thanks 
are owed also to the University of Alberta’s Kule Institute for Advanced Studies 
and to the University of Arizona for supporting an extremely helpful workshop in 
connection with this volume.  The author is grateful to all the participants in that 
workshop and, in particular, the discussants Albertina Antognini and Andrew 
Woods for sharing their reactions to an earlier draft. 
2020]               PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER                  159 
 
article will chart the operation of private power in setting standards 
for the protection of dairy cattle and identify the damage this 
privatized authority does to public law values. The article will 
tentatively suggest in conclusion that high levels of privatization in 
standard-setting may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the 
idea of regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence 
respecting the practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight. 
I.  Introduction 
At the heart of the Canadian and US dairy industries are 
cows: millions of living, feeling creatures, whose lives are shaped, 
from birth to death, by our collective decision to use their bodies in 
food production.  It is widely assumed that laws governing dairy 
production include substantial protection of these animals’ 
interests—that in some way the state is regulating the treatment of 
farmed animals and protecting them against the worst excesses of 
their owners’ self-interest.1  In fact, across jurisdictions in Canada 
and the United States, the standards governing farmed animal 
protection are not elaborated by elected lawmakers or appointed 
regulators, but are instead primarily defined by private, interested 
parties, including producers themselves. 
As scholars of animal law have noted, this has contributed to 
weak and ineffectual legal protection of the interests of farmed 
animals.2  The present study will focus on a distinct, though related, 
difficulty arising from the de facto or de jure delegation of standard-
setting authority to animal industries.  Not only does this delegation 
result in less stringent standards, but it also works to erode crucial 
public law values, such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality.  This limitation of public law values poses a deep 
structural threat to animal interests, especially in light of animals’ 
particular dependence on public law for their protection.  Animals 
are excluded from private law protections, and from direct access to 
conventional means of legal and political participation, leaving them 
without legal avenues to press their interests as individuals.  Effective 
animal protection therefore requires that the human beings who 
advocate for animal interests have meaningful access to standard-
setting processes.  Such meaningful access is facilitated where public 
 
1 David J. Wolfson & Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, 
Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, 205, 206, 226 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (describing a widespread “presumption that the 
law currently provides some basic legal protection for animals, even if there is 
skepticism about its effectiveness or enforcement”). 
2 See id. 
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law values assure transparent, accountable and impartial decision-
making.  For this reason, the assignment of standard-setting authority 
to private producers, and the attendant diminution of public law 
values, is of special concern in the animal protection context. 
This article will offer a descriptive account of farmed animal 
protection regimes across Canada and the United States, with a 
particular focus on dairy cattle.  The article will further advance a 
normative critique of privatized standard-setting in this sphere given 
animals’ particular vulnerabilities.  Part II will describe the 
regulatory context under consideration: the lives and well-being of 
dairy cattle in Canada and the United States.  Part III will confront 
the complexity of the supposed public/private distinction in law, 
drawing on scholarship in feminist legal theory and comparative 
administrative law.  Despite the instability of these categories, 
however, this Part will argue that the identification of public and 
private authority—and the related operation (or not) of public law 
values—remains salient in the animal protection context.  In 
particular, animals’ exclusion from private law protections and from 
formal access to legal and political institutions make public law and 
public law values (including transparency, impartiality and 
accountability) critical to effective animal protection. 
With this framework in place, Part IV will offer a description 
of regulatory approaches to dairy cattle protection in the United 
States and Canada, with an emphasis on the role of private actors in 
legal standard-setting in these jurisdictions.  This Part will reveal 
that, although a variety of regulatory mechanisms exist across 
jurisdictions, private standard-setting is commonly employed, 
supplanting crucial public law functions and values.  The Conclusion 
will reflect on why, despite the significance of public law values to 
animal protection, private power over legal standard-setting persists.  
Tentatively, this Conclusion will suggest that the present legal 
landscape may reflect a public desire to be comforted by the idea of 
regulation, tempered by an underlying ambivalence respecting the 
practical consequences of meaningful legal oversight. 
II.  Milk and the Lives of Dairy Cattle 
The lives of cows in the Canadian and U.S. dairy industries 
are controlled by human beings, from their broadest contours to their 
most minute details.3  The choices of cows themselves—respecting 
whether and how to care for their young, when and with whom to 
 
3 Jessica Eisen, Milked: Nature, Necessity, and American Law, 34 BERKELEY J. 
GENDER L. & JUST. 71, 106–109 (2019). 
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have sex, and how to live in community with their herds—are highly 
constrained.4  Their bodies are surgically altered, physically 
restrained, and continually manipulated to facilitate the production 
and extraction of their nursing materials.5  The human actors whose 
decisions so thoroughly shape these animals’ lives range from the 
farmers who own these cows as a matter of private law to participants 
in the dense networks of public administration that govern the 
production and sale of dairy products. 
The calves of dairy cows are generally separated from their 
mothers immediately after birth.6  Male calves are usually auctioned 
to be slaughtered for veal.7  Female calves spend their early days 
isolated in individual hutches, then spend a period in group housing, 
before they are old enough for their first insemination.8  Many cows 
are subject to painful physical modifications designed to support 
their use in dairying.  These include the “disbudding” or removal of 
horns to reduce the risk of injury arising from their confinement in 
close proximity;9 the cutting of “supernumerary” or inconveniently 
 
4 Id.  Animals, of course, retain their agency in the face of human constraints, 
resisting coercion and refusing instructions.  See Jason C. Hribal, Animals, Agency, 
and Class: Writing the History of Animals from Below, 14 HUM. ECOLOGY 
REV. 101, 103 (2007) (observing that “[f]aking ignorance, rejection of commands  
. . . foot-dragging . . . breaking equipment” and other tactics constitute forms of 
resistance employed by animals against human beings); Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 263, 270 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2004) (“Do animals dissent from human hegemony? I think they 
often do. They vote with their feet by running away. They bite back, scream in 
alarm, withhold affection, approach warily, fly and swim off.”); cf. JOCELYNE 
PORCHER, THE ETHICS OF ANIMAL LABOUR: A COLLABORATIVE UTOPIA 116 (2017) 
(explaining that cattle apply their “affective and cognitive capacities to work” in 
order to “collaborate” in certain milking processes).   
5 Eisen, supra note 3, at 106–109. 
6 Kathrin Wagner, Daniel Seitner, Kerstin Barth, Rupert Palme, Andreas Futschik 
& Susanne Waiblinger, Effects of Mother versus Artificial Rearing During the 
First 12 Weeks of Life on Challenge Responses of Dairy Cows, 164 APPLIED 
ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 1, 2 (2015).  
7 Kathryn Gillespie, Sexualized Violence and the Gendered Commodification of the 
Animal Body in Pacific Northwest US Dairy Production, 21 GENDER, PLACE & 
CULTURE 1321, 1327 (2014). 
8 Eisen, supra note 3, at 107. 
9 See Erin Mintline, Mairi Stewart, Andrea Rogers, Neil Cox, Gwyneth Verkerk, 
Joseph Stookey, James Webster & Cassandra Tucker, Play Behavior as an 
Indicator of Animal Welfare: Disbudding in Dairy Calves, 144 APPLIED ANIMAL 
BEHAV. SCI. 22, 23 (2013). 
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placed teats;10 and the “docking” or amputation of their tails to 
improve cleanliness and access to their udders.11 
To stimulate milk production, dairy cows are repeatedly 
impregnated, almost always through artificial insemination.12  When 
their calves are born, they are taken away immediately to be raised 
for dairy or veal according to their sex.13  While lactating, many cows 
are held in “tie-stall” housing systems, in which they are closely 
chained at the neck in individual stalls just large enough to allow 
them to lie down or stand up.14  A feeding trough runs in front of the 
cows, and a waste trough runs behind them.15  Such tie-stall housing 
is often supported by the use of “electric trainers” that hover over the 
cows and administer a shock if they move their bodies into positions 
that might allow them to defecate outside the designated trough.16  
When no longer considered productive, dairy cows are slaughtered, 
often after being transported many hours by truck without access to 
water or rest on their journey.17  Dairy cows are generally slaughtered 
between 4-6 years of age, well below their life expectancy (if not 
slaughtered) of 15-20 years.18 
Cows are intelligent, social animals, and there is strong 
evidence that many of these practices cause serious physical and 
emotional harm.  It is widely agreed, for example, that separation of 
these mammals from their young is a source of “distress” or “stress” 
 
10 ROGER W. BLOWEY & A. DAVID WEAVER, COLOR ATLAS OF DISEASES AND 
DISORDERS OF CATTLE 203 (3rd ed. 2011) (explaining that supernumerary teats “are 
unsightly, may interfere with milking, and can develop mastitis” and so are 
“normally removed with curved scissors early in life”). 
11 See Literature Review on the Welfare Implications of Tail Docking of 
Cattle, AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Aug. 2014), 
https://www.avma.org/resources-tools/literature-reviews/welfare-implications-tail-
docking-cattle; Tail Docking of Dairy Cattle: Position Statement, CAN. 
VETERINARY MED. ASS’N (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.canadianveterinarians.net/documents/tail-docking-of-dairy-cattle; 
W. K. Fulwider, T. Grandin, B. E. Rollin, T. E. Engle, N. L. Dalsted & W. D. 
Lamm, Survey of Dairy Management Practices on One Hundred Thirteen North 
Central and Northeastern United States Dairies, 91 J. DAIRY SCI. 1686, 1688 
(2008). 
12 Eisen, supra note 3, at 107. 
13 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
14 Eisen, supra note 3, at 108. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 109. 
17 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208; Curb the Cruelty: Canada’s Farm 
Animal Transport System in Need of Repair, WORLD SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF ANIMALS 4 (2010), https://www.animalalliance.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/report-WSPA-Curb-the-Cruelty-Report.pdf. 
18 Eisen, supra note 3, at 109. 
 
2020]               PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER                  163 
 
(to use the parlance of dairy science) for both cow and calf. 19  Indeed, 
a significant body of literature has emerged to address how the 
precise timing and manner of separation might improve productivity 
and animal well-being, since cow-calf separation often causes weight 
loss and injury as the pair attempt to reunite.20  There is also extensive 
evidence demonstrating that tail docking is painful for cows, and that 
the practice provokes behaviors associated with discomfort or severe 
pain.21  (The amputation or “docking” of cows tails is most 
commonly achieved by placing a tight band or rubber ring near the 
base of the cow’s tail, with the tail ultimately atrophying from lack 
of blood flow, then falling off.22) The practice of routine tail docking 
is officially opposed by both the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association23 and the American Veterinary Medical Association.24   
There are sharp differences in opinion as to the morality of 
confining, impregnating and milking animals, and as to the 
acceptability of many of the specific animal use practices within the 
dairy sector.25  Questions about the justice or fairness of laws 
protecting animals in agricultural contexts often, perhaps inevitably, 
lead to underlying questions about the importance or necessity of 
 
19 See, e.g., Frances C. Flower & Daniel M. Weary, The Effects of Early 
Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf, 12 ANIMAL WELFARE 339, 340 (2003) 
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Early Separation]; Frances C. Flower & Daniel M. 
Weary, Effects of Early Separation on the Dairy Cow and Calf: 2. Separation at 1 
Day and 2 Weeks after Birth, 70 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 275, 276 (2001) 
[hereinafter Flower & Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks]; E.O. Price, J. E. 
Harris, R. E. Borgward, M. L. Sween & J. M. Connor, Fenceline Contact of Beef 
Calves with Their Dams at Weaning Reduces the Negative Effects of Separation on 
Behavior and Growth Rate, 81 J. ANIMAL SCI. 116, 121 (2003); Wagner et al., 
supra note 6, at 2. 
20 See, e.g., Flower & Weary, Early Separation, supra note 19, passim; Flower & 
Weary, Separation at 1 Day and 2 Weeks, supra note 19, at 282–83; Price, supra 
note 19, at 121; Wagner et al., supra note 6, at 2.  
21 See M.A. Sutherland & C.B. Tucker, The Long and Short of It: A Review of Tail 
Docking in Farm Animals, 135 APPLIED ANIMAL BEHAV. SCI. 179, 187–89 (2011); 
S.D. Eicher, H.W. Cheng, A.D. Sorrells & M.M. Shutz, Short Communication: 
Behavioral and Physiological Indicators of Sensitivity or Chronic Pain Following 
Tail Docking, 89 J. DAIRY SCI. 3047, 3047 (2006); S.D. Eicher & J.W. Dailey, 
Indicators of Acute Pain and Fly Avoidance Behaviors in Holstein Calves 
Following Tail-docking, 85 J. DAIRY SCI. 2850, 2850 (2002). 
22 See AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11; CAN. VETERINARY 
MED. ASS’N, supra note 11. 
23 CAN. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra note 11. 
24 AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS’N, supra, note 11. 
25 See Jessica Eisen, Xiaoqian Hu & Erum Sattar, Dairy Tales: Global Portraits of 
Milk and Law, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2020). 
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animal products in human diets and food systems.26  The analysis that 
follows will not endeavor to answer underlying questions as to 
whether or how the farming of mammals for their nursing materials 
might be humanely or ethically conducted.  Instead, the aim is to 
explain how different regulatory regimes have answered questions 
respecting animal care as a matter of law—and how these regimes 
have decided who decides.  In particular, this study will demonstrate 
that significant decisions respecting the permissible treatment of 
animals are often left to the private choices of individual producers.  
As the following Part will argue, high levels of regulatory 
privatization, and the resulting marginalization of public law values, 
represent serious obstacles to effective farmed animal protection. 
III.  Animals and Public Law 
Private dairy producers currently enjoy significant authority 
to set standards for farmed animal care.27 This Part will argue that 
such privatization of regulatory authority is of special concern in the 
sphere of farmed animal protection.  Because farmed animals lack 
both private law rights and direct access to formal legal and political 
remedies, their meaningful protection requires that the humans who 
advocate for animal interests have adequate access to standard-
setting processes.  This access is best supported where decision-
making is shaped by public law values such as accountability, 
transparency and impartiality. 
A. Defining Public and Private Law 
It bears mention at the outset that distinctions between public 
and private are rarely clean and never unproblematic—as scholars of 
both administrative law and feminist legal theory have long warned.  
In schematic terms, public law describes the legal relationship 
between state and citizen, while private law denotes legal relations 
between individuals.  According to this schematic, the public sphere 
is defined by shared commitments and values, while the private 
 
26 See Katie Sykes, Rethinking the Application of Canadian Criminal Law to 
Factory Farming, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 33, 55–
56 (Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (observing that 
“opening up the question of what is ‘unnecessary’ in the context of food 
production could be a discomfiting prospect, since it unavoidably leads to 
questions about whether the use of animals for food is necessary at all”); Elaine L. 
Hughes & Christine Meyer, Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe, 6 
ANIMAL L. 23, 56 (2000) (“A clear definition of necessity would require a social 
consensus on the legitimacy and importance of various human uses of animals; 
however, this is lacking.”). 
27 See infra Part IV. 
 
2020]               PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER                  165 
 
sphere is characterized by pursuit of self-interest.28  Within both 
administrative law and feminist scholarships, the terms public and 
private are deeply contested, subject to multiple (sometimes 
conflicting) definitions, and, in practice, impossibly intertwined. 
Within administrative law scholarship, the conventional 
public/private division is increasingly understood to be complicated 
or collapsed by the privatization of public authority, especially 
respecting standard-setting.29  The fraying edges of the public and 
private spheres identified in administrative law scholarship echo a 
related destabilization of these categories identified by feminist legal 
theorists.30  In particular, feminist theory has exposed supposedly 
“private” spheres, including “the home” and “sexuality,” as being, in 
fact, fundamentally constituted by collective commitments and 
public power.31 
For both feminist theorists and administrative law scholars, 
the complex interplay between the supposedly public and private 
aspects of law are matters of normative concern.  Feminist theorists 
have emphasized that the rhetorical delineation of certain “private” 
spheres has allowed governments to ignore, shirk or deny 
“responsibility” for certain harms or inequalities.32  In a similar vein, 
administrative lawyers have identified the operation of private power 
 
28 See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 8–10 
(1988). 
29 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth, and Blake Emerson, COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 2 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake 
Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017) (noting that, although “[t]he distinction between public 
and private is . . . essential to administrative law,” the assumption that “one can 
compartmentalize regulatory activities and actors into either a public or a private 
sphere” fails to capture “the increasingly blurred boundary between state and 
society” in practice). 
30 See Derek McKee, The Public/Private Distinction in Roncarelli v. Duplessis, 55 
MCGILL L.J. 461, 472 (2010) (linking the public/private distinction within 
administrative law to the state/market divide of classical liberalism, and to related 
distinctions between market/family and civilization/state). 
31 See, e.g., Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Divide, in 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281–307 (S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 
1983); Susan B. Boyd, Can Law Challenge the Public/Private Divide? Women, 
Work and Family, 15 WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 161, 171–74 (1996). 
32 Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private 
Dichotomy, 20 J.L. & SOCIETY 93, 97 (1993) (asserting that the public/private 
distinction “allows government to clean its hands of any responsibility for the state 
of the ‘private’ world”); see also Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A 
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1502 (1983) 
(describing the casting of relations of “domination” as “private matters that do not 
implicate the political state”). 
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in public administration as a possible threat to public law values such 
as transparency, democracy, accountability and fairness.33   
These analyses point to a common set of underlying 
concerns.  First, the conceptual delineation of private spaces within 
legal regimes—even, or perhaps especially, when cloaked in the 
language of freedom or liberty—may in fact operate to authorize 
oppressive and even violent relationships in practice.34  Second, there 
are harms and power dynamics for which governed societies rightly 
accept shared responsibility, and our institutions should be organized 
accordingly.35  In other words, it is not simply that it is difficult or 
impossible to sort the public from the private, but rather that efforts 
to cast these spheres as independent often work to conceal and distort 
our collective obligations to one another. 
The concern that public/private legal distinctions can be 
deployed to obscure and confuse law’s role in shaping practices and 
relationships is apparent in the field of farmed animal protection.  
Elsewhere, I have suggested that the farm is analogous to the private 
sphere of the family within feminist theory—a space in which a 
particular, contestable conception of the public good is pursued using 
legal forms and social discourses that often reject overt public 
regulation in favor of such values as privacy, personal duty, and even 
love.36  The present analysis details farmed animal protection 
regimes in Canada and the United States to reveal the mechanics of 
 
33 See, e.g., Jean-Bernard Auby, Contracting Out and “Public Values”: A 
Theoretical and Comparative Approach, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
552, 552 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Linseth & Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed. 
2017) (describing the question of how to maintain private contractors’ adherence 
to “public values” as a “characteristically post-modern administrative law 
question”).   
34 See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY 
OF SELF, AUTONOMY AND LAW (2011) (offering an extended argument in favor of 
legal analyses that focus on the relationships produced by legal rules). 
35 C.f. Lacey, supra note 32, at 97. 
36 See Eisen, supra note 3, at 98-101 (2019) (discussing “the farm” as analogous to 
the “private sphere” of feminist theory); Jessica Eisen, Milk and Meaning: Puzzles 
in Posthumanist Method, in MAKING MILK: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF 
OUR PRIMARY FOOD 237, 240 (Mathilde Cohen & Yoriko Otomo eds., 2017) 
(observing that regulation of the farm, like “the family” within feminist critique, 
“trusts private actors (farmers; husbands) to wield their power appropriately 
because they are well-intentioned, bound by duty, and even because they love 
those in their charge”); see also Dinesh Wadiwel, Whipping to Win: Measured 
Violence, Delegated Sovereignty and the Privatised Domination of Non-Human 
Life, in LAW AND THE QUESTION OF THE ANIMAL: A CRITICAL JURISPRUDENCE 116, 
116–32 (Yoriko Otomo & Edward Mussawir eds., 2013) (describing the 
“privatised domination of non-human life”); Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the 
Constitution, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 115, 152 n.238 (2017) (analogizing the 
private sphere of the farm to the private sphere of the family). 
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the public/private law interplay working to keep the treatment of 
farmed animals effectively unregulated by public authorities.  
B. Animals and Public Law Values 
Despite the identified artificiality of distinctions between 
public and private in legal ordering, the analysis that follows will rely 
on these terms to some extent.  This is because, although 
problematic, these categories remain operative, with their operation 
having significant consequences for farmed animal protection.  There 
are two critical aspects of animal protection regimes that demand 
continued attention to distinctions between public and private law in 
this context.  The first is the reality that so-called private law (laws 
understood to govern relations between individuals) have 
consistently refused to recognize animals as the kinds of individuals 
whose relations are of legal consequence.  The second is that values 
such as transparency, accountability and impartiality are legally 
cognizable only with respect to public law authority.  Because these 
public law values are crucial to effective animal protection, the 
juridical positioning of animal protection as a matter of public law 
improves prospects for animal protection. 
Animals do not hold private legal rights, even to their own 
lives and bodies.  Instead, private law has quite durably retained a 
basic classification of animals as things: mere objects of the property 
rights of others.37  In terms of private law alone, animals are objects, 
not subjects.  They are things to be owned, traded, and extinguished 
at the will of those who hold rights to their bodies.  In the famous 
formulation of property as relations amongst people (rather than 
relations between people and objects),38 relations with animals are 
 
37 See GARY FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW 65–115 (1995); 
Wendy Adams, Human Subjects and Animal Objects: Animals as “Other” in Law, 
in 3 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 29, 29–30 (2009).  In recent years, a number of civil 
law jurisdictions have formally affirmed in their civil codes that animals are not 
“things”; however, each of these jurisdictions has also specified that provisions 
pertaining to “things” also apply to animals, making the change in status merely 
nominal.  See Sabine Brels, The Evolution of the Legal Status of Animals: From 
Things to Sentient Beings, THE CONSCIOUS LAWYER (Jan. 2016), 
https://www.theconsciouslawyer.co.uk/the-evolution-of-the-legal-status-of-
animals-from-things-to-sentient-beings/. 
38 See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, 
THEORY AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 3–4 (1994); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE 
L.J. 16, 22–23 (1913).  
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invisible, with no real meaning in the world of legal value and 
exchange.39 
Public law, on the other hand, has long recognized some 
minimal legal significance in animals’ own lives and experiences, 
most notably through prohibitions against cruelty and the regulation 
of certain animal-use industries.  Admittedly, the longest-standing 
forms of public law protection of animal interests—criminal 
prohibitions of cruelty and bestiality—have not focused on animal 
well-being as much as they have attended to human property interests 
or community morals.40  In both Canada and the United States, 
however, there is evidence of a shift in emphasis in public and 
judicial understandings of these laws: a growing sense that their 
purpose is, at least in part, to protect animals for their own sakes.41  
The treatment of animals has become the subject of regulatory 
concern, with human use of animal property addressed as a site of 
ongoing risk and oversight.42  These regulatory interventions now 
commonly reference the interests of animals as being legally 
relevant.43 
In addition to providing the sole available forum for pressing 
animals’ interests, public law is tied to values of particular 
significance for effective animal protection—namely transparency, 
 
39 Some have claimed that being “owned” may be beneficial to animals.  See, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 143, 148–149 (Cass R. Sunstein & 
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause they use and value 
animals, owners will spend resources for their protection,” such that “[o]ver broad 
areas of human endeavour, the ownership of animals has worked to their 
advantage”).  Of course, any indirect benefit that animals may experience to the 
extent that they hold value to their human owners does not amount to private law 
recognition of animals’ interests.  Moreover, in the case of farmed animals, 
especially in industrial-scale agricultural operations, relations of economic 
exploitation diminish the likelihood of alignment between animal and owner 
interests.  See Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Subjects: Beyond Interest-
Convergence, Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 79–80 (2009). 
40 See Margit Livingston, Desecrating the Ark: Animal Abuse and the Law’s Role 
in Prevention, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1, 21–29 (2001) (noting that, in the United States, 
19th century anti-cruelty laws were generally interpreted by courts “under the 
rubric of property” or as emphasizing that “cruelty was degrading to the human 
perpetrator, the human witnesses, and society as a whole”).  
41 See, e.g., Regina v. D.L.W., [2016] 1 S.C.R. 402, para. 140; see also Jessica 
Eisen, Animals in the Constitutional State, 15 ICON: INT’L J. CONST. L. 909, 911–
923 (2018) (offering a broader cross-jurisdictional account of legal attention to 
animal interests). 
42 See, e.g., The Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131. 
43 See, e.g., id. at § 2131(1). 
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impartiality and accountability.44  Because animals lack access to 
human language, they are especially vulnerable to having their 
interests overlooked in legal and political processes as they are 
currently structured.45  The traditional democratic mechanisms 
through which state power is held to account—elections and 
litigation—are not directly available to animals to contest inadequate 
or unfair conduct.46  Elsewhere, I have argued that animals therefore 
experience “radical vulnerability” within contemporary legal 
systems: they are both subject to ongoing state-sanctioned harm, and 
practically excluded from both law-making and rights-
enforcement.47   
Because animals are not legally empowered to press the 
private dimensions of their own individual interests,48 the public 
character of animal protection demands heightened acknowledgment 
and institutional fortification.  Effective protection of animal 
interests depends on animal advocates having meaningful access to 
processes that assure the sufficiency and implementation of 
standards.  In public law terms, this requires that standard-setting 
 
44 See Michael Taggart, The Province of Administrative Law Determined?, in THE 
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 3–4 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997) 
(summarizing that “[t]he list of public law values includes openness, fairness, 
participation, impartiality, accountability, honesty and rationality”). 
45 Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42.  Some scholars have argued that this structural 
exclusion of animals from political and legal decision-making can and should be 
reformed.  See, e.g., SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS: A POLITICAL 
THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 255 (2011) (calling for recognition of “animals not 
just as individual subjects entitled to respect of their basic rights, but as members 
of communities—both ours and theirs—woven together in relations of 
interdependency, mutuality and responsibility”); Will Kymlicka & Sue Donaldson, 
Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 207 
(2014); Alasdair Cochrane, SHOULD ANIMALS HAVE POLITICAL RIGHTS? 90–91 
(2020); Robert Garner, Animals, Politics and Democracy, in THE POLITICAL TURN 
IN ANIMAL ETHICS 103, 115 (Robert Garner & Siobhan O’Sullivan eds., 2016). 
46 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 925–29. 
47 Id. at 941-946.  For other scholarly treatments of animal “vulnerability,” see, 
e.g., Maneesha Deckha, Vulnerability, Equality, and Animals, 27 CANADIAN 
J. WOMEN & L. 47 (2015); Satz, supra note 39. 
48 Scholars have debated whether legal standing for animals should be either 
acknowledged or expanded as a means of allowing animals, through their 
representatives, to enforce legal interests or rights.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, 
Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1333 
(2000); Kelsey Kobil, When it Comes to Standing, Two Legs are Better than Four, 
120 PENN. ST. L. REV. 621 (2016).  Even if such standing were recognized, 
however, the legal rights and interests in question would (absent dramatic 
transformation of animals’ legal status) remain public law protections.  Moreover, 
the effective advancement and enforcement of legal standards by animals’ 
representatives would continue to require transparent, impartial and accountable 
institutions. 
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authority be entrusted to institutions that value impartiality, 
accountability, and transparency.49 
The first of these principles, impartiality, represents a core 
public law value relevant to animal protection law.  Impartiality 
requires that decision-makers not decide matters in their own self-
interest, a principle rooted in the idea that “a judge should neither 
judge her own cause nor have any interest in the outcome of a case 
before her (nemo judex in sua causa debet esse).”50  Impartiality has 
been a particularly fraught moral and legal concept, particularly 
insofar as it might seem to imply the possibility of a “view from 
nowhere,” concealing the standpoint of privileged speakers in the 
process.51  In the case of animal protection, we might think it 
impossible to find a truly impartial or disinterested human decision-
maker, given the widespread human consumption of animal 
products.52  But a narrower conception of impartiality—foreclosing 
decision-making by those with a direct financial stake in the 
outcome—is also at stake in dairy governance. To the extent that 
dairy producers have economic incentives to intensify dairy 
operations in ways that prioritize efficiency over animal well-being, 
the value of impartiality weighs against granting them the authority 
to set standards of animal care.53 
 
49 See Jessica Eisen, Beyond Rights and Welfare: Democracy, Dialogue, and the 
Animal Welfare Act, 51 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 469, 481–485 (2018). See generally 
Eisen, supra note 41.   
50 Laverne A. Jacobs, Tribunal Independence and Impartiality: Rethinking the 
Theory after Bell and Ocean Port Hotel—A Call for Empirical Analysis, in 
DIALOGUE BETWEEN COURTS AND TRIBUNALS—ESSAYS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AND JUSTICE (2001–2007) 43, 47–48 (Laverne A. Jacobs & Justice Anne L. 
Mactavish eds., 2008).  Jacobs further notes the connection between impartiality 
and “the notion that decision-making requires a decision-maker to hear and listen 
to both sides of the case before making a decision (audi alteram partem).”  Id.  
Some have distinguished “impartiality” from “independence,” with “impartiality” 
representing a “state of mind” and “independence” invoking the institutional forms 
that assure impartiality.  R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 at para. 15; see also 
Gillies v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 All E.R. 731 at para. 
38 (Baroness Hale).  In this article, I take “impartiality” to embrace both the 
personal and institutional dimensions. 
51 See Kathryn Murphy and Anita Traninger, Introduction: Instances of 
Impartiality, in THE EMERGENCE OF IMPARTIALITY 1, 5–6, 20 (Kathryn Murphy & 
Anita Traninger eds., 2013). 
52 See Matthew Liebman, Who the Judge Ate for Breakfast: On the Limits of 
Creativity in Animal Law and the Redeeming Power of Powerlessness, 18 ANIMAL 
L. 133 (2011). 
53 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 950 (“Human efforts to determine the legal and 
regulatory strategies that best advance the interests of animals are plagued by 
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The second of these values, accountability, connotes “legal 
oversight of public power.”54  While accountability might embrace a 
broad array of values and institutions, I mean here to invoke a 
relatively narrow meaning: that public actors might be called upon to 
justify their decisions, that their justifications may be subject to 
review, and that there may be consequences for failed justification.55  
The principle that exercises of public power must be held to account 
is essential to democracy and the rule of law.56  It is also critical to 
animal protection.  To the extent that animal protection depends upon 
the oversight of human advocates for animal interests, those human 
advocates must have access to legal mechanisms by which to 
challenge decisions respecting standards of animal use and care.  
Transparency is a third public law value that is critical for 
both animal protection and democratic governance more broadly.57  
Transparency refers to the ability of “external stakeholders to 
monitor the internal workings of an organization.”58  While 
transparency may have costs and “trade-offs” in terms of efficiency 
and other values, it is generally accepted that “at very low levels of 
transparency, more transparency is likely to be beneficial” for good 
governance.59  With respect to animal protection, transparency 
 
conflicts of interest, and these conflicts are exacerbated when enforcement 
agencies lack independence from the industries they regulate.”). 
54 CRAIG FORCESE, ADAM DODEK, PHILIP BRYDEN, RICHARD HAIGH, MARY LISTON 
& CONSTANCE MACINTOSH, PUBLIC LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND ANALYSIS 12 
(4th ed., 2020).  Such “legal oversight” (for example, by judges and administrative 
tribunals) is distinguishable from “political oversight” (achieved, for example, 
through periodic elections).  Id. at 10–14. See generally THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas 
Schillemans eds., 2014) (offering an introduction to scholarship on accountability 
as a legal and political value). 
55 Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework, 13 EURO. L.J. 447 (2007) (setting out the definition of accountability 
on which I rely here).  
56 Forcese et al., supra note 54, at 10.  See also Mark E. Warren, Accountability 
and Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 39 
(Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans eds., 2014). 
57 See Anoeska Buijze, The Six Faces of Transparency, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 3, 5 
(2013).   
58 Scott Douglas & Albert Meijer, Transparency and Public Value—Analyzing the 
Transparency Practices and Value Creation of Public Utilities, 39 INT’L J. PUB. 
ADMIN. 940, 940 (2016). 
59 David Heald, Transparency as an Instrumental Value, in TRANSPARENCY: THE 
KEY TO BETTER GOVERNANCE? 59, 59 (Christopher Hood & David Heald eds., 
2006); see also Paul Daly, Administrative Law: A Values-based Approach, in 
PUBLIC LAW ADJUDICATION IN COMMON LAW SYSTEMS: PROCESS AND SUBSTANCE 
23 (John Bell, Mark Elliott, Jason N.E. Varuhas & Philip Murray eds., 2016) 
(identifying transparency as “an important legal value”). 
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(respecting both the conditions of animals’ lives and the processes 
by which those conditions are regulated) is necessary to minimize 
the risk of political erasure arising from animals’ exclusion from 
traditional modes of legal engagement.60  Because animals cannot 
advocate for themselves under current legal arrangements, human 
advocates for animal interests must have some minimal access to 
information in order to hold decision-makers accountable and assure 
adequate substantive protection.61 
Commitments to impartiality, transparency, and 
accountability thus take on a special significance in the animal 
protection context.  These values, however, are generally only 
cognizable as legal commitments where public authority is 
recognized as operative.62  Yet, despite the practical significance of 
public law values to effective animal protection, regulatory regimes 
in Canada and the United States often depend on privatized standard-
setting, concealing public responsibility and minimizing or erasing 
the application of public law values. 
IV.  The Public and the Private In Dairy Governance 
Across Canada and the United States, a variety of regulatory 
regimes govern the protection of farmed animals.  This Part offers a 
survey of these governance approaches, organized according to a 
rough spectrum of legal forms, ranging from the most public (i.e., 
primary legislation) to the most private (i.e., unencumbered 
individual producer choice).  As this survey will demonstrate, 
however, this neat organizational structure belies the messy interplay 
between public and private authority that in fact characterizes this 
 
60 See Eisen, supra note 41, at 951; Eisen, supra note 49. 
61 See Albert Meijer, Transparency, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 507 (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans 
eds., 2014) (examining the relationship between transparency and accountability). 
62 It is, of course, possible for private parties to bind themselves to such principles 
through private contractual obligations.  The U.S. National Dairy FARM program 
and the Dairy Farmers of Canada ProAction Initiative are examples of this form of 
commitment respecting dairy cattle welfare.  See Katelyn E. Mills, Katherine E. 
Koralesky, Daniel M. Weary & Marina A. G. von Keyserlingk, Dairy Farmer 
Advising in Relation to the Development of Standard Operating Procedures, 103 J. 
DAIRY SCI. 11524, 11524 (2020).  Such mechanisms have become matters of 
increasing interest in the fields of international and comparative administrative 
law.  See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 
YALE L.J. 383 (2006).  This article has focused on standard-setting with a 
connection, however tenuous, to generalized legal requirements.  The role of 
voluntary or contractual standard-setting by commodity producer associations 
represents a distinct but equally fascinating case study into agricultural industry 
self-regulation. 
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field of law.  On closer examination, it becomes apparent that even 
the most ostensibly public forms of governance are structured to give 
substantial standard-setting power to animal use industries.  This 
privatization of governing authority comes at the expense of public 
law values that are required for effective animal protection.  
Various legal forms are employed to confer standard-setting 
authority on dairy producers.  In some jurisdictions, this is achieved 
through judicial or statutory deference to the aggregate choices of 
individual producers, expressed as affirmative permission to engage 
in “customary farming practices.”63  In other jurisdictions, private 
bodies comprised largely of producers and their representatives are 
directly or indirectly empowered to set standards for permissible 
conduct.  The following subsections will detail these various 
regulatory forms.  The final subsection of this Part will summarize 
the substantial role that private parties play across these animal 
protection regimes, and the threat that this privatized governance 
poses to public law values such as transparency, impartiality and 
accountability. 
A.  Primary Legislation 
One governance tool employed to protect farmed animals is 
primary legislation.  Farmed animal protection laws are passed either 
through ordinary legislative processes (i.e., by elected 
representatives) or through direct popular referenda in states where 
such lawmaking processes exist.64  Respecting primary legislation, 
the connection to public law values and processes is, in principle, 
relatively clear: legislators are broadly accountable to the electorate 
(not just to any single interest group), and their laws and legislative 
processes are relatively transparent by constitutional design.65  Yet, 
as we will see, legislative provisions protecting farmed animals often 
grant significant de facto or de jure authority to private actors to 
determine the substance of the standards imposed. 
 
63 Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 212. 
64 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ANIMALS ON FARMS 
(2018) at 8–11. 
65 Of course, in practice, these values are often not well safeguarded.  As public 
choice theorists, in particular, have elaborated, legislative processes are often not 
public, transparent or impartial at all.  See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice Theory 
and Legal Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, VOL. 
1: METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTS (Francesco Parisi ed., 2017).  Nonetheless, the 
basic institutions of democratic governance are present, and legislation is among 
the most undeniably public forms of standard-setting. 
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Legislation restricting specific animal use practices on farms 
are exceedingly rare in Canada and the United States.66  Respecting 
dairy cattle, these are limited to legislative prohibitions on routine 
tail docking in California67 and Rhode Island.68  In all other US states, 
and in Canada, the use of primary legislation to protect animals on 
farms is limited to broadly framed provisions, for example 
prohibiting “cruelty” or the causing of “distress” (collectively 
referred to here as “anti-cruelty statutes”).69  In Canada, these include 
both federal criminal prohibitions on cruelty toward animals70 and 
provincial quasi-criminal cruelty prohibitions.71  In the United States, 
 
66 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 8–11. Note that the 
present analysis is restricted to the legal treatment of animals on farms.  More 
detailed legislative and regulatory constraints apply with respect to transport and 
slaughter in both jurisdictions.  In Canada, see Health of Animals Act, S.C. 1990, 
c 21 and Health of Animals Regulations, C.R.C., c 296 (regarding transport); Safe 
Food for Canadians Act, S.C. 2012, c 24 and Safe Food for Canadians Regulation, 
S.O.R./2018-108 (regarding slaughter).  In the United States, see Twenty-Eight 
Hour Law, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (1994) (regarding transport); Humane Methods of 
Slaughter Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1901 (1958) and Humane Slaughter of 
Livestock Regulations, 9 C.F.R. 313 (1987) (regarding slaughter).  For 
commentary on these regimes, see Vaughan Black, Traffic Tickets on the Last 
Ride, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 57, 57–68, 73–79 
(Peter Sankoff, Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015); Sophie Gaillard & 
Peter Sankoff, Bringing Animal Abusers to Justice Independently: Private 
Prosecutions and the Enforcement of Canadian Animal Protection Legislation, in 
CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON ANIMALS AND THE LAW 307, 313–14 (Peter Sankoff, 
Vaughan Black & Katie Sykes eds., 2015) (arguing that private prosecutions might 
also be brought under these statutes); Wolfson & Sullivan supra note 1, at 207–
209. 
67  CAL. PENAL CODE § 597n (West 2010). 
68 4 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4-1-6.1 (West 2012). In addition, there are some 
legislated protections respecting the tethering and confinement of calves, though 
this more commonly impacts the related veal industry. See generally ANIMAL 
WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 9, 11. 
69 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 2; LESLI BISGOULD, ANIMALS 
AND THE LAW 57–123 (2011).  As discussed above, both jurisdictions include 
further regulatory oversight once animals have left the farm, during transport and 
slaughter. See supra note 66.  
70 In Canada, criminal law is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 91(27).  The Criminal Code of 
Canada sets out a number of offences respecting the treatment of animals, 
including a general prohibition against causing unnecessary pain, suffering or 
injury to an animal.  Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 445.1(a). 
71 Provincial governments in Canada are authorized to make law in respect of 
property and civil rights.  Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3, § 92(14). 
Provincial authority to govern the treatment of animals is generally grounded in 
this power, as animals are legally classified as property.  For a survey and 
discussion of Canadian provincial anti-cruelty laws, see BISGOULD, supra note 69, 
at 97-123. 
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these take the form of state-level criminal anti-cruelty laws.72  These 
general anti-cruelty statutes are often structured to exempt common 
agricultural practices from their purview—an exemption that has 
given industry actors a central role in defining the substance of the 
governing legal standards. 
In Canada, the classic case establishing the exemption of 
common agricultural practices from criminal cruelty prohibitions is 
Pacific Meat.73  In that case, the British Columbia County Court was 
called upon to construe a federal Criminal Code provision making it 
a criminal offence to “wilfully cause[] or, being the owner, wilfully 
permit[] to be caused unnecessary pain, suffering or injury to an 
animal or bird.”74  At issue in that case was whether a method of 
slaughtering pigs—in which conscious pigs were hoisted by the leg, 
slammed into a wall and then stuck with a knife—caused pain, 
suffering or injury that was “unnecessary” and so prohibited by the 
criminal law.75  The court held that, while this conduct might 
constitute criminal cruelty outside the slaughterhouse context, in the 
present case there was no “unnecessary” suffering given the 
“necessity of slaughtering hogs to provide food for mankind.”76  
Although the Crown adduced evidence of less-painful slaughter 
methods, the court was not prepared to accept that this made the 
method at issue “unnecessary.”77  In particular, the court was 
persuaded by the fact that all other slaughter houses in Canada, and 
several U.S. slaughterhouses employed this same method.78 
 
72 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 208–09.  In the United States, criminal 
law is generally determined at the state level, rather than by the federal 
government. 
73 Regina v. Pacific Meat Co., [1957] B.C.J. No. 98, para. 14 (B.C. Cty. Ct.). 
74 Criminal Code of Canada, 1953-54, c 51, § 387(1)(a).  That provision has since 
been replaced by the identically phrased Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c 
C-46, § 445.1(a). 
75 See Pacific Meat, [1957] B.C.J. at para. 1–4. 
76 Id. at para. 14. 
77 Id. 
78 Id at para. 10.  The court, on the evidence, was not prepared to find that these 
alternative methods were, in fact, less painful.  Id.  Nonetheless, the case has come 
to stand for the proposition that courts ought to defer to common industry practice 
in defining the scope of the criminal prohibition at issue.  See Sykes, supra note 
26, at 33, 38 (explaining that “an interpretation of the animal cruelty offence has  
. . . become entrenched whereby almost anything done to animals as part of the 
business of producing animal food is exempt from the Code’s application,” though 
disputing the doctrinal basis for this interpretation); see BISGOULD, supra note 69, 
at 71 (explaining that prevailing interpretations of the Criminal Code include a “de 
facto exemption” for farmed animals). 
 
176               JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY               [Vol.16 
 
Since Pacific Meat, the Criminal Code has not generally 
been applied in prosecutions of agricultural operations.79  Instead, 
prosecutions for cruelty tend to proceed under provincial quasi-
criminal anti-cruelty statutes.80 Even with respect to proceedings 
brought under these provincial statutes, however, the Pacific Meat 
protection of common industry practice (sometimes referred to as the 
“implicit farming exemption”81) has continued to operate.  In many 
cases, such exemptions are reflected in the text of provincial anti-
cruelty statutes.82  For example, the Ontario Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act establishes that “[n]o person 
shall cause an animal to be in distress,” but then goes on to specify 
that this prohibition does not apply to “an activity carried out in 
accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of 
agricultural animal care, management or husbandry.”83  Similar 
exemptions for common agricultural practices exist in Alberta,84 
 
79 See Maneesha Deckha, Initiating a Non-Anthropocentric Jurisprudence: The 
Rule of Law and Animal Vulnerability under a Property Paradigm, 50 ALBERTA L. 
REV. 783, 806 n. 152 (2013); Sykes, supra note 26, at 34–35, 40–41 n.36, 49 
(explaining that the Criminal Code provision is “almost invariably” applied in 
cases where “pet dogs and cats” are victims of “acts of pointless sadism or spite,” 
with the exceptional application of the provision to farmed animals occurring only 
in respect of farms that have “stopped functioning as a farm” due to financial ruin); 
BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 74 (reporting that the “criminal law has not generally 
been invoked in the context of the actual practices by which animals are used,” 
including in agriculture, and that “much deference is given to those in industry to 
know best how to handle their animal property”); Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note 
66, at 318 (discussing the reluctance of prosecutors to bring criminal charges 
against agricultural operations). 
80 Gaillard & Sankoff, supra note 66, at 318–319 (explaining that “public 
prosecutors have shown an unwillingness” to lay charges under federal criminal 
anti-cruelty laws, preferring to proceed under provincial quasi-criminal offences 
“even in cases of extreme mistreatment”); Peter Sankoff, Canada’s Experiment 
with Industry Self-Regulation in Agriculture: Radical Innovation or Means of 
Insulation, 5 CANADIAN J. COMPARATIVE & CONTEMPORARY L. 1, 10 n.19 (2019) 
(observing that, following an undercover investigation of a dairy in Chilliwack, 
British Columbia, “[n]othwithstanding what seemed like a clear case of criminal 
level abuse, the workers were only charged and convicted of provincial offences”). 
81 Sykes, supra note 26, at 33. 
82 See Hughes and Meyer, supra note 26, at 63. 
83 Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.O. 1990, c 
O.36, §§ 11.2(1), 11.2(6)(c). In theory, the term “reasonable” could be interpreted 
to carry a meaning independent of “generally accepted,” but in practice courts have 
construed these terms together as providing a blanket exemption for common 
agricultural practices.  See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 13–14. 
84 Animal Protection Act, R.S.A. 2000, c A-41, §§ 2(1)(1.1), 2(1)(2) (providing 
that “[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that 
“[t]his section does not apply if the distress results from an activity carried on in 
accordance with. . . reasonable and generally accepted practices of animal care, 
management, husbandry . . . or slaughter”). 
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British Columbia,85 Nova Scotia,86 and Quebec.87  Consequently, the 
aggregate choices of individual producers become part of the law—
defining through common use which practices are immune from 
prosecution regardless of how harmful they may be to animals. 
In the United States, a similar picture emerges: general anti-
cruelty statutes have been drafted or construed to exempt common 
agricultural practices.  As a result, the collective private choices of 
individual producers effectively become legal standards.  In their 
critique of farmed animal protection in the United States, David 
Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan describe this dynamic as it arose in 
the case of Commonwealth v. Barnes:88 
In Pennsylvania, individuals accused of starving 
horses argued that the practice of denying nutrition 
to horses who were no longer wanted and were to be 
sold for meat was a “normal agricultural operation” 
. . . .  Such horses, the defendants argued, are 
commonly denied veterinary care and sufficient 
nutrition, and are placed in so-called killer pens  
. . . .  While the court did convict the defendants of 
cruelty, it decided to do so only because the 
defendants failed to offer sufficient testimony as to 
the pervasiveness of the practice, and no testimony 
[that they were in fact raising the horses for meat].  
The case highlights the ramifications of the 
exclusion of customary farming practices from 
criminal anticruelty statutes . . . .  The defendants’ 
 
85 Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 372, § 24.02(c) 
(providing that “[a] person must not be convicted of an offence under this Act in 
relation to an animal in distress if . . . the distress results from an activity that is 
carried out in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted practices of 
animal management . . . .”).  Note that British Columbia has additionally 
incorporated the NFACC Codes into its legislative scheme.  See Animal Care 
Codes of Practice Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4; see also infra note 142 and 
accompanying text. 
86 Animal Protection Act, S.N.S. 2008, c 33, §§ 21(1), 21(4) (establishing that 
“[n]o person shall cause an animal to be in distress,” then specifying that this 
prohibition does not apply “if the distress, pain suffering or injury results from an 
activity carried on . . . in accordance with reasonable and generally accepted 
practices of animal management, husbandry or slaughter”). 
87 Animal Welfare and Safety Act, C.Q.L.R., c B-3.1, §§ 6, 7 (establishing that “[a] 
person may not, by an act or omission, cause an animal to be in distress,” then 
stating that this prohibition does not apply in respect of “agricultural activities . . . 
carried on in accordance with generally recognized rules”).   
88 629 A.2d 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
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problem was not that they starved horses, but that 
they could not prove that enough people were doing 
the same thing.89  
Since the time of Wolfson and Sullivan’s writing, the practice of 
codifying explicit customary agricultural practice exemptions has 
only expanded in the United States.90  As a result, primary legislation, 
despite its formal anchoring in public law, places significant 
authority to set legal standards in the hands of private actors. 
B.  Regulation and Delegated Legislation 
Regulations, or “delegated legislation,” represent another 
public law tool governing the lives of farmed animals.  Regulations 
arise where primary legislation has expressly delegated to an agency 
or public body the authority to set precise regulatory standards.  The 
formal role of public law standards and values remains relatively 
clear in cases of regulation or delegated legislation.  Under such 
arrangements, public bodies are bound by enabling legislation, which 
is in turn passed through democratic means.  Although the shape and 
content of public engagement respecting rule-making and standard-
setting differs significantly between Canada and the United States, 
both jurisdictions include some basic procedural requirements that 
are followed in the creation of regulations, and some minimal 
opportunities for judicial and appellate review through which 
citizens might hold public actors accountable to their statutory grants 
of authority.91 
As is the case with primary legislation in both Canada and 
the United States, regulatory prohibitions respecting specific farmed 
animal use practices are extremely rare.  In Canada, provincial 
farmed animal protection regulations are either highly general in 
form or explicitly import standards set by non-governmental entities 
 
89 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 214–215. 
90 See JUSTIN MARCEAU, BEYOND CAGES: ANIMAL LAW AND CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT 98–110 (2019) (surveying common agricultural practice exemptions 
in the United States and explaining that, “[i]f a practice becomes generally 
accepted or customary, no matter how cruel, it cannot, as a matter of law, serve as 
the basis for an animal cruelty prosecution in forty states”). 
91 For a discussion of regulatory oversight in Canada, see Linda Reid, Oversight of 
Regulations by Parliamentarians, 33 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 7, 7–10 
(2010); Lorne Neudorf, Rule by Regulation: Revitalizing Parliament’s Supervisory 
Role in the Making of Subordinate Legislation, 39 CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARY 
REV. 29, 29–31 (2016).  For a discussion of ‘rulemaking’ in U.S. administrative 
law, including a discussion of differences from select parliamentary systems, see 
PETER CANE, CONTROLLING ADMINISTRATIVE POWER: AN HISTORICAL COMPARISON 
ch. 8 (2016). 
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(as discussed in the following subsection).  In the United States, 
however, a small minority of states have delegated law-making 
authority to a public body which has in turn established detailed 
regulations respecting specific agricultural practices.92  These rare 
instances of detailed regulatory protection of animal interests 
arguably represent the strongest importation of enforceable public 
law values into farmed animal protection regimes in Canada and the 
United States.   
New Jersey’s experience with detailed regulation of farmed 
animal protection provides a useful example.  In 1996, the New 
Jersey Legislature amended its anti-cruelty statute to delegate 
standard-setting authority to the New Jersey Department of 
Agriculture (NJDA) and the state Board of Agriculture.93 In 
particular, the amended statute prohibited “cruelty” toward animals 
while also enabling the NJDA and Board of Agriculture to establish 
“safe harbor” provisions that would insulate certain practices from 
legal action under the statute and its regulations.94  In that context, 
the NJDA attempted to create, inter alia, a broad “safe harbor” 
exemption for common agricultural practices and a narrower “safe 
harbor” for tail docking.95  Because the NJDA was bound by a 
substantive statutory mandate, to which it was accountable as a 
matter of public law, the regulatory process and resulting standards 
reflected public law values. 
Consider the impact of public law values on the common 
agricultural practices “safe harbor.”96  First, a relatively transparent 
 
92 See ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra note 64, at 3, 5, 6, 14 (discussing 
delegated authority to set binding standards for the protection of farmed animals in 
New Jersey, Alaska, Arizona and Ohio).  
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(a) (1996) (“The State Board of Agriculture and the 
Department of Agriculture, in consultation with the New Jersey Agricultural 
Experiment Station and within six months of the date of enactment of this act, shall 
develop and adopt, pursuant to the ‘Administrative Procedure Act,’ P.L.1968, 
c.410 (C. 52:14B-1 et seq.): (1) standards for the humane raising, keeping, care, 
treatment, marketing, and sale of domestic livestock; and (2) rules and regulations 
governing the enforcement of those standards.”). 
94 N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955 
A.2d 886, 900 (N.J. 2008); see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:22-16.1(b) (1996) 
(“[T]here shall exist a presumption that the raising, keeping, care, treatment, 
marketing, and sale of domestic livestock in accordance with the standards 
developed and adopted therefor pursuant to subsection a. of this section shall not 
constitute a violation of any provision of this title involving alleged cruelty to, or 
inhumane care or treatment of, domestic livestock.”).   
95 See N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep’t of Agric., 955 
A.2d 886, 903–909 (N.J. 2008). 
96 Id. 
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and accountable process was followed in the development and 
adoption of regulatory standards. Second, the standards themselves 
were subject to judicial review, creating a further layer of 
accountability and transparency, and introducing the courts as 
relatively impartial adjudicators.  Third, the courts’ ultimate decision 
respecting the safe harbor constrained the role of private producers, 
in part out of concern that producers’ economic incentives made 
them ill-suited to impartial standard-setting respecting animal care.   
First, the process by which regulatory standards were 
adopted was relatively transparent and accountable, resulting in a 
final regulation that was somewhat more protective of animal 
interests.  The regulations as originally proposed had defined 
exempted “routine husbandry practices” broadly, as “techniques 
commonly employed and accepted as necessary or beneficial to raise, 
keep, care, treat, market, and transport livestock.”97  This would have 
had the effect of conferring substantive standard-setting authority on 
producers, essentially re-inscribing the common agricultural practice 
exemption found in the anti-cruelty provisions discussed in the 
previous subsection.  In accordance with the New Jersey 
Administrative Procedures Act, however, this initial proposal was 
subject to a public comment period, in which over 6,500 written 
comments were received and various witnesses appeared at a public 
hearing.98  Following extensive criticism of the proposed definition 
of “routine husbandry practices” as both vague and inclusive of 
inhumane practices,99 the definition of “routine husbandry practices” 
was redefined in the promulgated regulation as “techniques 
commonly taught by veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and 
agricultural extension agents.”100  This public process therefore 
resulted in a regulatory definition of prohibited conduct that was a 
degree removed from a direct conferral of authority on the collective 
choices of individual producers.  The process itself, moreover, was 
relatively transparent and accountable to the public. 
Second, the standards adopted by the regulators were subject 
to judicial review, further demonstrating and bolstering the presence 
of public law values in the New Jersey scheme.  The conferral of 
authority on “veterinary schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural 
extension agents” to define acceptable “routine husbandry 
practices,” although narrower than the initially proposed definition, 
 
97 35 N.J. Reg. 1877 (May 5, 2003). 
98 36 N.J. Reg. 2586(a) (June 7, 2004).  
99 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905. 
100 Id. at 904.  
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was nonetheless challenged in judicial review proceedings.101 The 
petitioners, including several animal advocacy groups, argued that 
the safe harbor provisions for routine husbandry practices 
impermissibly delegated authority to private parties (in particular, 
veterinary schools, land grant colleges and agricultural extension 
agents), despite the legislative mandate that the NJDA and Board of 
Agriculture were to determine the content of the “humane” practices 
that would be authorized by the regulations.102  In arguing that the 
regulations impermissibly delegated standard-setting authority to 
these private parties, the petitioners noted that there was no evidence 
that the NJDA scrutinized these entities, individually or as a whole, 
for example through independent assessment of their texts, curricula, 
course offerings or personnel.103  The NJDA, it was argued, thus had 
no evidentiary basis for assuming that the practices taught by these 
entities were “humane,” as required by the enabling legislation, and 
in accordance with the NJDA’s own regulatory definition of 
“humane” as “marked by compassion, sympathy, and consideration 
for the welfare of animals.”104 
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed.105  The court 
described the regulations as “plac[ing] into the hands of this wide-
ranging and ill-defined group of presumed experts the power to 
determine what is humane.”106  The agency’s failure to conduct any 
substantive inquiry into the practices endorsed by these entities left 
the NJDA “without any basis in the record” for their apparent 
 
101 Id. at 903–904.  The legal challenge took the form of an “appeal” to the 
Appellate Division. Id. at 888. Appeals to the Appellate division may be made as 
of right “to review final decisions or actions of any state administrative agency or 
officer, and to review the validity of any rule promulgated by such agency or 
officer” with specified exceptions, none of which applied in this case.  See N.J. CT. 
R. 2:2-3(a)(2).  An earlier appeal, launched prior to the promulgation of the 
amended regulations, had been dismissed without prejudice to allow the parties to 
pursue the matter after the regulations had been promulgated.  See Soc’y for 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 917 n.6. 
102 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904. 
103 Id. at 904–05.  The NJDA countered that it had in fact reviewed some such 
curricular materials, though the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that this 
review did not take place until after the regulations had been promulgated and 
litigation was underway. Id. at 905–06. 
104 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.2(a) (2004); see Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 955 A.2d at 904. 
105 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 904–07.  The 
petitioners were initially unsuccessful before the New Jersey Appellate Division.  
N.J. Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., No. A-
6319-03T1, 2007 WL 486764, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 16, 2007). 
106 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 905. 
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presumption that the practices endorsed by these entities were in fact 
humane.107   
The New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized two distinct but 
interrelated flaws in the routine practices safe harbor exemptions: 
first, that they failed to follow the legislature’s directive that the 
agency authorize only “humane” practices; and, second, that they 
amounted to an impermissible delegation of statutory authority.108  
The court observed that many other jurisdictions have adopted 
welfare laws that exempt routine agricultural practices,109 and that 
the New Jersey legislature explicitly chose a different “specific 
goal,” namely to exempt “humane,” rather than merely “routine” 
practices.110  In the court’s view, “[t]o suggest, as the Department's 
‘routine husbandry practices’ definition implies, that the Legislature 
meant ‘routine’ when it said ‘humane’ would ‘abuse the interpretive 
process and . . . frustrate the announced will of the people.’”111  In 
other words, the public law value of accountability was engaged and, 
because of the regulatory structure in place, enforceable through 
judicial review. 
Third, the public law value of impartiality was relevant to 
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s assessment.  The court was 
particularly troubled by the fact that the “impermissible 
subdelegation” in this instance transferred power to “some entities 
that might also be described as private interests.”112  Dr. Bernard E. 
Rollin, an expert in animal welfare, had filed an amicus brief with 
the court explaining that the private entities in question in fact 
endorsed practices on the basis of their economic productivity, rather 
than on the basis of compassion or concern for animal well-being.113  
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that “there is no evidence 
that [the NJDA] considered the intersection between the interests of 
those who attended these institutions or are taught by them and those 
 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 906–07.   
109 Id.; see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5511(c)(3) (repealed 2015); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-9-201.5(1).  For an overview of customary agricultural practice 
exemptions in the United States, see Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–16. 
110 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906. 
111 Id. (quoting Serv. Armament Co. v. Hyland, 362 A.2d 13, 17 (N.J. 1976)). 
112 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 906. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court relied on the established principle that agencies may not 
subdelegate their statutory powers unless the legislature intends that they may do 
so.  Id.  The court also relied on caselaw demonstrating particular skepticism of 
unauthorized subdelegations to interested parties.  Id.  
113 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 896–97, 904. 
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who are concerned with the welfare of animals.”114  The court 
remarked that it would have been possible for the NJDA to 
incorporate external standards through more deliberate reference to 
specific institutions that the agency determined to be reliable arbiters 
of “humane” treatment.115  As it stood though, the agency “accepted, 
without analysis, the practices that are taught in every veterinary 
school, land grant college, and agricultural extension agent not only 
in this state, but in the rest of the country and, it would appear, 
wherever they might be found around the globe . . . [although] 
nothing in the record suggests that all of them will meet the standard 
set by our Legislature.”116   
In light of this broad, unauthorized, and unaccountable 
delegation of authority, the court struck down the safe harbor 
exemptions for routine husbandry practices as representing 
“arbitrary and capricious” agency action.117  Following this ruling, 
the agency passed a revised regulation, prescribing an open list of 
specific “science-based” sources and standards, which “may be 
found to be humane.”118  By specifically identifying particular 
“science-based” sources, the agency narrowed its reliance on private 
parties as arbiters of “humane” conduct, and assigned this role to 
actors defined by their supposed impartiality.119  Moreover, these 
actors’ assessments of “humane” practices no longer gave rise to 
definite “safe harbors,” but were instead merely persuasive (i.e. “may 
 
114 Id. at 906. 
115 Id. at 906–07. 
116 Id. at 907. 
117 Id. 
118 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-1.1(b) (2012) (establishing a presumption that “the 
raising, keeping, care, treatment, marketing and sale of domestic livestock” does 
not constitute “cruelty” or “inhumane care” where it includes practices that “may 
be found to be humane, based upon techniques for necessary livestock 
management and producers included in the following science-based sources or 
other sources, which may be shown to incorporate similar science-based 
standards,” including the Handbook of Livestock Management, (Battaglia, 4th ed., 
2007), and particular publications of the Federation of Animal Science Societies, 
the American Veterinary Medical Association, the American Association of 
Equine Practitioners, the Rutgers School of Environmental and Biological 
Sciences, and the New Jersey Agricultural Experiment Station. 
119 The presumed independence and impartiality of “science-based” sources is 
contested.  See generally SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (1995) (arguing that scientific and legal knowledge 
are interconnected and co-constituting).  Nonetheless, this appeal to “science” 
undeniably represents an embrace of impartiality as a public law value, particularly 
in comparison to the prior scheme’s delegation of authority to parties with more 
direct financial self-interest in lax regulatory standards.  See supra notes 112–113 
and accompanying text. 
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be found to be humane”); the ultimate decision as to whether a 
practice qualified as “humane” was now more clearly in the hands of 
public authorities. 
In addition to challenging the NJDA’s routine agricultural 
practice exemption, the petitioners also challenged a number of more 
particular safe harbor exemptions, including the “tail docking” of 
dairy cows.120  The petitioners argued that the practice of tail docking 
was not “humane” as required by the governing statute, and so its 
inclusion within a safe harbor was beyond the scope of the 
regulator’s authority.121  The NJDA defended its decision on the basis 
that it had responded appropriately to concerns about animal pain 
raised in public comment and that there was some (albeit conflicting) 
evidence to support the view that tail docking might improve milk 
quality and udder health and reduce the spread of disease.122  The 
NJDA further noted that it does in fact “discourage[]” tail docking, 
and intends to monitor the practice with the possibility of banning it 
in the future if it later concludes the practice to be “inhumane.”123  
The NJDA was thus required in the course of judicial review 
proceedings to account for both its decision-making process and its 
ultimate choice as a regulator.  Such transparency and accountability 
exceed that required of producers empowered to set standards 
through the common agricultural practice exemptions to anti-cruelty 
legislation, as discussed in the previous subsection.   
Ultimately, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the 
NJDA’s arguments.  The reviewing court recognized the 
“considerable expertise that the [NJDA] brought to bear in reaching 
its decision to include tail docking within its list of permitted 
practices,” and the very high standard of review that applies to 
agency decisions of this kind.124  Nonetheless, the court concluded 
that the decision to list routine tail docking as a permissible (i.e. 
“humane”) practice was “both arbitrary and capricious,” and so 
outside the scope of the regulator’s authority.125  The court was 
swayed not only by the evidence of the pain and suffering caused by 
the practice, but also by the fact that both the American Veterinary 
Medical Association and the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association  have “specifically disparaged” the practice “as having 
 
120 Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 908. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
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no benefit and as leading to distress.”126  The ambiguity of the 
evidence of any benefit associated with routine tail docking, and the 
fact that the practice was “discourage[d]” by the NJDA, supported 
the court’s finding that shielding tail docking from penalty was 
contrary to the statutory mandate.127  The statutory directive that the 
agency must define “humane” practices required that decisions 
respecting tail docking not be left to the “individual conscience of 
each dairy farmer.”128  Further to this judicial ruling, the governing 
regulation was modified to provide that tail docking of cattle be 
permitted only in individual cases (i.e. not as a routine matter), and 
“only upon determination by a veterinarian for individual 
animals.”129  Again, we see that the regulator was required to be 
transparent about its reasons for setting particular standards, and was 
accountable to an impartial judiciary.  This public law oversight, 
moreover, substantively elevated the governing standards for the care 
of dairy cattle.  
New Jersey’s experience of regulation and review is highly 
unusual in the context of farmed animal protection in Canada and the 
United States, representing a relatively remarkable level of 
protection for public law values.   It is not my intention to suggest 
that dairy cows in New Jersey have good lives, or that the legal 
regime governing producers in that state is acceptable.  It is important 
to emphasize that dairy industries across Canadian and U.S. 
jurisdictions are characterized by extensive social and physical 
control of animals.130  The NJDA and reviewing court were each 
engaged in welfare balancing wherein considerable attention was 
given to whether impugned practices were in fact useful to dairy 
production.131  Tail docking was ultimately impermissible as a 
routine practice because there was no persuasive evidence that it 
benefited dairying.132  Harmful practices that are perceived as 
necessary to industrial dairying—most notably calf separation—are 
not disrupted or even threatened by the New Jersey scheme.133  While 





129 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 2:8-2.6(f) (2012); see ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE, supra 
note 64, at 3. 
130 See supra Part II. 
131 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
132 See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text. 
133 For a discussion of calf separation, see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying 
text. 
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protection, they are certainly not sufficient, especially absent 
substantial democratic commitment to animal interests.134   
Nonetheless, the presence of public law values—
impartiality, transparency and accountability—are remarkable in this 
scheme relative to other forms of farmed animal protection across 
Canada and the United States.  Concerned citizens in New Jersey 
believed that a regulatory body was failing to adhere to its statutory 
mandate in defining “humane” practices.  These citizens were able 
to file suit, bring evidence, and convince a reviewing court that it was 
“arbitrary and capricious” to conclude that routine tail docking was 
“humane,” and that it was similarly “arbitrary and capricious” to 
assume that the practices endorsed by “veterinary schools, land grant 
colleges, and agricultural extension agents” ought to be trusted as 
necessarily “humane.”135 The litigation and ensuing judicial reasons 
engaged with themes of bias, transparency, adequacy of reasons, and 
substantive conformity with legal requirements.  In short, the 
governing regime was legible as an operation of public power, and, 
as such, public law values were understood by all involved to be both 
relevant and operative.   
C.  Private or Quasi-Private Standards 
Canada’s National Farm Animal Care Council (NFACC) 
represents a step further along the rough public-to-private spectrum 
of farmed animal protection tools: formal but private (or quasi-
private) standard-setting bodies.  Such bodies may be recognized 
through statute, regulation or judicial assessment as setting 
persuasive or authoritative standards for animal care.  But these 
bodies themselves are not legally bound to public law values.  As the 
NFACC case study demonstrates, such entities may choose to adopt 
processes that have elements of transparency, accountability or 
impartiality, but these choices are not subject to public law 
enforcement. 
NFACC is wholly funded by government, but not created or 
constrained by statute or regulations.136  NFACC is comprised of 
 
134 See infra Part V.  See also Eisen, supra note 49 (arguing that democratic 
engagement is necessary to enforcing and strengthening animal protection 
standards). 
135 See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07.  
136 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 17 (“From the start, the endeavour has been 
funded by Agriculture Canada, a federal agency, though the government has no 
voting seat at the table, and no official role in the direction of the coalition.  It 
funds the project and has observer status – nothing more.  Other provincial 
 
2020]               PRIVATE FARMS, PUBLIC POWER                  187 
 
commodity producers (including Dairy Farmers of Canada, Dairy 
Processors Association of Canada, and Dairy Farmers of Ontario), 
animal protection groups, the Canadian Veterinary Medical 
Association, and other interested parties, including restaurants and 
retailers, and manufacturers of animal feed.137  The primary function 
of NFACC is the development of “Codes of Practice” (Codes) setting 
out guidelines for the care of farmed animals.138  
Although NFACC Codes use some language suggestive of 
legal compulsion (i.e. “standards” and “requirements”),139 the Codes 
have no independent legal force.140  Their juridical role varies from 
province to province depending on the extent, if any, of legislative 
incorporation.  In some provinces, where no legislative or regulatory 
reference is made to the Codes, they may be relied upon by courts as 
evidence of the “reasonable and generally accepted” practices that 
are routinely exempted from the ordinary operation of anti-cruelty 
statutes.141  In other provinces, the Codes are referentially 
incorporated to provide “safe harbors,” such that compliance with the 
Codes constitutes an absolute defense to a cruelty prosecution.142  
The Codes are not generally incorporated as establishing mandatory 
regulatory standards, although such incorporation is certainly 
possible.143 
 
agriculture ministries have also been involved, though government agencies are 
not permitted to vote on NFACC matters.”). 
137 Id. at 16–17. 
138 See id. at 18. 
139 Id. at 18, 32–33, 48–49; see also Implementing Codes of Practice, NFACC.CA 
(2013), http://www.nfacc.ca/resources/assessment/ 
animal_care_assessment_framework.pdf. 
140 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 18–19. 
141 See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 35, 37 n.122 (discussing R. v. Dondale, 2017 
SKPC 58 as a case in which “failing to follow the code of practice, in conjunction 
with other evidence, established that the animals were in distress for the purposes 
of the Act”); id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Kowalik, 2010 SKPC 58 and R. v. 
Tomalin, 2011 NBPC 29 as cases that demonstrate that courts are strongly 
influenced by NFACC Codes). But see id. at 35 n.118 (discussing R. v. Van 
Dongen, 2004 BCPC 479 and R. v. Hurley, 2017 ONCJ 263 as emphasizing 
NFACC compliance is neither mandatory nor determinative of compliance with 
the law). 
142 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 19; see, e.g., Animal Care Codes of Practice 
Regulation, B.C. Reg. 34/2019, § 4 (establishing that “the requirements and 
recommendations contained in a [listed] code of practice [including the 2009 
NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle] are 
recognized as reasonable and generally accepted” for the purposes of the statutory 
customary agricultural practices exemption). 
143 See Sankoff, supra note 80, at 20.  For examples of mandatory incorporation of 
Codes, see Animal Protection Standards Regulations, Nfld. Reg. 36/12, §§ 2(2) & 
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The NFACC “Code development process” sets out a number 
of procedural and substantive requirements for Codes.144  These 
include, for example, that Codes “should meet or exceed [World 
Organisation for Animal Health] standards,” should be based on “the 
best available science and other acceptable knowledge sources,” and, 
wherever possible, should include reasons for standards imposed.145  
The Code process is initiated by commodity groups themselves, for 
example the Dairy Farmers of Canada.146  An expert scientific report 
is first prepared, setting out major animal welfare concerns in a given 
industry.147  A draft Code is then developed by a Code Committee 
with a specified composition, and made available for a 60-day public 
consultation period.148  If that process is “appropriately followed,” 
the NFACC Executive “will support the Code,” and a final Code will 
be issued.149  There is, however, no mechanism by which to hold the 
NFACC process accountable to these requirements, through judicial 
review or otherwise.150 
NFACC’s treatment of calf separation and tail docking 
demonstrate the limits of this regulatory model.  First, the Code’s 
approach to tail docking illustrates the weakness of Code 
“requirements.”  Second, the Code’s approach to calf separation 
demonstrates the strength of producer interests in defining Codes that 
 
5 (establishing that a “code or standard adopted in these regulations may be 
considered a requirement” where the code contains mandatory language, and 
“adopt[ing]” aspects of the NFACC Code of Practice for the Care and Handling of 
Dairy Cattle); Animal Welfare Regulations, P.E.I. Reg. EC194/17, § 26, sched. B 
(requiring out that “[e]very owner of a commercial animal shall comply with the 
codes of practice listed in Schedule B,” including the Code of Practice for the 
Care and Handling of Dairy Cattle). NFACC specifies that Code requirements 
“may be enforceable under federal and provincial legislation” and that producers 
“may be compelled by industry associations to undertake corrective measures or 
risk a loss of market options.” Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of 
Farm Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-development-
process.  Such possible incorporation into legislative or voluntary standards are, 
however, not intrinsic to the Codes themselves.  See Sankoff, supra note 84, at 23. 
144 Development Process for Codes of Practice for the Care and Handling of Farm 
Animals, NFACC.CA (2020), https://www.nfacc.ca/code-development-process 
[hereinafter Development Process for Codes]; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at 
22–23. 
145 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
146 Id. 
147 Id.   
148 Id.   
149 Id. 
150 See Sankoff, supra note 80 at 4–5 (observing that NFACC is “a major player on 
the Canadian law-making scene” despite “an organizational framework that lacks 
many of the traditional checks and balances of a legislative body, and the fact that 
what the group produces is not actually law, in the strict sense of the word”). 
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prioritize industry imperatives over animal well-being—and the 
absence of protection for public law values in spite of this predictable 
outcome. 
The Dairy Code of Practice (2009) takes preambular note of 
the lack of evidence supporting tail docking as a hygiene measure, 
and the research demonstrating that “[d]ocked heifers show signs of 
chronic pain,” among other possible complications.151  The Code sets 
out as a “requirement” that “[d]airy cattle must not be tail docked 
unless medically necessary,”152 and sets out a number of alternative 
“recommended best practices,” including “switch trimming” (i.e. 
trimming the hair on cows’ tails) and maintenance of a clean housing 
environment.153  As noted above, however, the language of 
“requirement” should not be taken to define a mandatory legal 
standard in the absence of formal incorporation into a provincial 
regulation.154  The Code’s use of the word “requirement” carries no 
independent legal force.155 
The Dairy Code of Practice further acknowledges calf 
separation as a source of “stress,” but does not provide for any 
“requirements” in relation to this practice.156  The Code’s preambular 
statement on “Calves” explains: 
Generally, dairy calves are separated from their 
mothers shortly after birth. There are benefits to both 
calf and dam by allowing the pair to bond. Allowing 
the calf to spend a longer period of time with the 
dam may result in lowered morbidity and mortality 
in the calf; however, separation stress to both the 
cow and calf will be higher the longer they are 
together. Cow health is generally improved by 
allowing the calf to suckle (related to oxytocin 
effects on the post partum uterus). Whether the calf 
is removed immediately or allowed to suckle the 
cow, it is important to ensure that the calf receives 
adequate colostrum.157  
 
151 Code of Practice for the Handling of Dairy Cattle, NFACC.CA § 4.6 (2009), 
https://www.nfacc.ca/codes-of-practice/dairy-cattle/code#Section4 [hereinafter 
Dairy Code of Practice]. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
155 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
156 Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 3.8. 
157 Id. (citations omitted). 
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The “recommended” practices that follow include monitoring the 
calf for signs of illness during its early days, and the recommendation 
that farmers “reduce separation distress by either removing the calf 
shortly after birth or by using a two-step weaning process.”158   
The notional (but not generally legal) force that “required” 
practices may have do not apply to such recommended practices.159  
In fact two-step weaning processes remain rare, with most dairy 
calves separated immediately from their mothers despite the 
associated “stress.”160  The sole social “requirement” set out for 
calves is that they “have visual contact with other calves.”161  It is 
further recommended that their “motivation to suck” be satisfied with 
an artificial teat.162  The acknowledged scientific consensus on the 
stress of separation, and the lack of associated “requirements” (even 
in the diminished form represented by the Code), reflects the interests 
of producers and production imperatives in the Code process.   
However, unlike under the New Jersey regime, the NFACC 
delegation of authority to producers is not legible as a public law 
concern amenable to judicial oversight.  NFACC, although funded 
entirely by government, and created for the purpose of setting 
standards contemplated to have legal effect, thus represents a step 
away from the public law values evident in the New Jersey scheme.  
Because NFACC does not operate pursuant to statutory authority, it 
cannot be made accountable as the NJDA was in respect of its 
decision to allow routine tail docking.  Arguments that NFACC is 
biased, lacks transparency, or makes unreasonable decisions are not 
cognizable as justiciable questions of public law.  Formally, NFACC 
is merely a private body, making private choices, unaccountable to 
the mechanisms that constrain public power.  This is true despite the 
fact that NFACC is created to, and does in fact, generate Canada’s 
only detailed articulation of standards for legally permissible 
treatment of farmed animals.163 
There is no legal basis on which to demand adherence to 
public law values—such as transparency, accountability and 
impartiality—in NFACC standard-setting.  These values do, 
 
158 Id. 
159 See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text. 
160 Emillie M. Bassi, Ellen Goddard & John R. Parkins, “That’s the Way We’ve 
Always Done It”: A Social Practice Analysis of Farm Animal Welfare in Alberta, 
32 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 335, 346–47 (2019). 
161 Dairy Code of Practice, supra note 151, at § 1.1.1. 
162 See id. at § 2.2.1. 
163 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5. 
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however, arguably remain operative in an attenuated form.  Because 
NFACC is designed to have many of the trappings of a conventional 
administrative body, NFACC offers some assurances of 
transparency, structured decision-making, and reason-giving—albeit 
assurances that are not subject to judicial or administrative 
supervision.  NFACC, for example, promises to follow a specific 
process for developing its Codes,164 binds itself to consider some 
kinds of evidence,165 includes requirements for the composition of 
Code Committees,166 commits to the regular review of Codes,167 and 
publishes draft Codes for comment before ultimately making its final 
Codes transparently available to the public.168  The fact that judicial 
review is unavailable, however, limits the confidence that might 
reasonably be placed in these voluntary processes and commitments. 
D.  Private Choices of Individual Actors 
In the absence of express legal requirements to the contrary 
(which, as we have seen, are rare), individual producers may decide 
to dock the tails of cattle on their farms, or separate calves from their 
mothers, or otherwise engage in common agricultural practices 
despite their harm to dairy animals.169  At first blush, these may 
appear to be purely private choices.  In legal terms, we might think 
of these as producers’ private decisions as to how to dispose of their 
own property.  But, as we have seen, even these purest of private 
actions carry a law-making function in the context of animal 
protection as it is structured in most jurisdictions.  This is because, 
as discussed above, almost every jurisdiction has incorporated 
“customary agricultural practices” as the governing legal standard 
for defining exemptions to criminal and quasi-criminal anti-cruelty 
laws—including in jurisdictions where those laws are the only ones 
governing the treatment of animals on farms.170  In most 
jurisdictions, therefore, dairy producers’ private, profit-seeking 
decisions carry a double valence for the lives of farmed animals.  
These private producer choices not only shape the experiences of the 
animals they own themselves, but they also contribute to setting the 
 
164 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.; see also Sankoff, supra note 80, at 28 (arguing that this establishment of 
periodic review enhances public deliberation on the legal treatment of farmed 
animals).  
168 Development Process for Codes, supra note 144. 
169 See supra Part II for a review of harmful dairy industry practices. 
170 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212–216; supra notes 64–90 and 
accompanying text. 
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legal standards that govern the treatment of farmed animals more 
generally.   
Because this form of standard-setting power is so diffuse and 
indirect, the force of public law values is negligible.  There is no 
expectation that individual dairy producers will be transparent with 
respect to how they treat their herds, let alone how they arrive at 
decisions respecting animal care.  In fact, across jurisdictions, the 
proliferation of “ag gag” laws affirmatively protect producers’ ability 
to shield their operations from public scrutiny.171  There is further no 
expectation that they will be impartial when making choices 
respecting animal care.  Producers are not bound, even notionally, to 
any public obligation to weigh competing values in setting standards 
for animal care.  They are, instead, legally authorized and expected 
to maximize their own interests in dairy productivity, with their 
resulting choices elevated to the level of de facto legal standards.  
Finally, with no public obligations to impartiality or transparency, 
there are no substantive commitments to which they might be made 
accountable, and no mechanism for public law accountability.  
E.  Dairy Cow Protection and Public Law Values  
The foregoing survey elaborates the various forms of legal 
oversight engaged by Canadian and U.S. jurisdictions to protect the 
interests of dairy cows.  Although organized around the formality of 
lawmaking authority involved (beginning with legislation and 
ending in practice or custom), this survey has demonstrated that, in 
reality, there are significant interactions and overlaps between these 
forms of governance.  These regulatory environments represent, in 
Jody Freeman’s terms, case studies of “regulatory regimes,” in which 
the classical administrative law distinction between “public” and 
“private” seems to blur, with private actors directly or indirectly 
engaged in public or quasi-public functions.172  In particular, we have 
seen that, across jurisdictions, the aggregate choices of individual 
agricultural producers have a significant impact on the substance of 
legal standards respecting the treatment of farmed animals. 
Scholars and animal advocates have long argued that this 
state of affairs gives farmers effectively unrestricted control over the 
 
171 See Jodi Lazare, Ag-Gag Laws, Animal Rights Activism, and the Constitution: 
What is Protected Speech? 58 ALBERTA L. REV. 83 (2020); Justin F. Marceau, Ag 
Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317 (2015). 
172 See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New 
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 816–19 (2000). 
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lives of the animals in their care.173  Such criticisms often emphasize 
that, given producers’ incentives to prioritize economic efficiency 
over animal well-being, this amounts to putting the proverbial 
“foxes” in charge of the “henhouse.”174   
I suggest here that this fox-in-charge-of-the-henhouse 
problem is one instance of a broader set of concerns respecting 
farmed animal protection: that public law values are inadequately 
guarded in this context.  Deficits of public law values such as 
impartiality, transparency and accountability are particularly 
problematic where animals are an affected constituency.  Animal 
experience lacks even the most basic recognition as a matter of 
private law.175  And public law, which has so far been the sole forum 
for legal recognition of animal interests, is only capable of providing 
robust protection where animals’ particular vulnerabilities are taken 
into account.176  Animals—who do not vote or hold office or instruct 
counsel—are likely to have their interests protected only where 
interested human voters, litigators and activists have the information 
and legal tools necessary to assure that protection.  In other words, 
effective animal protection is possible only in settings where 
decision-making is relatively impartial, transparent and 
accountable.177  
 Yet despite the importance of public law values to effective 
animal protection, legal regulation of farmed animal use has not 
generally nourished these values.  Exceptionally, in New Jersey, a 
generalized regulatory reliance on the judgments of “veterinary 
schools, land grant colleges, and agricultural extension agents” was 
justiciable, and ultimately found to be an impermissible delegation 
of authority to define standards of animal care, in part because of 
these parties’ interest in the economic exploitation of animals.178  But 
this lack of impartiality was only visible as a legal “problem” because 
of the structure of the particular statutory regime, the United States’ 
more developed judicial constraints on rulemaking processes,179 and 
because of the legislature’s choice to bring animal protection out of 
 
173 See BISGOULD, supra note 69, at 173–74; Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 
226.  
174 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 1, at 212-219. 
175 See supra Part III. 
176 See supra Part III. 
177 See supra Part III. 
178 See Soc’y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 955 A.2d at 903–07; supra Part 
IV.B. 
179 See sources cited supra note 91. 
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the sphere of broad criminal or quasi-criminal prohibition,180 and into 
the realm of more detailed public regulation.181 
More commonly, standard-setting respecting the treatment 
and use of farmed animals is left in the hands of entities like 
NFACC,182 or even the aggregate choices of individual producers, 
who are not bound to public law values.183 Although the NFACC 
process is entirely publicly funded, governments play no substantive 
role in establishing Code standards.184  The Code development 
process includes many of the trappings of a regulatory process 
(procedural requirements, public comment periods, substantive 
parameters, etc.), but these ostensible requirements are not subject to 
oversight or enforcement through judicial review proceedings.185  
The resulting process is unlike a statutory delegation of legislative 
authority, for example to professional associations: there is no 
delegating statute constraining the exercise of rulemaking or 
standard-setting, and no judicial oversight, despite the fact that the 
NFACC process does, and is contemplated to, generate standards 
with legal force.186 
 
180 See supra Part IV.A.  For a broader critique of criminal and carceral approaches 
to animal protection, see generally MARCEAU, supra note 90. 
181 See supra Part IV.B.   
182 See supra Part IV.C. 
183 See supra Part IV.D. 
184 See supra Part IV.C. 
185 See supra Part IV.C.  Such unenforceable methods of implementing public law 
values in privatized regulatory regimes have been scrutinized in administrative law 
scholarship.  See, e.g., MICHAEL TAGGART, THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW 2 (1997); Steven Bernstein, When is Non-State Global Governance Really 
Governance?, 1 UTAH L. REV. 91, 91, 93 (2010) (arguing that many forms of non-
state government do not function as “meaningful governance”); Francesca 
Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New 
Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 859, 860–61 
(2011); Cary Coglianese & Evan Mendelson, Meta-Regulation and Self-
Regulation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 146, 146–68 (Robert 
Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge eds., 2010); Freeman, supra note 177, at 
816–19; Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. 
& ADMIN. L. 291, 298–326 (2014); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as 
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2003) (assessing whether and how 
private delegations might remain constitutionally accountable in the absence of 
judicial oversight); Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation 
More than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 
ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 361, 361 (2010) (describing conditions under which self-
regulation is more or less effective, and concluding that self-regulation cannot 
fully replace direct legal enforcement mechanisms). 
186 Sankoff, supra note 80, at 4–5, 24 n.82 (referring to NFACC as a “body 
performing a government function of setting standards”). 
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Even more starkly, the prevalence of common agricultural 
practice exemptions to cruelty provisions across Canada and the 
United States effectively endows producers themselves with the 
authority to set standards of animal care.187  It may be the case that 
these farmers are effectively defining the substance of farmed animal 
protection law, but they are not subject in this function to any 
structured public oversight whatsoever.  Unlike primary legislation, 
these choices are not made by elected representatives.  Unlike 
regulation, they are not legally bound to follow any substantive or 
procedural requirements. Unlike private or quasi-private standard-
setting, there is not even a voluntary or implied commitment to 
embrace any public purposes whatsoever—or to articulate and 
defend decisions made.188   
In sum, standard-setting in the sphere of farmed animal 
protection is often left in the hands of actors who are legally welcome 
and expected to act in their own self-interest, rather than in the 
interests of animals, or in accordance with any other public-regarding 
interests; who are not required to explain or even publicly reveal their 
choices in any systematic way; and who are not generally 
accountable to any statute or public body.  Under this common model 
of standard-setting in the farmed animal protection context, the 
operation of public law values—including transparency, 
accountability, and impartiality—dwindles and effectively 
disappears. 
V.  Conclusion 
Dairy cows are radically vulnerable beings.189  They are 
subject to routinized, large-scale and deeply intimate harms in every 
area of their lives.190  Their sex, birth, and nursing are, in particular, 
meticulously controlled as the engines of vast economic and political 
machines constructed and directed by human beings.191  Like other 
farmed animals, they are particularly vulnerable to the private 
authority that their legal owners exercise over their lives and bodies, 
and to public law institutions, which they have no direct power to 
shape.   
 
187 See supra Part IV.A. and Part IV.D. 
188 The sole minimal exception would appear to be that some farmers may choose, 
on an individual basis, to bring their practices into the judicial and public-law 
spotlight by testifying as to their own practices in order to assist in the defence of 
another farmer charged with cruelty for a similar practice. 
189 Eisen, supra note 41, at 941–42; see supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
190 See supra Part II. 
191 See supra Part II. 
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Meaningful legal protection of animal interests requires 
recognition of public law values.  Impartiality, transparency, and 
accountability facilitate public engagement on the part of democratic 
and litigation constituencies beyond those who have a direct financial 
interest in the unencumbered exploitation of animals.  Yet, as we 
have seen, significant regulatory and standard-setting authority 
across Canada and the United States has been effectively ceded to 
producers, with exemptions for common agricultural practices 
serving as only the most extreme (and most common) example.  
These privatized modes of standard-setting leave vanishingly little 
role for the public law values necessary to effective farmed animal 
protection. 
The choice across jurisdictions to establish some veneer of 
constraint on industry, while at the same time allowing industry to 
substantially determine governing standards, raises questions.  Why 
are farmed animals regulated in this way, despite the apparent 
importance of transparency, impartiality and accountability to 
effective protection?  One possibility is that governments and 
democratic majorities feel a moral imperative to protect animals, but 
this imperative is significantly tempered by an ambivalence as to the 
consequences of more interventionist regulation.  The price and 
availability of agricultural products, including perhaps especially 
dairy,192 is weighted heavily in the policy balance.  If, however, we 
wish to take seriously the experiences of the animals whose lives are 
so thoroughly determined by their positions as farmed animals, the 
public law dimensions of our commitments must be more 
consciously and more consistently defended. 
 
192 See Mathilde Cohen, Of Milk and the Constitution, 40 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
115, 119–21 (2017). 
 
 
The U.S. Dairy Industry in 
the 20th & 21st Century 
 




At the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. dairy industry 
was comprised of millions of small-scale operations producing for 
their own or for very local consumption. By the end of the 20th 
Century, the industry was dominated by large-scale producers 
marketing products via large cooperatives. Improvements in 
transportation, advances in animal breeding and feeding 
technologies, and scale economies have allowed the industry to be 
more competitive on global markets, where there is now active 
international trade in dairy products. Major government programs to 
support dairy farm income date back to Depression-era problems 
facing the industry. Federal programs to support dairy income led to 
recurring problems of overproduction. Programs initially instituted 
to protect dairy producers from oligopsony power of purchasers now 
have more questionable effects given industry concentration. 
Increased market concentration has led to ongoing antitrust scrutiny 
of the industry, while geographic concentration of production has 
raised concerns over water and air pollution. At the outset of the 21st 
Century, increased productivity has made the dairy industry less 
reliant on government programs and more reliant on global markets. 
Yet the industry faces many challenges: greater scrutiny over 
greenhouse gas emissions, secular declines in milk prices and U.S. 
per capita milk consumption, reduced viability of small-scale 
operations, and the rise of plant-based milk substitutes. Still, dairies 
and dairy products remain an important part of U.S. agriculture and 
U.S. household food consumption. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The U.S. dairy industry at the beginning of the 20th Century 
was characterized by diffuse production and geographically 
concentrated consumption.1 By the end of the century, it was 
characterized by concentrated production, with nationally and 
 
 Professor, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of 
Arizona. 
1 See M. R. Weimer & D. P. Blayney, Landmarks in the U.S. Dairy Industry, 694 
AGRIC. INFORMATION BULL. 1, 3–4 (1994). The United States Department of 
Agriculture provides statistical data through the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service that may be access publicly online. See generally Quick Stats, NAT’L 
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ (last visited February 9, 
2020). 
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globally diffused marketing for consumption.2 Numerous 
technological advances enabled this transformation.3  The federal 
and state governments have also actively intervened in U.S. dairy 
markets.4 Many laws and programs enacted in response to income 
and market problems facing dairy producers at the beginning of the 
century and during the Great Depression remain in effect today.5 Several 
critics have questioned the need for and value of such programs in 
light of modern market realities.6 For example, government 
programs to raise dairy prices have led to waves of overproduction, 
which led to the slaughter of dairy herds.7 As the industry became 
increasingly comprised of larger-scale producers and marketing 
cooperatives, it has faced ongoing antitrust scrutiny from the U.S. 
Department of Justice.8 The rise of farm-level and geographical 
concentration has also presented problems of air and water pollution.9  
 
At the outset of the 21st Century, increased productivity has 
made the dairy industry less reliant on government programs and 
more reliant on global markets.10 Yet, the industry faces many 
challenges: greater scrutiny over greenhouse gas emissions, secular 
declines in milk prices and U.S. per capita milk consumption, 
reduced viability of small-scale operations, and the rise in plant-
based milk substitutes.11 Still, dairies and dairy products remain an 
 
2 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. at 17–18. 
5 ERIC M. ERBA & ANDREW M. NOVAKOVIC, THE EVOLUTION OF MILK PRICING AND 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN DAIRY MARKETS 14 (Cornell Program on Dairy 
Mkts. and Policy, EB 95-05, 1995). 
6 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and Goals of 
Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REV. 662, 663 
(1978). 
7 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13. 
8 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 674. 
9 JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE 
OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 
2007). 
10 See DANIEL A. SUMNER, DAIRY POLICY PROGRESS: COMPLETING THE MOVE TO 
MARKETS 9 (2018). 
11 NIGEL KEY & STACY SNEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE ADOPTION OF 
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011). Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. 
Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks for Investments in Dairy 
Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018). HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE 
AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK? A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL 
DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research 
Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013). HAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK, 
DAIRY AND POULTRY OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A 
LOOK AT SALES OF COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017). JAMES M. MACDONALD 
ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. 
S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 2007). 




important part of U.S. agriculture and U.S. household food 
consumption.12 
 
II. The U.S. Dairy Industry at the Beginning of the 20th 
Century  
 
At the beginning of the 20th Century, households produced 
milk primarily for home consumption, while markets for milk were 
not yet well developed.13 While most farms had cows, production 
was small-scale and diffuse.14 By 1920, five million US farms had 
dairy cows (compared to 54 thousand today).15 In 1930, 70% of US 
farms had dairy cows, yet sale of dairy products accounted for a 
relatively small share of farm household income.16 Among all farms 
with cows, dairy sales accounted for more than 40% of total farm 
sales on only 14%.17  
 
The scope for marketing dairy products increased with 
improvements in technology and infrastructure.18 Refrigerated tanker 
cars allowed rail shipments of milk across longer distances, allowing 
transportation of milk from rural areas to fast-growing urban ones.19  
The introduction of trucks and improved roads gave producers 
greater flexibility and control in milk shipping.20 Production of 
evaporated milk, processed cheese, and butter, which were less 
perishable than fluid milk, all became more widespread.21 There was 
more scope for storing and marketing these processed products over 
greater distances.22 But, after World War I, European demand for those 
U.S. dairy products that could be preserved and shipped more easily 
dropped, leading to falling dairy prices.23 
 
 
12 M. SWEITZER ET AL., FOOD-AT-HOME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL 
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017). NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS 
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 
HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1 (2019), 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.   
13 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1. 
14 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
15 For historical numbers, see id. at 3. For current numbers, see Quick Stats, supra 
note 1.  
16 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
17 Id. 
18 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
19 Id. at 1. 
20 Id. 
21 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
22 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1 and 4. 
23 Id. at 4. 
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Moreover, many barriers remained to permit orderly 
marketing of milk.24 First, farm households lacked many basic 
resources: only 58% had cars, 25% had telephones, and 33% had 
electricity.25 Few farms then had refrigeration.26 Fluid milk is 
produced daily on dairies.27 Yet, it is highly perishable even with 
refrigeration (which most farms still lacked).28 Without phones, it 
was difficult for farmers to find and negotiate with buyers.29 Prices 
were based on weight and butterfat content, but farmers could not 
know if their milk that was shipped more distantly was being 
weighed and tested fairly by milk purchasers.30 On the other side, 
handlers were not assured the milk they contracted for in advance 
was not soured or tainted.31  
 
Fluid milk was bulky and difficult to transport over long 
distances.32 It is also highly perishable, greatly limiting the space and 
time over which it may be transported and consumed.33 In urban 
centers, there were a relatively small number of large milk buyers 
(called handlers) purchasing milk from a large number of small, 
unorganized producers.34 This market structure gave handlers 
oligopsony power to push down milk purchase prices below 
competitive levels.35  
 
To countervail this oligopsony power, dairy producers began 
to organize collectively in cooperatives to bargain over the prices of 
dairy products they received.36  Handlers countered this collective 
action in court, arguing that such explicit cooperation by sellers 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.37 The Clayton Act of 
191438 explicitly exempted non-stock agricultural associations from 
antitrust laws, but did not address some of the vague wording of the 
Sherman Act that left the status of cooperative marketing 
 
24 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668–69. 
25 MARYANNA S. SMITH & DENNIS M. ROTH, CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS IN 
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 63 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Info. Bulletin No. 425, 
1990).   
26 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 3. 
27 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5. 
28 Id.; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670. 




33 Id.; see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5. 
34 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
35 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670. 
36 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
37 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2019); see ERBA & 
NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
38 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2019). 




associations ambiguous.39 To partially address this ambiguity, 
Congress annually passed “riders” on appropriations for the 
Department of Justice, prohibiting it from prosecuting cooperating 
farmers.40 Dairy producers began organizing large-scale “milk 
strikes” withholding milk to cities.41  
 
To address these ongoing issues, the 1922 Capper-Volstead 
Act 42 allowed farmers limited exemptions from antitrust controls of 
the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Act, allowing them to organize to 
collectively set product prices.43 Passage of Capper-Volstead was 
controversial at the time, with concerns that the antitrust exemption 
would give dairy cooperative marketing associations too much 
power to raise prices, at the expense of consumers.44 Senator Atlee 
Pomerene of Ohio argued, “There is nothing in this bill to prevent a 
combination of men who are dealing in food products – and I refer 
to the dairymen – from getting the most exorbitant prices, and doing 
so at the expense of the babes of the country.”45 Capper-Volstead 
prohibited “undue price enhancement” by cooperatives, but did not 
specify what constituted “undue.”46 Further, authority to monitor and 
temper agricultural cooperative pricing behavior was given to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than the Department 
of Justice.47 USDA was perceived at the time to be more sympathetic 
to farm interests (and less likely to restrict their behavior).48   
 
In the 1930s, while court decisions restricted cooperatives 
from interstate marketing of dairy products, courts tended to uphold 
cooperative intrastate marketing.49 California, a major dairy state, 
adopted an intrastate marketing organization in the early 1930s, which 
is still in effect today.50 Despite Capper-Volstead, cooperative 
marketing associations were largely unsuccessful in raising dairy 
product prices, for two reasons.51 First, because milk is highly 
perishable, its value falls dramatically over a short time.52 The threat 
by dairies of withholding milk supplies was less credible than for 
 
39 James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress: 
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 68 (1982). 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2020). 
43 Id.; see Guth, supra note 36, at 82. 
44 Guth, supra note 36, at 75. 
45 Id. at 78. 
46 7 U.S.C. § 292. 
47 Guth, supra note 36, at 82. 
48 See id. 
49 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 7. 
50 Id. 
51 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 5. 
52 See id. at 3. 
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more easily storable agricultural commodities.53 Second, because the 
associations were voluntary, producers were not compelled to join 
them, and those not in associations often sold into the urban markets 
(acting as “strikebreakers”).54 
 
In the wake of the Great Depression, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) was passed, giving the Secretary of 
Agriculture authority to impose production controls to reduce 
commodity surpluses and raise prices.55 The AAA provided for the 
establishment of marketing orders.56 Unlike cooperative associations, 
marketing orders had aspects of mandatory compulsion.57 Growers 
within a designated region could vote on whether to form a marketing 
order, with the referenda requiring a super-majority to assent.58 Once 
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, however, the rules of the 
order applied to all producers in the region.59 Thus, producers were no 
longer able to free ride and undercut arrangements negotiated by the 
order.  
In 1935, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
National Industrial Recover Act was an unconstitutional delegation 
of power.60 The AAA was amended in 1935 to address the Court’s 
ruling, but in 1936 the Supreme Court ruled that the 1935 AAA 
violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.61 To address 
the Court’s ruling, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing and 
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which among other things 
specified the Secretary’s powers over establishment and enforcement 
of marketing orders more clearly.62 The AMAA also brought all 
handlers (buyer processors) in an approved marketing order area 
under the authority of the order.63 Minimum prices for different types 
of dairy products were set for all handlers in an order.64  
 
53 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. Swantz, Alexander. "How we came 
to have federal milk marketing orders: What they are and what they do." Journal 
of Dairy Science 45, no. 11 (1962): 1397-1402, at 1398. 
54 Id. at 5.  
55 See Paul L. Murphy, The New Deal Agricultural Program and the Constitution, 
29 AGRIC. HIST. 160, 160–69 (1955). 
56 Id. at 161. 
57 See id. at 160–62. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935); Murphy, supra 
note 51, at 160. 
61 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77–78 (1936); Murphy, supra note 51, at 
160–61. 
62 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 
246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Murphy, supra note 
51, at 163. 
63 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 
246; see Murphy, supra note 51, at 163–64. 
64 See Murphy, supra note 51, at 163. 





When some processors refused to pay assessments under and 
order, the United States filed a complaint against them in October 27, 
1938.65 The processors countered that the marketing order and the 
AMAA of 1937 was unconstitutional, infringing on their Fifth 
Amendment rights to due process, their property rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, and on rights reserved only for states under the 
Tenth Amendment.66 The District Court concurred, and the United 
States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.67 The Court upheld both 
the AMAA and the Milk Order in a 5 to 4 decision, citing both 
Congress’ authority to regulate economic activity through the 
Interstate Commerce Clause and under its power to authorize 
regulatory powers it deemed necessary, even if this granted powers 
to the Executive Branch (i.e., the Secretary of Agriculture).68  
 
The AMAA and subsequent legislation in the 1940s 
solidified key aspects of U.S. dairy policy.69 These included:  
• Establishment of Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO) 
across different regions and states;70 the FMMOs allowed 
dairy producers to coordinate to increase their sales 
revenue;71 
• Government price supports for dairy products carried out by 
direct government purchases of dairy products;72 
• Dairy product import controls;73  
• Disposal of “surplus” dairy products by channeling them to 
foreign relief, the School Lunch Program, and other 
outlets.74  
 
The Steagall Amendment of 1941 established a support price 
for dairy products promoted my government purchases of butter 
(which could be stored).75 Under the Agricultural Act of 1949, 
government purchases of dairy products to support farm income was 
 
65 United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 540 (1939); see 9 
NEIL E. HARL & CHARLES F. CURTISS, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 70.01[3] (2007). 
66 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 541, 568; see HARL & CURTISS, supra 
note 61, at § 70.01[3]. 
67 HARL & CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]; see Rock Royal Cooperative, 
Inc., 307 U.S. at 539–41. 
68 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 568–71, 577–78; see HARL & 
CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]. 
69 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10. 
70 Id. at 8, 10. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 8–9. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 8. 
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formalized as a central policy.76 Section 22 of the original, 1933 
AMAA included provisions for import controls.77 These were first 
applied with implementation of the Trade Agreements Extension Act 
of 1951.78 Imported products were typically limited to 3% or less of 
U.S. milk production.79 Import restrictions were another means to 
maintain the government support price.80  
 
These policies sought to address a host of problems facing 
dairy farming in particular, and U.S. agriculture in general, in the 
1930s.  First, there were certain aspects of agriculture that led to what 
was called “the farm problem.”81  Both the demand and supply of 
dairy products was inelastic – both consumption and production 
changed relatively little in response to changes in market prices.82  
Related to this feature, small changes in consumer demand or 
production could cause large fluctuations in milk prices.83 Next, 
demand for dairy products was growing slowly, while technological 
innovations were causing supply to increase faster.84 As production 
outstripped demand, this placed downward pressure on prices.85 A 
related problem was what Cochrane called the “agricultural 
treadmill.”86 Farmers adopting cost-reducing technologies or 
improved practices could sell at lower prices than non-adopters.87 
This downward price pressure induced other operators to adopt cost-
cutting technologies and practices in order to survive in the market.88 
This, in turn, increased supply further, starting another cycle of price 




77 Id. at 9. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 See id. 
81 John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton, 
Concurrence, Coopératives de Producteurs et Marketing Orders aux États-Unis 
[Competition, U.S. Farmer Cooperatives, and Marketing Orders], 277–78 
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 135, 135 (2003) (Fr.), English translation available in 
RESEARCHGATE, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289527129_Crespi-
Sexton-EconRurale-ENGLISH; Bruce L. Gardner, Changing Economic 
Perspectives on the Farm Problem, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 62, 62 (1992). 




86 WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 96–97 (1958). 
87 See id. at 95. 
88 Id. at 96. 
89 Id. at 95. 




Marketing orders and dairy cooperatives were also supposed 
to address the oligopsony power of milk handlers.90 Collective action 
by dairy producers was intended to provide countervailing power to 
such buyer market power.91 Economic theory suggests that buyers 
who exercise oligopsony power restrict purchases and lower prices 
for the inputs they purchase.92  In the case of milk, this would lead to 
lower prices dairies received for milk and lower volumes of milk 
purchased.93  This latter would also reduce the supply of milk 
available to final consumers.94 Theory also suggests that if sellers 
coordinate action in this type of market, they can increase both the 
price they receive and sales.95 This raises both overall economic 
welfare and benefits final milk consumers because greater 
production lowers consumer prices.96 While the 1937 Act established 
programs to raise dairy farm income, policies to raise farm prices 
were to, “be in the public interest.”97  
 
Finally, the marketing orders were intended to use 
coordination to overcome a host of communication, transportation, 
and technological impediments to marketing milk.98  An explicit goal 
of legislation was to promote “orderly marketing” of products.99   
 
Further, dairy legislation was drafted in the context of rural 
poverty and nutrition concerns during the Great Depression.100 For 
example, there was concern that if a large share of dairy operations 
went out of production, it would take years to rebuild production 
capacity.101 This would lead to price spikes later, once consumer 
demand recovered.102  But, such price spikes would harm consumers. 
Further, rural poverty (as illustrated by popular literature such as 
Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and by Dorothea Lange’s iconic 
photographs of the rural poor for the Farm Security Administration) 
was a major macroeconomic problem.103 Then, a large share of the 
 
90 David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185 
(1986). 
91 Id. at 185 & n.8. 
92 Id. at 197 & n.46. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. at 198. 
95 Id. at 196; see Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral 
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831, 831–41 (1989). 
96 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 198. 
97 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662–63. 
98 See id. at 670. 
99 Id. at 662. 
100 See id. at 678. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See generally SUSAN LEVINE, SCHOOL LUNCH POLITICS: THE SURPRISING 
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FAVORITE WELFARE PROGRAM 40, 46 (2008). 
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U.S. population still resided on farms.104 A motivation of providing 
milk for the School Lunch Program and dairy products as foreign aid, 
aside from supporting farm income, was to improve nutrition of low-
income, vulnerable populations.105   
 
III. The Dairy Industry in the Latter Half of the 20th 
Century  
 
Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the dairy 
industry and federal dairy policy faced several challenges. While the 
USDA intervened significantly to increase dairy prices, these myriad 
market interventions often had unintended negative consequences, 
which led to a cascade of new interventions (with their own 
contradictions).106 Protected from antitrust limits by the Capper-
Volstead Act, and encouraged by economies of scale, dairies and 
marketing cooperatives grew larger and larger.107 Various tactics by 
large cooperatives to increase their market power led to greater 
Justice Department scrutiny and initiatives to limit what was 
characterized as their anti-competitive behavior.108 This has raised 
various legal questions about the appropriate limits of cooperative 
and marketing order behavior under Capper-Volstead.109  Finally, 
programs to “dispose of” surplus milk via foreign aid and federal 
nutrition programs sought to simultaneously (a) raise farm income 
and (b) improve nutrition of the economically vulnerable.110  Some 
commentators began to question whether the farm income support 
goal of these programs was promoted at the expense of nutrition and 
anti-poverty goals.111   
 
A. Difficulties Maintaining Federal Price Supports  
 
 
104 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANALYZING THE SMALL 
CITY AND RURAL MARKET AREA 3 (1933). 
105 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.   
106 Id. at 46; E. Dale Odom, Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated: Testing the 
Limits of Capper-Volstead, 59 AGRIC. HIST. 40, 46 nn. 10–11 (1985). 
107 See Odom, supra note 102, at 47–48. 
108 Id. at 50. 
109 Id. at 52–53. 
110 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.   
111 J. Amy Dillard, Sloppy Joe, Slop, Sloppy Joe: How USDA Commodities 
Dumping Ruined the National School Lunch Program, 87 OR. L. REV. 221, 223 
(2008); Michael T. Belongia, The Dairy Price Support Program: A Study of 
Misdirected Economic Incentives, 66 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 5, 14 (1984); 
see Michael Correll, Getting Fat on Government Cheese: The Connection Between 
Social Welfare Participation, Gender, and Obesity in America, 18 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2010). 




The Agriculture Act of 1949 established the Milk Price 
Support Program (MPSP).112 Under the MPSP, USDA would 
purchase less perishable dairy products, such as cheddar cheese, 
nonfat dry milk, and butter at a pre-determined, government set 
price.113  USDA would commit to purchasing as much of these 
products as the dairy industry could supply at these support prices.114  
The law also required the Secretary of Agriculture to set a minimum 
price support for fluid milk as well as these manufactured dairy 
products.115  Because fluid milk is an input into manufactured dairy 
products, government purchases of manufactured products bid up the 
price of milk.116  The MPSP did not, however, place any limits on the 
quantity of milk that dairies could produce.117   
 
The intention of the program was to take dairy products off 
the market in times when prices were low and then make them 
available when prices recovered.118 The government sent nonfat dry 
milk abroad as food aid through Food for Peace programs.119 Some 
cheddar cheese and butter was distributed to the School Lunch 
Program, by other federal nutrition programs, by Veterans 
Administration hospitals, and by federal prisons.120 The rest was 
stored in warehouses or underground caverns. 121 
 
The post-World War II period saw a series of technological 
innovations that reduced the costs of dairy production.122 In the 
1950s, producers began adopting antibiotics and sulfa drugs to 
combat mastitis and other diseases.123 This increased milk production 
per cow.124 The use of mathematical linear programming techniques 
allowed researchers to develop least-cost feed rations.125  Use of 
mainframe computers in the 1960s made it easier for feed companies 
 
112 Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2 
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
115 Id. 
116 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-42-823, CONSEQUENCES OF DAIRY PRICE 
SUPPORT POLICY 15 (1979). 
117 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 17; see Jeffrey LaFrance & Harry de Gorter, 
Regulation in a Dynamic Market: The U.S. Dairy Industry, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 
821, 821–32 (1985).  
118 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 112, at 22–24. 
119 See Seth King, Dairy Support Prices to Increase on April 1, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 1978, at 19. 
120 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20. 
121 See id. 
122 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 10-11 
123 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
124 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
125 See I. Katzman, Solving Feed Problems Through Linear Programming, 28 J. 
FARM ECON. 420, 420 (1956). 
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and Cooperative Extension to quickly develop and disseminate 
information about these least-cost rations.126 By the late 1970s, 
artificial insemination was wide used for dairy cow breeding.127 
These innovations all acted to push down costs and increase supplies 
of dairy products.128 These growing supplies made it more difficult 
for the government to support prices above market levels.129 
    
Government price supports were trimmed in the Nixon and 
Ford administrations under the tenure of Secretary of Agriculture, 
Earl Butz.130 In attempts to control inflation in the early 1970s, the 
Nixon Administration relaxed certain dairy product import quotas.131 
Increased imports and expansion of domestic production led to 
subsequent price collapses.132  In response, farmers lobbied Congress 
and pushed 1976 presidential candidates for more government 
support.133  Newly-elected President Carter signed the Food and 
Agricultural Act of 1977, which increased the milk support price by 
11% in 1978 and another 14% in 1979.134  
 
With guaranteed higher prices, dairy production expanded, 
inducing the USDA to stockpile even more products to support 
prices.135 Each year, though, dairies had an economic incentive to 
over-produce, which only increased government acquisitions further 
to support prices.136 Dairies produced 10% more milk per year than 
the private market demanded at support prices.137  From 1977 to 1981 
alone, the USDA bought up and stored more than 560 million pounds 
of cheddar cheese alone.138 Government dairy program spending rose 
above $2 billion per year.139  By 1981, government stocks of dairy 
products were growing by 20 million pounds per week.140 The 
Reagan Administration attempted to reign in dairy program spending 
 
126 See generally id. 
127  Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5. 
128 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4-5, 10. 
129 Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2 
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020).  de Goiter, H., Nielson, D. J., 
& Rausser, G. C. (1995). The determination of technology and commodity policy 
in the US dairy industry. In GATT Negotiations and the Political Economy of 
Policy Reform (pp. 253-274). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. 
130 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 11–12. 
131 Id. at 12. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. at 19. 
134 See id. at 12. 
135 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 18. 
136 See id. at 17–22. 
137 See id. at 21. 
138 See id. at 14.  
139 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20. 
140 Associated Press, A Big Dairy Surplus Grows, So Do U.S. Wishes to Shed It, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1981, at 74; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20. 




and accumulation of dairy product stocks, without much success 
initially.141 The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act, slowed the rate of 
support price increases. 142 The Administration authorized the release 
of what became known as “government cheese” – stockpiled cheese 
distributed to low-income people via food banks, food pantries, and 
other non-profit organizations.143  Yet, because dairies could sell to 
the government at high prices, supply continued to expand as 
producers adopted output-expanding technologies and practices.144 
Stocks continued to accumulate.145  
  
The 1983 Dairy Production Stabilization Act established the 
Milk Diversion Program (MDP) to control the supply of milk.146 The 
federal government offered dairy farmers $10-per-hundredweight to 
reduce their sales below their historical production.147 More than 2 
billion pounds of these reductions, however, were only “air” as many 
producers had already reduced their production prior to signing 
contracts.148 Thus, a significant portion of program funds went to 
producers who were planning to reduce their production anyway. 
There was further slippage as dairy producers who did not sign up 
for the MDP increased their production.149 Total U.S. milk 
production increased to record levels, again triggering even more 
government dairy purchases.150  
 
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act did, however, set in 
place reductions in the support price.151 The USDA also instituted the 
Dairy Termination Program (DTP) to control supplies.152 Under the 
DTP, the federal government bought out entire dairy herds, with 
farmers committing to forego dairying for five years.153 The 
government slaughtered or exported animals from purchased 
herds.154 Operating from April, 1986 to September 1987, the program 
cost more than $1.8 billion,  155 with more than 1.4 million animal 
 
141 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20–21. 
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slaughtered.156 Originally authorized under the Food Security Act of 
1985,157 the Dairy Export Incentive Program provided subsidies to 
exporters shipping dairy products abroad.158 The Dairy Production 
Stabilization Act159 also created the National Dairy Board (NDB), 
which from 1984 to 1987 spent more than $100 million in television 
and radio advertising to promote dairy products.160 There is some 
evidence that the advertising and promotional programs succeeded in 
increasing the demand for milk.161 Through this combination of 
reduced price supports, export subsidies, increased demand via 
advertising, and animal slaughter, dairy over-supply problems began 
to ebb.162 USDA stocks of dairy products began to fall steadily starting 
in 1984.163 
 
Since the late 1980s, structural and technological change in 
the U.S. industry has dramatically reduced the cost of U.S. 
production.164 This had the effect of making U.S. products more 
competitive on global markets.165 The early 1980s were 
characterized by U.S. export subsidies and tight import restrictions 
keeping competing products out of U.S. markets.166 As U.S. 
production became more competitive, world prices rather than 
government support prices served as a price floor for U.S. dairy 
commodities.167 By the 1990s, government support prices were 
rarely in effect.168 The 2014 Farm Bill (Agricultural Act of 2014) 
eliminated price supports and export subsidies altogether.169 The 
U.S. still has what Sumner has called a “mind-boggling array of TRQ 
regulations.”170 TRQs (tariff rate quotas) essentially act as import 
quotas, and the United States still maintains many of these for dairy 
products.171 Yet, Sumner has assessed these have relatively little 
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effect, favoring a few companies, but with little effects on larger 
markets.172  
 
Two major remaining components of U.S. dairy policy are 
the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) and a relatively new 
Margin Protection Program (MPP), which, on the surface, operates 
as a revenue insurance program.173 Producers can take out (highly 
subsidized) insurance policies that protect them when the price of 
animal feed rises relative to milk prices.174 Like US crop insurance 
programs, payments can be more than actuarially fair.175 In other 
words, indemnity payments can regularly exceed payment premiums 
(i.e., some can regularly make money from their insurance).176 Similar 
to crop insurance, when MPP constitutes essentially a disguised 
federal income payment. In cases where signing up does not provide 
producers such assured returns, producers have either not signed up at 
all or have signed up at the minimum level of coverage, which requires 
zero premiums.177  
 
 B. Nutrition Programs  
 
The distribution of government-purchased dairy products as 
domestic or international food aid dates back to the AAA of 1935.178 
Surplus dairy products were distributed under the School Lunch 
Programs, first established in 1935.179  The Agricultural Act of 1954 
established the Special School Milk Program to use USDA funds to 
increase fluid milk consumption in schools.180 The program was 
extended in 1956 to include “nonprofit summer camps, orphanages, and 
other child-care institutions.”181 The national Food Stamp Program was 
approved and made part of permanent agricultural legislation in 1964.182 
Implementation of USDA nutrition programs have not been without 
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controversy.183 Programs have been tasked with achieving multiple 
goals, disposing of government purchased surpluses, increasing 
demand for competing commodities (and pleasing competing 
commodity groups), and improving nutrition of low income or other 
target populations.184 Controversies have arisen when farm income 
support and nutrition objectives have not coincided.185 Some critics 
have argued that the farm income support objectives have taken 
precedent over nutrition goals.186 
 
C. Challenges to Capper-Volstead Exemptions 
 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) increase dairy 
producer incomes through price discrimination.187 FMMOs divide the 
country into geographic regions.188 There have been as many as 42, 
but that has been reduced to 11.189 Milk and dairy product processors 
in each region are required to pay farmers at least a minimum price for 
four classes of milk defined by the Federal government.190 Class I is 
the milk used for fluid beverage products.191 The price of fluid milk is 
relatively inelastic – the quantity that consumers demand changes little 
relative to changes in the price of milk.192 Conversely, if the quantity 
available of milk falls, the price increases more proportionally than the 
quantity reduction.193 So, limiting supplies increases sales revenues. 
Demand for fluid milk is inelastic because it is highly perishable and 
expensive to transport, so fluid milk in a particular area faces little 
competition from outlying areas.194 Demand for manufactured milk 
products (e.g. cheese, butter) can be stored longer and transported less 
expensively.195 These products face more regional and even global 
 
183 Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09, 
130. 
184 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10. 
185 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; see 
LEVINE, supra note 99, at 68, 108–09, 130. 
186 Correll, supra note 107, at 62–65; Dillard, supra note 107, at 244–45; Belongia, 
supra note 107, at 9. 
187 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12. 
188 Id. at 11. 
189 Hayley H. Chouinard et al., Milk Marketing Order Winners and Losers, 32 
APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 59, 59–60 (2010).  US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Office of Budget & Program Analysis. 2020 USDA Budget Explanatory 
Notes. Agricultural Marketing Service. At 21-9. 
https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/documents/21ams2020notes.pdf (accessed 
12/8/2020) 
190 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 12. 
191 Id. at 13. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 21. 
194 Id. at 21–22. 
195 Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The Social Cost of Government 
Regulation of Milk, 21 J. L. & ECON. 33, 56 (1978); Masson & Eisenstat, supra 
note 6, at 670. 




price competition.196 Because of this, demand for these products is 
more price elastic.197 Changes in the amount supplied have a relatively 
small impact on the price producers receive.198  
 
Marketing orders increase producer income by setting a high 
price for fluid milk and reducing its supply below competitive 
levels.199 At the same time production is shunted toward 
manufactured products.200 As output of manufactured products 
increases, their prices fall only a little bit.201 When the supply of fluid 
milk is reduced, though, its price rises a lot.202 Dairy producers 
receive a blend price that is a weighted average of fluid milk and 
manufactured dairy product prices.203 Compared to a competitive 
market outcome, more milk is produced overall, but less actually is 
sold as fluid milk, while more is sold in the form of manufactured 
products.204 How individual consumers are affected overall by the 
price changes depends on their relative expenditures on fluid milk 
versus processed dairy products.205 Consumers, on the whole, are 
made worse off, though, as consumer losses from higher fresh milk 
prices outweigh gains from lowered prices of manufactured 
products.206 
 
The economic welfare effects of marketing orders depend on 
one’s reference point. Gardner (1984) characterized competing views 
of U.S. dairy policy.207 One was of “market failure” story, where dairy 
policy is designed to counter anti-competitive behavior of milk 
processors.208 The Capper Volstead Act was passed at a time when 
technological and institutional constraints presented severe problems 
for dairy producers.209 In the 1920s on-farm refrigeration was limited 
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as was transportation infrastructure.210 Dairies were captive to a small 
number of buyers in the nearest urban centers to their farms.211 Dairies 
marketed their wares individually and so had little bargaining 
power.212 In contrast, handlers had great scope to exert monopsony 
power.213 Capper Volstead allowed dairies to organize to set prices, 
but the intent was to countervail monopsony power.214  The 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 and subsequent legislation 
supported formation of milk marketing orders and marketing 
cooperatives.215  At the time, dairy production was small-scale and 
marketing largely uncoordinated.216   
 
A competing perspective was one of “capture” where dairy 
producers were able to influence USDA policy to their benefit at 
consumer and taxpayer expense.217 As dairy marketing became more 
consolidated, sentiment, particularly by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice began to shift toward the 
capture perspective.218  In the post-World War II era, technological 
and institutional change fundamentally altered how dairy products 
were marketed.219 First, improvements in roads, refrigeration, and 
shipping technology meant that dairies could sell their product to 
more distant markets, lessening the need to only sell to the most local 
processors.220  Also, dairy marketing cooperatives began to 
consolidate, increasing their geographic scope and market power.221 
The large cooperative, American Milk Producers Incorporated 
(AMPI) formed in 1969 out of several mergers of smaller 
cooperatives in 1967.222 Over the next three years AMPI merged with 
54 more cooperatives223 until it stretched from Texas to the Canadian 
Border.224 By the mid-1970s, AMPI produced about one eighth of all 
milk sold in the United States and had become the largest cheese 
producer in the world.225 Around this time, two other large 
cooperatives were formed via merger: Mid-America Dairymen 
(Mid-Am) and Dairyman, Inc. (DI).226 In many markets, AMPI, Mid-
 
210 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670. 
211 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1. 
212 Id. at 2. 
213 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 34. 
214 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 193. 
215 Id. at 206; see Ippolito & Masson, supra note 187, at 37. 
216 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 669–70. 
217 Price Discrimination, supra note 199, at 763. 
218 See Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 204; see Kwoka, supra note 198, at 380. 
219 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9; Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 9. 
220 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 9. 
221 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220. 
222 Welfare Impacts, supra note 191, at 275.. 
223 Id. 
224 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220. 
225 Odom, supra note 102, at 44. 
226 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 220. 




Am or DI controlled 90% or more of all raw milk sales.227 By 1982, 
these three cooperatives, along with Land O’Lakes were all Fortune 
500 companies.228 
 
Justice Department economists began to argue that actions 
of the larger cooperatives went beyond just countervailing the 
market power of milk purchasers.229 They argued that the largest 
cooperatives were exercising supervailing power.230 While 
countervailing power would lead to greater milk sales (and lower 
prices) to consumers, the exercise of supervailing power was meant 
to increase cooperative profits at the expense of consumers, raising 
prices above competitive levels.231 Economists at the Federal Trade 
Commission and Justice Department conducted econometric market 
studies estimating the effects of cooperative behavior on prices and 
consumer welfare.232 Kwoka estimated that marketing orders raised 
milk prices 7-15% above competitive levels and created a 
deadweight loss to the economy of $55 to $180 million per year.233 
Ippolito and Masson estimated that U.S. milk marketing orders, by 
increasing fluid milk prices, transferred $210 million from 
consumers to producers.234 Masson and Eisenstat estimated that 
U.S. dairy cooperatives succeeded in raising retail fluid milk prices 
by $0.07 -$0.10 per gallon, costing consumers of $71 million per 
year from 1967-1975.235 
 
In addition to such studies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
also began to take a more aggressive stance to reign in what was 
perceived as excessive anticompetitive behavior.236 The DOJ sued 
the three large cooperatives, AMPI, Mid-Am and DI in 1972.237 
DOJ alleged the cooperatives engaged in “predatory pricing, price 
squeezes, and foreclosure of nonmembers from customers through 
contracts and mergers with nonfarmer milk processors.”238 DOJ 
signed a consent decree with AMPI in 1975 and one with Mid-Am 
in 1977.239 In the AMPI consent decree, AMPI did not admit to any 
wrongdoing, but agreed to desist from specific "predatory and 
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exclusionary" practices.240 AMPI also lost that part of the major 
private case charging conspiracy to monopolize.241 In 1976, the suit 
against DI went to trial in 1976 and was eventually resolved in 1985, 
partially in the DOJ's favor.242  Studies found that after the consent 
decrees, cooperatives were less able to exercise market power to push 
fluid milk prices significantly above minimum government support 
prices.243 In other cases, courts have ruled that cooperatives 
attempting to further monopoly power by acquiring investor-owned 
firms, engaging in predatory practices, or forming joint ventures with 
non-cooperative businesses are not protected by Capper Volstead 
exemptions and are subject to prosecution under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.244 
 
IV. The U.S. Dairy Landscape Today  
 
Dairy production is important to US farm and food systems. 
In 2018, the United States produced more than 200 billion pounds of 
milk, 13 billion pounds of cheese, 840 million gallons of ice cream, 
and 50 million gallons of frozen yogurt.245 Dairy farming, product 
processing, and wholesaling employed more than 290,000 workers, 
who received more than $15 billion in wages in 2018.246 According 
to the most recent, 2017 Census of Agriculture, farms sold nearly $37 
billion of milk, accounting for about 9% of total U.S. farm sales.247 
U.S. households spend roughly $8 per week on dairy products on 
average, with spending ranging from $4 per week for low income 
households to nearly $12 per week for high income ones.248 
Households with lower incomes, children, or both tend to have a 
higher share of dairy spending in the form of fresh milk.249   
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Milk production is characterized by concentration regionally 
and across operations.250 Five states – California, Wisconsin, Idaho, 
New York, and Texas – account for more than half of all U.S. milk 
production.251 The top eight states (adding Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
and Minnesota) account for two-thirds.252 In 2017, there were more 
than 9.5 million milk cows on more than 54,000 U.S. farm 
operations.253 About 15,000 operations had no milk sales.254 These 
were comprised almost entirely of operations with herds of 19 or 
fewer cows.255 Of farms that did have sales, those with herds of fewer 
than 100 cows accounted for nearly two-thirds of operations, but only 
11% of sales.256 In contrast, just 5% of farms had dairy herds of 1,000 
or more cows, but these farms accounted for more than half of all 
milk sales.257 About 84% of milk sold in the United States is 
marketed by dairy farmer-owned cooperatives.258  The four largest of 
these – Dairy Farmers of America, Land O’Lakes, Dairy Farmers 
Incorporated, and Darigold Inc. – market about 40% of all U.S. 
milk.259   
 
From 1980 to 2018, the total U.S. dairy herd size has 
declined about 12%, but milk produced per cow has more than 
doubled.260 The average number of milk cows per farm with cows 
rose from about 50 in the 1987 Census of Agriculture to about 175 in 
the 2017 Census.261 Another measure of dairy scale is the midpoint 
herd size – the size for which half of all milk cows are in herds of 
that size or larger.262 This midpoint has risen from 80 cows in 1987 
to 900 cows in 2012, and to more than 1,000 cows by 2017.263  
The United States has become a major exporter of some 
dairy products, especially dry milk powder, while still being a 
significant importer of others, particularly cheese.264 From 2004 to 
2014, U.S. dairy product exports more than quadrupled.265 Overall, 
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the United State is the third largest global exporter of dairy products, 
following New Zealand and the European Union (EU).266 
 
What can we glean from this dizzying array of dairy facts and 
figures? First, the U.S. dairy industry remains a central part of U.S. 
agriculture, while dairy products remain an important part of consumer 
diets. It is a technologically dynamic sector, demonstrating impressive 
and sustained productivity growth. A driving factor behind this growth 
are scale economies that have allowed producers to lower average 
costs by increasing operation size.267 Today, the U.S. dairy industry is 
dominated by large-scale operations, with marketing dominated by 
large-scale marketing cooperatives.268 Productivity growth has made 
U.S. dairy production more competitive in international markets.269 
This has shifted the U.S. policy stance away from protectionism to a 
more outward looking export orientation.270 The United States has 
abandoned dairy product export subsidies and moved away from 
import controls and tariffs (although this has been incomplete).271 
The industry has moved toward less government intervention in 
general (although substantial involvement remains).272  
 
A. Technological and Structural Change  
 
Larger dairy farms have been able to take better advantage 
of a range of technologies and practices (Table 1).273 Larger 
operations make greater use of artificial insemination as well as 
services of veterinarians and nutritionists.274 They are also far more 
likely to use computers to deliver feed to cattle and for milking.275 
As operations have grown, dairies have relied less on producing their 
own feed and raising their own heifers (as replacements) and more 
on purchasing them from other operations.276 While smaller 
operations produce more of their own feed, larger operations are 
more specialized, purchasing it from others.277 Larger farms are also 
more likely to enter into forward pricing contracts for inputs 
(primarily feed).278 This reduces their risks against unexpected 
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increases in feed prices.279 Larger farms can also use their size to 
increase their bargaining power, negotiating input prices, rather than 
accepting them as given.280 
 
Table 1. Comparison of dairy practice adoption for three different 
herd sizes  
 Herd Size (number of cows) 
Practices <50 200-499 >1,999 
 Percent of Farms Adopting Practice 
Artificial insemination 75 80 99 
Routine veterinary service 43 89 96 
Nutritionist service 59 87 95 
All feed purchased 2 5 21 
Most feed purchased 36 54 95 
Heifers off-farm 1 10 31 
Forward contract inputs 7 49 69 
Negotiate for inputs 17 63 93 
Computers for feed delivery 1 16 69 
Computers for milking 1 24 33 
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016281 
 
Thus, larger farms have split off several functions that 
smaller operations still engage in. This has allowed them to greatly 
reduce their average production costs (Figure 1).282 One can see 
dramatic reductions in production costs as the scale of operation 
increases.283 The dramatic shift in the average scale of dairy 
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Figure 1. Average cost per cwt (hundredweight) of milk 
produced by herd size  
 
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016284 
 
A. Dairy Antitrust Issues in the 21st Century  
 
Economists have continued to find evidence of dairy policies 
redistributing income from consumers to producers.285 One study 
examined effects on different types of households.286 It found that 
marketing orders reduced wellbeing for families with young 
children, but benefited couples without children.287 This was because 
they reduced prices of processed products (such as cheese or yogurt), 
but raised prices of fluid milk.288 It also estimated that the program 
was more costly to lower income than high income households.289 
Another study found that in markets regulated by Federal Milk 
Marketing Orders, cooperatives are able to exert market power to 
raise the price of milk 9% above marginal cost, transferring more 
than $70 million per year from final consumers.290  
  
Dairy cooperative and marketing order activity has continued 
to receive antitrust scrutiny.291  In 2010, the DOJ and several states filed 
a civil antitrust suit against Dean Foods alleging that its purchase of 
processing plants owned by the Wisconsin cooperative, Foremost 
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Farms, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.292 DOJ asserted the 
acquisition would eliminate price competition from Foremost Farms, 
raising milk prices paid by schools, grocery chains, restaurants, and 
other retail outlets.293  Various cooperatives have been the defendants in 
class action suits, often settling out of court.294  
 
B. Emerging Environmental and Consumer Challenges 
 
As the U.S. population has shifted westward, so has dairy 
production, with significant growth in California, Idaho, New 
Mexico, and Arizona.295 Western operations also tend to be larger on 
average.296 Although U.S. milk production continues to grow, that 
production has been concentrated in fewer counties over time.297 In 
1969, 71 counties had one-quarter of all dairy cows, while half of all 
cows were in 247 counties.298 By 2017, a quarter of U.S. dairy cows 
were in just 16 counties (with all but one in the West), while half of 
all cows were in just 50 counties.299  
 
This concentration and westward movements present certain 
environmental challenges.300 First, this concentrates manure wastes 
on a smaller land area.301 As noted above, larger operations have 
moved away from feed and forage crop production, which means 
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price-fixing-retailer-lawsuit-settlement/; Carol Dumas, National Milk Settles CWT 
Lawsuit for $220 Million, CAPITAL PRESS (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.capitalpress.com/ag_sectors/dairy/national-milk-settles-cwt-lawsuit-
for-220-million/article_566e01f4-1b6b-11ea-98a1-0b954157be31.html; Melinda 
Burton, Not Everything is Settled in the Allen v. Dairy Farmers of America 
Antitrust Class Action – The Fight Over Allocating Fees to Class Counsel, FARUKI 
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.ficlaw.com/blog/class-actions/archives/not-
everything-is-settled-in-the-allen-v-dairy-farmers-of-america-antitrust-class-
action-the-fight-over-allocating-fees-to-class-counsel; see Yuliya V. Bolotova, 
Agricultural Supply Control: Lessons from the U.S. Dairy and Potato Industries, 
CHOICES, 4th Quarter 2015, at 1, 1.  
295 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 1. 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 23. 
298 Id. 
299 See NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., supra note 239; see 2017 Census Ag Atlas 
Maps: Milk Cows – Inventory, NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS SERV., 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2017/Online_Resources/Ag_At
las_Maps/17-M209g.php (last modified Feb. 1, 2019). 
300 See MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 23. 
301 Id. at 23–24. 
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there are fewer crop acres where manure might be applied as 
fertilizer.302  
 
This excess manure can lead to various types of water and 
air pollution.303 Nitrogen and phosphorus from manure can end up in 
surface and groundwater.304 One study of public wells in California 
found that one in ten of those sampled exceeded the maximum 
concentration level (MCL) of nitrate permissible under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act.305 Fertilizers on cropland of which dairy manure 
was a significant part, were the dominant factor accounting for the 
contamination.306 An EPA study of Washington found one in five 
sampled wells exceeding the nitrate MCL, with dairy manure again 
being a significant contributor.307 This same study also found a group 
of dairies in the Yakima Valley were the primary source for 
pharmaceutical contamination in the majority of dairy source water 
samples.308 Dairy production can also contribute to air pollution in the 
form of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
and oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO2), ammonia (NH3), hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) as well as 
particulate matter.309 Many of these are criteria pollutants regulated 
under the U.S. Clean Air Act.310 In addition, Section 304 of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 
requires farms to report NH3 and H2S emissions if 45.3 kg or more of 
either are emitted in any given 24-hour period.311 
 
In the mid-1970s, EPA established effluent limits for large 
feedlots (including dairies) under its Clean Water Act authority.312 In 
April 2003, EPA established regulatory requirements for 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).313 After a legal 
challenge to the 2003 rule, EPA was remanded to revise some 
 
302 Id. at 3. 
303 Id. at 23–24; M. A. G. von Keyserlingk et al., Invited Interview: Sustainability 
of the US Dairy Industry, 96 J. DAIRY SCI. 5405, 5415 (2013). 
304 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 24. 
305 THOMAS HARTER ET AL., ADDRESSING NITRATE IN CALIFORNIA’S DRINKING 
WATER WITH A FOCUS ON TULARE LAKE BASIN AND SALINAS VALLEY 
GROUNDWATER 11, 35 (2012). 
306 Id. at 11. 
307 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-910-R-13-004, RELATION BETWEEN NITRATE 
IN WATER WELLS AND POTENTIAL SOURCES IN THE LOWER YAKIMA VALLEY, 
WASHINGTON, at ES-6 (2012), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-
12/documents/lower-yakima-valley-groundwater-report-2013.pdf. 
308 Id. at 23–24. 
309 See Keyserlingk et al., supra note 295, at 5415. 
310 Id. 
311 Id. 
312 MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 9, at 26. 
313 Id. 




portions of the regulations.314 The original 2003 regulations required 
all CAFOS to apply for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permits.315 This designated all CAFOs as point 
sources of pollution.316 The revised rule only required CAFOs 
discharging (or proposing to discharge animal wastes) into U.S. 
water to obtain NPDES permits.317  
 
One potential technology for dealing with dairy wastes are 
anaerobic digesters, which use the methane in manure to produce 
electricity.318 Methane has 28-36 the global warming potential of 
carbon dioxide.319 Adoption of digesters, however, is less than nine 
percent on very large operations and nearly nonexistent for smaller 
operations.320 Digesters can reduce dairy electricity costs and 
potentially be a source of revenue through the sale of excess 
electricity.321 Another source of revenue is the sale of carbon offsets, 
but markets for such offsets has been slow to develop, with low 
prices.322  
 
In California, the dairy industry is a major source of methane 
emissions.323  Under Senate Bill 1383, signed into law in 2016, 
livestock operations will be required to reduce methane emissions 
starting in 2024, with a requirement to reduce emissions by 40% by 
2030.324 Using anaerobic digesters to produce electricity in 
California can be problematic, though, because the process can 
generate other air pollutants.325 Many dairies are already located in 
air pollution nonattainment areas regulated by the EPA.326 An 
alternative is to use the process to produce pipeline-injectable 
renewable natural gas that could potentially be used as transportation 
fuel.327 To be economically viable, even large dairies would have to 
operate cooperatively to achieve the needed scale economies. The 
 
314 Id.  
315 Id. 
316 Id. 
317 Id.  
318 Id. at 29. 
319 Nicolas Sanchez & David C. Mays, Effects of Methane Leakage on the 
Greenhouse Gas Footprint of Electricity Generation, 133 CLIMATE CHANGE 169, 
172, 176 (2015). 
320 NIGEL KEY & STACY SNEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE ADOPTION OF 
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011). 
321 Id. at 1. 
322 Id. 
323 Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks 
for Investments in Dairy Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018). 
324 Id. at 226. 
325 Id. at 229. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. 
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California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) Program has a 
tradable credit system that allows to producers of eligible low-carbon 
transportation fuels to sell emission reduction credits.328 In 
December 2015, the California Air Resources Board announced it 
would allow LCFS credits for vehicle fuel produced from biogas that 
counts toward avoided dairy methane emissions.329 Lee and Sumner 
warn however that the viability of dairy production of biogas for 
vehicles depends on a raft of assumptions about future regulations 
and incentives facing transportation, air pollution, and energy 
production.330  
 
Another resource concern deals with water scarcity. Much 
dairy production has expanded in the arid Western United States.331 
With limited water supplies and continued population growth, water 
scarcity has grown acute.332 Prolonged drought and the potential 
lower precipitation under climate change exacerbates this scarcity 
problem.333 A future challenge for dairies will be the water 
requirements for feed and forage crops needed to support their 
herds.334 Such crops like alfalfa and corn silage tend to be relatively 
water intensive.335 In the future, dairies may have to rely on feed and 
forage from more distant markets.  
 
The dairy industry also faces challenges on the consumer 
side.336 US per capita milk consumption has been declining with each 
successive generation consuming less fluid milk than the generation 
before.337 Increases in cheese and yogurt consumption partially 
offsets this downward trend.338 Another challenge to the dairy 
industry is the rise of plant-based milks (e.g. soy milk, cashew milk, 
 
328 Id. at 230. 
329 Id. 
330 Id.  
331 George B. Frisvold et al., Agriculture and Ranching, in ASSESSMENT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR 
THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL TECHNICAL INPUT REPORT 
SERIES 218, 220–21 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).   
332 Jonathan Overpeck et al., Summary for Decisionmakers, in ASSESSMENT OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR 
THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL TECHNICAL INPUT REPORT 
SERIES 1, 15 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).  
333 Margaret Wilder et al., Climate Change and U.S.-Mexico Border 
Communities, in ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE SOUTHWEST UNITED 
STATES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT REGIONAL 
TECHNICAL INPUT REPORT SERIES 340, 341 (Gregg Garfin et al. eds., 2013).  
334 Frisvold et al., supra note 323, at 222. 
335Id. at 224. 
336 HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK? 
A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., Econ. Research Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013). 
337 Id. 
338 Id. at 1. 




almond milk, rice milk, oat milk, etc.).339 These plant-base products 
now represent nearly 7% of the combined animal and plant milk 
sales.340 The dairy industry has attempted legal action to prevent 
these products from using the term “milk” but, in a set of cases, it has 
been turned back (Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co.; Gitson v. Trader 
Joe’s Co.; Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers).341 In 2017, Senator 
Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin) introduced the Dairy Pride Act, 
which would prohibit plant-based products from using terms such as 
“milk,” “yogurt” or “cheese” on their labels.342 The bill, however is 
“languishing in committee.”343 Interestingly, it has no co-sponsors 
from major nut producing states such as California, New Mexico or 
Georgia.344 The first two are also major dairy states.345 Neither does 





The U.S. dairy industry has transformed itself from one 
isolated from world markets and highly dependent on government 
programs to an industry more globally and market oriented.347  
Impressive productivity growth and industry concentration has made 
this possible.348 Yet, such concentration (including geographical 
concentration) has certain negative environmental implications.349 A 
future challenge facing the industry will be compliance with 
environmental laws while navigating changes in global dairy 
markets. Increased consolidation of dairy cooperatives has also 
brought increasing challenges to the Capper Volstead exemptions for 
agricultural cooperatives to antitrust action.350 The rise of plant-
 
339 HAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK, DAIRY AND POULTRY 
OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A LOOK AT SALES OF 
COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. 
Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017). 
340 Id. at 3. 
341 Iselin Gambert, Got Mylk: The Disruptive Possibilities of Plant Milk, 84 BROOK 
L. REV. 801, 812–17 (2019). 
342 Id. at 803. 
343 Elaine Watson, NMPF Hails Victory over Plant-Based “Milks” in Spending 
Bill, PBFA Says Claims Have “Zero Legal Significance”, FOOD NAVIGATOR (Mar. 
23, 2018, 15:23 GMT), https://www.foodnavigator-
usa.com/Article/2018/03/23/NMPF-hails-victory-over-plant-based-milks-in-
spending-bill-PBFA-says-claims-have-zero-legal-significance.  
344 Cosponsors: S.130 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-
bill/130/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded (last visited Oct. 25, 2020). 
345 Id.  
346 Id. 
347 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
348 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
349 See Frisvold et al., supra note 323. 
350 See supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text. 
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based milk substitutes and declining per capita U.S. milk 
consumption threaten domestic demand.351 Yet, income growth (and 
increased demand for dairy products in developing countries) 
represents a market opportunity.352   
 
351 See supra notes 328–333 and accompanying text. 
352 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 9–10. 
 
 
Towards Industrial Dairy Farming in Pakistan:  
The End of Small Farms and the  






Milk in Pakistan is infused with the self-understanding of a 
nation. British colonial administrators laid the modern-day 
foundations of the country’s structure through land grants to small 
farmers.  In an agricultural country where nearly forty percent of the 
population remains food insecure, rearing animals is a way of life in 
the rural areas where milk remains an important source of animal 
protein. Selling the daily surplus that families don’t consume is a 
significant source of earnings for cash poor families – and here an 
unprecedented change is taking place within dairy management and 
milk procurement systems. The scale of this change is significant as 
is its ability to connect even the smallest of dairy farmers to the milk 
buying habits, shaped by sophisticated marketing campaigns, of 
middle-class buyers in the country’s burgeoning cities. The 
significant changes underway are the result of the actions of large 
multinational and national companies - including the entry of the 
commercial arm of the military in the commercialization of the milk 
value chain - paying cash to small farmers. These operations, which 
may at first seem symbiotic, in connecting rural sellers to urban 
buyers, are in fact placing significant pressures on farmers to increase 
the size of their holdings as well as to improve their breeding stock 
by moving towards improved (meaning imported) higher yielding 
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cattle varieties.  While national and provincial governments with the 
support of international development partners promote the dairy 
sector as contributing to rural, economic and national development, 
I argue that a strategy driven by efficiency will ultimately lead to the 
demise of those very same small livestock and agricultural farmers it 
aims to uplift. This is because the logic of commercializing the milk 
value chain through the operations of large Milk Procurement and 
Marketing Companies (MPMC’s) and the pressures to increase milk 
yields and herd sizes requires consolidation and financing – options 
that are mostly available to richer and larger farmers. Is modernized 
milk collection already moving beyond its reliance on collecting milk 
from dispersed small farms? The unfolding pressures carry with them 
the effects of increasing demand for all inputs, including 
consolidated land, water and feed operations which in turn have 
significant implications for small farmers, animals and the 
environment. With small farmers reliant on the income from the sale 
of milk that ties them to a system that may come to no longer need 
them, can we foretell the demise of small farms?  I suggest that these 
insights are particularly relevant for the study of rural, economic, 
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"You are assisting the poor of Pakistan and this helps us fight 
the root cause of  
extremism and terrorism." 
- President General Parvez Musharraf on the opening of 
Nestle’s milk factory1 
 
I. Background  
 
Let me recount an anecdote from a field visit2 to a model 
Nestle3 farm in Punjab province of Pakistan.4 A hardworking, 
educated young farmer who spoke good English and wore jeans had 
 
1 Kabirwala, Nestlé Opens New Milk Factory in Pakistan, Its Largest Milk 
Reception Plant in the World, Nestlé (Mar. 16, 2007), 
https://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/milkfactorypaskistan. 
At the inauguration outside Lahore, Pakistan of Nestle’s largest milk plant in the 
world when General Parvez Musharraf was President of the country, “Nestlé opens 
new milk factory in Pakistan, its largest milk reception plant in the world.” Id. 
2 See Communique, Friends of Democratic Pakistan Summit Meeting Concluding 
Statement by the Co-Chairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Sept. 24, 2009), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/sca/ci/pk/friends/131015.htm. This portion of the research was 
conducted along with the Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FODP), a consortium of 
Pakistan’s largest donors formed after the resumption of democratic rule in 2008 to 
help achieve development priorities, and the Harvard Water Security Initiative’s 
Water Federalism Project. Id. See generally Jonathan Shaw, The Water Tamer, 
HARVARD MAGAZINE (Jan. – Feb. 2012), 
https://harvardmagazine.com/2012/01/the-water-tamer.  
3 Nestle is one of the two largest dairy companies in Pakistan. See Nestle Pakistan 
Sells Pasteurized Milk in $23 Billion Market, EDAIRYNEWS (Feb. 27, 2015), 
https://edairynews.com/en/nestle-pakistan-sells-pasteurized-milk-in-23-billion-
market-42185/ [hereinafter Pasteurized]. It took over operations of the older local 
MilkPak Pakistan Ltd. Id. The other main local conglomerate, Engro Pakistan 
(now FrieslandCampina Engro) (Engro), emerged after the majority share buyout 
by the Dutch conglomerate of the local Engro Foods Ltd. Jim Cornall, 
FrieslandCampina Completes Engro Foods Deal, DAIRY REPORTER (Jan. 5, 2017, 
10:23 GMT), 
https://www.dairyreporter.com/Article/2017/01/05/FrieslandCampina-completes-
Engro-Foods-deal. For details of the corporate takeover, see generally Our Brands, 
FRIESLAND CAMPINA, https://www.frieslandcampina.com/about-
frieslandcampina/our-brands/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2020). 
4 A “province” is the equivalent administrative unit to a “state” in the U.S. 
Resource Library: Encyclopedia Entry, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/province/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2020). 
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returned to Pakistan after a degree in computer science from the 
United States. His parents had money to invest so he bought land 
with access to a road network and partnered with Nestle to become a 
bulk milk supplier. He saw commercial milk operations as a 
profitable business venture and initially targeted a herd size of 50-
100 buffaloes and cows.5 He had plans to grow and improve his herd 
with imported varieties and artificial insemination. Nestle was very 
proud of his farm and showcased him to visitors as a model farmer,6 
certainly more affluent and educated than the average dairy farmer7. 
To demonstrate his commitment to Nestle’s recommended 
infrastructure and cattle rearing practices, he’d installed large ceiling 
fans which periodically dispersed cooling mist in the well-ventilated 
cattle sheds. He had two biogas pits to produce electricity from dung, 
which gave him uninterrupted electricity,8 to power the farm’s tube 
well9 and the 6 split air conditioners in the farm office. Because he 
had access to investment capital, he could take advantage of Nestle’s 
assurance that the company would buy all the milk volume he could 
produce through increased herd size and yields. The question for us 
is whether this model farmer is representative of the bulk of livestock 
and small farmers in the country who would find anything close to 
such expenditure beyond their reach. Also, what does presenting 
such a commercially minded farmer as a ‘model farmer’ reveal about 
the operations of large private-sector national, and international dairy 
marketers more broadly, as well as the implications of the dairy value 
chains they are creating. 
 
Two large foreign milk and dairy conglomerates, the Swiss 
Nestle and the Dutch FrieslandCampina, are Pakistan’s largest 
 
5 Milk from both buffaloes and cows makes up the bulk of commercial milk sales 
in Pakistan. UMM E. ZIA ET AL., DAIRY REPORTS: DAIRY DEVELOPMENT IN 
PAKISTAN 2 (2011), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-al750e.pdf. 
6 NESTLÉ, CSV REPORT OF NESTLÉ PAKISTAN LIMITED: TOGETHER WE CARE 24–29 
(2014), available at https://www.nestle.pk/sites/g/files/pydnoa361/files/asset-
library/documents/financial_reports/nestle_ar_2014_csv.pdf [hereinafter CVS 
NESTLÉ]. Nestle is funding a project of the NGO, the Dairy and Rural 
Development Foundation (DRDF) to upgrade 100 farms on a 50% cost-sharing 
basis to model farms. Id. at 28. 
7 See Samrina Akhtar et al., Management Profile and Contribution of Livestock in 
Poverty Alleviation and Nutritional Improvement in Peri-Urban Areas of 
Faisalabad, 45 PAK. J. AGRI. SCI. 381, 381–82 (2008). A study conducted in sub-
urban areas of Faisalabad, Pakistan’s third largest city, found that just over 58% of 
dairy farmers were illiterate. Id. 
8 Shahzeb Jillani, Power Cuts Hit Pakistan’s Economy, BBC NEWS (July 15, 
2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-pacific-14164825. Reliable 
regular electricity is far from the norm with power blackouts colloquially known as 
‘loadshedding’ prevalent in both urban and rural areas. Id. 
9 A well with a submersible pump to access groundwater.  
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formal sector providers of milk.10 Together the two companies 
control approximately 90% of Pakistan’s formal dairy value chain.11 
Providing a rationale for the work that the foreign dairy 
conglomerates are doing. Nestle, for instance, claims that by 
“developing progressive dairy farmers (medium scale) into 
commercial dairy farmers (large scale)” it is “contributing to 
achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 and 2 (No 
poverty and Zero Hunger) which aim at poverty reduction, ending 
hunger, achieving food security, and promoting more sustainable 
agriculture.”12 Let us take a closer look at the development of 
Pakistan’s dairy sector to assess the extent to which this particular 
form of market development, and the global language of economic 
and social development that is used to justify it, is warranted in the 
country’s case.  
  
II.  Introduction 
 
What we saw that day was certainly not the norm for the 
majority of Pakistan’s dairy farmers and animals, whether local 
buffaloes or cows (local, imported, or improved through AI), where 
about 84% of rural households have between 1-4 dairy animals.13 
The bulk of milk consumed in the country is from indigenous breeds 
of riverine buffaloes, approximately double that of cow’s milk: 58% 
to 35%.14 Even though Pakistan is the world’s fourth largest producer 
of milk after China, India, and the U.S.,15 with a stock of 
approximately 48 million heads of buffaloes and cows.16 Only 7% of 
farms report having what may be considered a large farm, 50 head of 
 
10 Kazim Alam, Of Loose Milk and Tight Margins, DAWN (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1541158.  
11 Id. 
12 Nestlé Empowering Farmers with Best Farm Practices, NESTLÉ PAKISTAN (Apr. 
23, 2018), https://www.nestle.pk/media/newsandfeatures/nestle-supporting-
farmers-to-become-leaders-in-agriculture [hereinafter Farm Practices].  




14 Omer Farooq, Agriculture, in PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2008–09 17, 33 
(Pak.), available at http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/02-
Agriculture09.pdf.  
15 Abdul Rehman et al., Livestock Production and Population Census in Pakistan: 
Determining Their Relationship with Agricultural GDP Using Econometric 
Analysis, 4 INFO. IN PROCESSING AGRIC. 168, 168 (2017). 
16 GOV’T OF PAK., AGRIC. CENSUS ORG., AGRICULTURE CENSUS 2010: ALL 
PAKISTAN TABLES (IN ACRES) tbl. 11.4 (2010), [hereinafter AGRICULTURE CENSUS 
2010], available at 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/aco/publications/agricultural_census2010
/Tables%20%28Pakistan%20-%20In%20Acres%29.pdf.  
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cattle.17 Further, given that milk yields are low, 5-6 times less than 
what are achieved in the developed world,18 cattle holdings are 
relatively dispersed and dairy is embedded in the fabric of daily rural 
life. In fact, 80% of the milk in the country is produced by either rural 
commercial or rural subsistence producers, 70% of that is produced 
by subsistence farmers.19 At the same time, given this particular form 
of dairy abundance, imports continue to rise as domestic demand 
outstrips supply.20 Pakistan is the largest importer of formula milk in 
the world.21 When looked at more closely, what imports reveal is that 
there is a shift from fresh milk towards manufactured dairy products 
(both liquid and powdered). The large commercial dairy marketers, 
in addition to their sale of packaged milk brands, are also at the 
forefront of promoting the sale of manufactured dairy products.22 
One explanation is that having these products in their portfolios 
allows them to target customers at lower price points which they’ve 
recognized as being potentially highly profitable since milk’s price 
(both fresh and packaged) continues to make it unaffordable for a 
large segment of the population.23 As per Nestle’s research, this 
group earns between $2-8 a day.24 We must of course recognize that 
it is precisely the practice of selling manufactured dairy products that 
undercuts the price of fresh, raw, and loose milk. This is because milk 
now has to compete against a product that can be manufactured at a 
lower cost, and to state the obvious is not milk but a substitute. It is 
this segment, fresh raw milk after all, that the companies see as their 
real competitor.25  
 
17 Umm E. Zia, Pakistan: A Dairy Sector at a Crossroads, in SMALLHOLDER 
DAIRY DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS LEARNED IN ASIA 76, 76 (Nancy Morgan ed., 
2009), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0588e.pdf [hereinafter Crossroads]. 
18 Sattar, supra note 13. 
19 Crossroads, supra note 17, at 76, 80. 
20 See generally Muhammad Naeem Tahir et al., Current Standing and Future 
challenges of Dairying in Pakistan: A Status Update, in MILK PRODUCTION, 




21 Dairy Industry in Pakistan, PAKISSAN.COM (Sept. 17, 2017, 5:12 pm), 
https://www.pakissan.com/2017/09/17/dairy-industry-in-pakistan/.  
22 See Marylou Andrew, Milk in the Time of Opportunity, AURORA (Jan. 29, 2018, 
10:36 AM), https://aurora.dawn.com/news/1141745. These products may be 
manufactured using whey, lactic acid, powdered milk or vegetable protein. Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Farooq Tirmizi, Despite Stellar Earnings, Nestle Pakistan Aspires for Better 
Results, THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Feb. 8, 2012), 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/333671/despite-stellar-earnings-nestle-pakistan-
aspires-for-better-results. In an interview the former CEO of Nestle Pakistan 
revealed for instance that, “Take the example of yoghurt. We are 80% of the 
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Since the country’s independence in 1947, the share of 
agriculture in the GDP has been on a downward trajectory, 
nevertheless, it remains significant at nearly 20%.26 Livestock, 
perhaps surprisingly, is the bulk of the agricultural sector at 60% 
representing 11% of total GDP.27 Let’s note how remarkable this is 
for a primarily agricultural country, such that the total value of 
livestock products is more than the combined value of all major crops 
including the largest primary commodities of cotton, wheat, rice, and 
sugarcane.28 Most farm families obtain 20-25 % of their income from 
their holdings of 2-3 buffaloes and cows along with 5-6 sheep and 
goats.29 These families sell about a third of the milk they produce.30 
Meanwhile, on the consumption side, nearly a third of household 
income spent on food is on milk and dairy products.31 About 69% of 
the irrigated area is in Punjab province which means that it has the 
most significant share of the country’s economy as well as its 
agricultural base.32 The milk production too comes from the two 
largest agricultural provinces, Punjab and Sindh, that together 
produce 96% of milk.33  Of this about 73% of milk production comes 
from Punjab, Sindh contributes about 23%, while the other provinces 
and areas produce the remainder.34  
 
 
market when it comes to packaged yoghurt. But that packaged segment is only 2% 
of the total market, . . . [s]o it doesn’t really matter what our market share is. We 
need to grow the whole packaged segment.” Id. 
26 Gov’t of Pak., Fin. Div., Agriculture, in PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20 
17, 17 (2020), [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20], available at 
http://finance.gov.pk/survey/chapter_20/02_Agriculture.pdf.  
27 Gov’t of Pak., Fin. Div., Agriculture, in Pakistan Economic Survey 2018-19 11, 
14 (2019), [hereinafter ECONOMIC SURVEY 2018-19], available at 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_19/2-Agriculture.pdf.  
28 See Muhammad Tariq et al., Milk Marketing and Value Chain Constraints, 45 
PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI. 195, 195 (2008). 
29 Muhammad Ashfaq et al., Factors Affecting the Economic Losses Due to 
Livestock Diseases: A Case Study of District Faisalabad, 52 PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI. 
503, 503 (2015).  
30 See generally Tariq et al., supra note 28, at 199. 
31 PETER WYNN ET AL., REPORT ON DAIRY MISSION TO PAKISTAN 5 (2006).  





visited Oct. 28, 2020). 
33 Sattar, supra note 13. 
34 Arshad H. Hashami et al., Gender Role in Livestock Management and Their 
Implication for Poverty Reduction in Rural Toba Tek Singh, Punjab-Pakistan, 44 
PAK. J. AGRIC. SCI. 674, 674 (2007). 
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In the seventh decade of Pakistan’s founding, a vast 
percentage of the population, about 47%, remains dependent on some 
form of an agricultural income.35 With an estimated population of 
approximately 220 million,36 this amounts to nearly 104 million 
people. Of this, an estimated 7.5 million families are involved in the 
livestock sector and depend on the milk they produce both to meet 
their own nutritional needs and the income they are able to generate 
from the sale of any surplus.37 The sector employs between 30-35 
million people directly.38 Approximately 62% of the rural population 
relies on an agricultural income.39 The bulk of livestock holdings 
remain small and dispersed, as farms of less than 5 acres make up 
64% of the total farms in the country.40 Perhaps, more than the sheer 
size of the livestock sector in the economy, for those dependent on 
an income from farming, the production and sale of milk is the most 
significant source of regular income throughout the year.41 This is 
because there are two annual cropping seasons, spring and winter.42 
 
35 Rehman et al., supra note 15, at 169. 
36 See Pakistan Population 2020 (Live), WORLD POPULATION REV., 
https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/pakistan-population (last visited Nov. 
3, 2020). The census remains deeply politicized in Pakistan and the previous 
completed census was in 1998. Even though the census is to be repeated every ten 
years, there was a nearly two-decade gap to the 2017 census. To date, the results of 
this remain provisional. Muhammad A. Wazir & Anne Goujon, Assessing the 2017 
Census of Pakistan Using Demographic Analysis” A Sub-National Perspective 2 
(Vienna Inst. of Demography, Working Paper No. 06/2019), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/207062/1/1667013416.pdf.  
37 CTR. FOR APPLIED POLICY RESEARCH IN LIVESTOCK, UNIV. OF VETERINARY & 
ANIMAL SCIS., POLICY PAPER: IMPORT OF MILK & WHEY POWDERS IN PAKISTAN 1 
(2017), available at http://www.uvas.edu.pk/doc/MBA/policy/Import-Milk.pdf 
[hereinafter POLICY PAPER]. 
38 M. Sarwar, Dairy Industry in Pakistan: A Scenario, 4 INT’L J. AGRIC. & 
BIOLOGY 420, 420 (2002); Pakistan Livestock Census 2006, PAK. BUREAU OF 
STAT., http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/pakistan-livestock-census-2006 (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Livestock Census 2006]. 
39 Rehman et al., supra note 15, at 169. 
40 AGRIC. CENSUS ORG., GOV’T OF PAK., AGRICULTURAL CENSUS 2010: PAKISTAN 
REPORT, at XLVII (2010), available at 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/files/aco/publications/agricultural_census2010
/WRITE-UP%20AGRI.%20CENSUS%202010.pdf [hereinafter AGRICULTURAL 
CENSUS]. 
41 Farmers are paid for their milk weekly and there is a shift to mobile payments so 
that some of the downsides of cash payments such as safety concerns can be 
minimized. See Staff Report, Milk Payments Mechanism: Easypaisa, Nestle 
Collaborate to Facilitate Dairy Farmers, DAILY TIMES (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://dailytimes.com.pk/91261/milk-payments-mechanism-easypaisa-nestle-
collaborate-to-facilitate-dairy-farmers/.  
42 See ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20, supra note 26, at 17–18. In the spring Kharif 
cropping season sowing takes place between Apr-Jun with harvesting taking place 
between Oct-Dec and in the winter Rabi cropping season, sowing takes place 
between Oct-Dec with harvesting occurring between Apr-May. See id. 
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Farmers and tenant farmers get paid for their crops when they harvest 
and bring them to market.43 Thus, the farming calendar makes the 
regular weekly income farmers can get from the sale of milk 
necessary for them to be able to meet their household expenses. 
Landless livestock farmers are even more dependent on their 
earnings from the sale of milk.44 In a cash-strapped, debt-burdened 
rural economy we should not underestimate the impacts of even 
small amounts of money to effect significant structural 
transformation. 
 
An analysis of the transformation in the dairy sector that is 
underway in Pakistan shows that while looked at individually, as on 
the farm above, each of the expansionary decisions to undertake 
dairy farming at greater scale is one of efficiency. Leading to higher 
productivity with increased milk yields from both improved, often 
imported, breeds and practices.45 Plus, as the model farmer and 
company representatives inform a visitor, producing cattle that is 
better cared for. However, the heart of the structural transformation 
in the dairy sector that is underway, in which large companies move 
in to connect livestock and small farmers with urban consumers by 
being a source of regular income. This is the very process through 
which the logic of the market may triumph at the cost of those same 
livestock, small farmers, and landless agricultural workers. Given the 
pressures on small farmers to consolidate, I suggest that greater 
infusions of regular payments, which at first glance is exactly what 
may seem to be what a resource-poor rural economy needs, is the 
very mechanism by which small farmers are made to feel the need to 
consolidate. Allowing them to feel the pressures through the 
transmission of price signals to overcome the small sizes of their 
landholdings and herds. In essence, to no longer remain small.  
 
In brief summary, there is a massive, structural 
transformation taking place in dairy production. Along with a 
growing nexus of rural areas with urban areas and the overall role of 
the private sector in this structural shift towards a market-based 
economy. The structural change towards a market-led approach 
means that Pakistan is well on its way to a capitalist dairy sector. One 
 
43 See generally id.  
44 See generally Akhtar et al., supra note 7, at 384–85. 
45 See generally Livestock Census 2006, supra note 38, at tbls.15–16. On average, 
buffalo milk has twice the fat content of cow milk which has an edge as far as 
consumer taste is concerned. See Milk Composition, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/dairy-production-products/products/milk-
composition/en/#:~:text=The%20fat%20content%20of%20milk,milk%20is%20ab
out%202%3A1 (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). 
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with severe, and troublesome, long-term implications for the survival 
of small-scale dairy and agricultural farmers. The negative effects on 
livestock health and welfare as the process of ever greater efficiency 
pressures fall on the most vulnerable, both human and animal. 
Pakistan is nowhere close to the kind of consolidation of the livestock 
industry we see in some other countries in this issue. Nevertheless, I 
suggest that with current trends, and the direction of change, the first 
hints of such a large structural shift are visible. Surely, once the goal 
becomes greater yield without a significant regulatory or ethical 
check developing concurrently, how long can the trend by bucked? 
The under-appreciated tragedy from a country perspective is that 
policy-makers are not even asking these relevant questions of the 
structural changes underway.  
 
To show this transformation in the dairy sector, the article is 
divided into four sections that taken together describe the forces of 
change that are underway: (i) the self-understanding of the nation as 
one based on its rural strength and the British colonial origins of the 
idea of ‘a nation of farmers’; (ii) the structure of the rural economy 
that supports milk production at a vast and small scale including the 
critical work of women in daily dairy management; (iii) how 
international development finance is enabling the role of market 
forces in shaping the lives of small farmers together with 
multinational and national companies to increase yields; and (iv) 
unconsidered implications for policy going forward.        
III.  Imperial rule Creates a Nation of Farmers  
 
To comprehend the self-understanding of a nation one must 
get a sense of the history through time and place. Modern-day 
Pakistan boasts the world’s largest contiguous irrigation network, an 
area covering 45 million acres.46 The origins of farming in the Indus 
Basin are to be found in the Bronze-era Indus Valley Civilization 
centered around Mohenjo-Daro.47 In the modern era, present-day 
Pakistan’s agricultural endowment is the result of Britain’s creation 
of a vast, agricultural landholding and loyal rural class situated 
primarily in that part of Punjab province in India. The Jewel in the 
Crown of the British Empire, that upon Partition in 1947, came to 
Pakistan’s share. This irrigation network remains the basis of 
Pakistan’s economy and continues to employ nearly half its labor 
 
46 See Indus Basin Irrigation System of Pakistan, TRIPLE BOTTOM-LINE, 
http://www.tbl.com.pk/indus-basin-irrigation-system-of-pakistan/ (last visited Nov. 
3, 2020). 
47 See generally MUHAMMAD H. PANHWAR, SIX THOUSAND YEARS OF IRRIGATION 
IN SINDH 67 (2011). 
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force.48 To this day, agriculture accounts for nearly 70% of the 
country’s export earnings.49 For instance, national development 
goals envisage it becoming a milk and meat exporter.50 Despite the 
sheer scale of the endowment of a rural agrarian base, 36.9% of the 
population remains food insecure.51 To date, the country’s dismal 
and regressive social and economic outcomes are grounded in this 
basic structure of an economy created to serve the ends of a departed 
Empire.  
 
A. British Rule of India and the Rural Cooperative Moment 
 
For our purposes, it is important to take account of the long 
history, going back to the colonial era of rural cooperatives in India 
when imperial rulers attempted to create them.52 Under British rule 
of India, the development of irrigation canals brought water to the 
previously unirrigated plains of the Indus river.53  This enabled the 
settlement of new lands, with new farmers moving west from the 
densely populated regions of eastern Punjab.54 At the same time as 
the canal irrigation project, building the canal colonies was also a 
colonial-settler project. This helped increase food production in the 
face of recurring and devastating famines that undermined the 
credibility of imperial rule. 55 At the height of their development, 
massive population transfers occurred.56 According to census 
figures, nearly 1.5 million settlers moved from Punjab’s eastern parts 
 
48 Agriculture Statistics: Introduction, PAK. BUREAU OF STAT., 
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/content/agriculture-statistics (last visited Nov. 4, 2020). 
49 Daniel Workman, Pakistan’s Top 10 Exports, WORLD’S TOP EXPORTS (Aug. 9, 
2020), http://www.worldstopexports.com/pakistans-top-10-exports/.  
50 Chairman Message, PLDDB, https://www.plddb.pk/syed-yawar-ali/ (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2020) (PLDDB stands for the Punjab Livestock and Dairy Development 
Board); see ECONOMIC SURVEY 2019-20, supra note 26, at 14. 
51 MINISTRY OF NAT’L HEALTH SERVS., GOV’T OF PAK., NATIONAL NUTRITION 
SURVEY 2018: KEY FINDINGS REPORT 38 (2018), available at 
https://www.unicef.org/pakistan/sites/unicef.org.pakistan/files/2019-
07/Final%20Key%20Findings%20Report%202019%20%281%29.pdf. 
52 See generally Mihir Shah et al., Rural Credit in 20th Century India: Overview of 
History and Perspectives, 42 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 1351, 1353 (2007). 
53 See generally SAIYID ALI NAQVI, INDUS WATERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: THE 
EVOLUTION AND TRANSITION OF AGRARIAN SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN (2013).  
54 For an excellent history of the development of the canal colonies of the Punjab, 
see IMRAN ALI, THE PUNJAB UNDER IMPERIALISM, 1885–1947 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 2014) (1988). 
55 In a masterful new study of the East India Company, William Dalrymple has a 
chapter, “Racked by Famine” that 
details the mass hunger and suffering British rule caused in India. See generally 
WILLIAM DALRYMPLE, THE ANARCHY: THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, CORPORATE 
VIOLENCE, AND THE PILLAGE OF AN EMPIRE 215–58 (2019). 
56 See ALI, supra note 54, at 8–10. 
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to the canal colonies of western and southern Punjab in the two 
decades between 1901-1921.57 While efforts were made to form and 
operate “cooperative irrigation societies” after the war in 1920, the 
experiments failed due to a lack of “harmony among the 
cultivators.”58 While the efforts had centered on the sharing of 
irrigation water, the colonial government learned the lesson and did 
not attempt to organize rural cooperatives for other purposes either.59 
When it comes to the formation of dairy cooperatives, forces similar 
to the ones disincentivizing cooperatives for water sharing may be in 
effect. 
IV.  Shifting Practices 
  
 A. Transporting Milk to Cities 
 
While dairy farmers have always sold their milk to peri-
urban areas and cities, with the advent of the MPMC’s milk 
procurement is becoming more formalized.60 This, of course, was a 
key rationale for their introduction as they would be able to bring 
high-quality milk to consumers. But, as the IFC has recognized, it is 
difficult to build businesses that bring nutrition to the base of the 
pyramid consumers.61 Before we take a closer look at the differences 
in practice between the informal and formal mechanisms for milk 
transport, we must note the immense difference in their market 
shares. To date, after three decades of the introduction of formal 
dairy value chains, raw unprocessed milk remains between 95-97% 
of the market while the remaining 3-5% of milk is Ultra High 
Treated(ment), or UHT, pasteurized and homogenized milk62 sold by 
the MPMC’s.63 In addition to this huge volumetric difference, the 
substantive differences in their practices are significant as they relate 
to procurement, handling, storage, transport, and sale.64 The 
 
57  Indu Agnihotri, The Canal Colonies of Punjab, 33 INDIAN ECON. & SOC. HIST. 
REV. 37, 38 (1996). 
58 See ALI, supra note 54, at 177. 
59 See id. 
60 See GENE MOSES, INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC IN THE DAIRY SECTOR: SPOTLIGHT ON 
NUTRITION 8 (2017). 
61 Id. at 13. 
62 The formal liquid milk category is dominated by UHT packaged milk that 
without refrigeration has a long shelf-life and only requires refrigeration after a 
carton is opened. As reliable electricity remains a challenge and fresh milk requires 
refrigeration throughout the supply chain it is not yet the norm across Pakistan’s 
formal dairy sector. Pasteurized, supra note 3. 
63 ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 17–18, 21. 
64 See generally Natasha Ansari et al., ‘Milk for Milk, Water for Water’: Analysing 
Pakistan’s Dairy Innovation, IDS BULLETIN (2018), 
https://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/index.php/idsbo/article/view/2933/Online%20article.  
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traditional doodh walas65 (milk sellers) buy milk either directly from 
farmers at short distances. More commonly, dodhis (milk 
transporting middle men), who transport milk to peri-urban areas and 
cities in large metal vats, or more recently plastic containers, without 
any quality checks or refrigerated transport.66 Usually, low-quality 
unhygienic ice may be added to the milk vats to cool and protect it 
from high temperatures during transport as well as to add to the 
volume of milk, thereby improving margins.67 This leads to dilution, 
as well as problems of contamination given the quality of water used 
to make ice.68 Despite these concerns, traditional dodhis perform a 
fundamental, low-cost, and efficient service in transporting milk 
from where it is primarily produced to where it is primarily 
consumed.  
 
The MPMC’s meanwhile have built a more formalized milk 
collection chain that embeds farmers and private-sector dodhis into 
a network of milk collection and chilling centers that allows them to 
check quality, while cooling the milk during transport.69 Nestle, for 
instance, collects milk from 190,000 dairy farmers, has 3,500 milk 
collection centers, and 3,300 chilling centers.70 By 2014, through its 
emphasis on checking quality from collection through transport, it 
lowered microbial and Mycotoxin levels, as well as reduced total 
milk rejections by 20% over the previous year. 71 Engro, too, has 
135,000 farmers from whom it collects milk and has developed a 
network of 1,600 milk collection centers.72 In partnership with a 
major telecom and digital phone service provider it has installed a 
data collection and payments system at its milk centers to gather 
quality data, volume data, and make automated payments to 
farmers.73    




65 Doodh is milk in Urdu.  
66 See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 11–12, 36. 
67 Id. at 11. 
68 Id. See generally Asif Kamran & Syed Muhammad Ahsan Rizvi, Reason and 
Trends for Using Packaged Milk in Pakistan: Study of Urban Pakistani 
Consumers, in 185 LECTURE NOTES IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 909, 909–10 (J. 
Xu et al. eds., 2013). 
69 See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 12, 22. 
70 See CSV NESTLÉ, supra note 6, at 24. 
71 Id. at 26.  
72 Press Release, Engro Corp., Telenor Pakistan Automates Milk Collection 
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B. Managing Diary Animals for Quality and Yields 
 
One of the major areas of concern for MPMC’s is the safe 
and hygienic procurement of milk.74 It is particularly illustrative to 
see some of the changing practices on farms and the ways market 
dynamics are transforming animal welfare. In some sense, as will be 
evident by contrast with some of the other articles in this volume, 
questions that may arise in other jurisdictions about animal welfare 
are currently largely absent from dairy development discourse in 
Pakistan. The driving motivation of MPMC training programs, for 
the most part, is to increase milk yields. Therefore, dairy animals are, 
in that framing, important to take proper care of due to their 
instrumental milk-yielding value. Nestle, for instance, works with its 
farmers to increase the low milk yields of dairy animals from a given 
base of 5-6 liters to 10-14 liters.75 While this is a very far cry from 
what dairy farmers in developed countries, such as the U.S. or 
Australia produce. For the farmers who sell their milk by volume, 
these are large gains.76 The improved practices for better animal 
welfare and hence greater milk yield that company representatives 
impart are a combination of a few simple things. For example, 
sheltering animals in open sheds, rather than closed brick rooms that 
retain greater heat. Along with such things as ensuring that during 
the long hot days of summer, with temperatures routinely crossing 
100-plus Fahrenheit, livestock even when tied, have ample leeway to 
easily reach a water container. Representatives of large milk buying 
companies explain the parallel to farmers by drawing an analogy to 
human lactating mothers; just as a breast-feeding mother has to have 
regular drinks of water to make sure that she produces enough milk 
to feed her child, so too do their dairy animals.77  
 
In addition to training farmers who remain on their own 
farms to care for their animals in ways that increase yields. The 
MPMC’s have also undertaken programs to train additional people, 
which is expected to professionalize the quality of human enterprise 
available to larger sized farms. Tapping into the need for trained 
human cadres that can help grow herd and farm sizes. Engro, for 
instance, with funding support from the European Union, other 
European country development banks, and governments has 
developed its proprietary Dairy Development Program which has 
trained male workers as farm supervisors and females as livestock 
 
74 See Tahir et al., supra note 20, at 8. 
75 See generally id. at 8–9, 13–14. 
76 See id. at 8–9. 
77 Field visit observations (notes on file with author).  
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extension workers.78 In 2019, the program had trained 1,263 workers 
of whom 35% are female.79 Nestle, however, has chosen to tackle 
another problem that stands in the way of larger farm sizes. Mainly, 
the lack of capital and financing that smaller farmers face in growing 
their farms to larger sizes, thereby improving their economic 
returns.80 The Kisan (farmer) Club subsidizes farm inputs, such as 
chillers, cow purchases, and breed improvement, through helping 
finance bank loans,81 or through innovative partnerships for digital 
micro-finance lending.82 
 
MPMC’s have also put in place testing and quality assurance 
checks at the points of collection. They perform various qualitative 
and quantitative tests at the Village Milk Collection centers, as well 
as at their Regional Milk Collection centers.83 “These include 
organoleptic, temperature, clot on boiling, fat%, solids not fat, total 
solids, and specific gravity. Tests for aflatoxins, antibiotics, and 
physiochemical characteristics are performed at RMC to ensure 
product processing quality and safety.”84 “At the second place during 
processing or intermediate steps, various systems for quality and 
safety management, e.g., ISO 9000, FSMS 22000, total quality 
management (TQM), hazard analysis and critical control point 
(HACCP), and many other ISO certificates are adopted.”85 Further, 
the companies have also adopted incentive systems, in the form of 
payment premiums for the volume of milk supplied, the regularity 
with which a farmer supplies milk to the company, and for other 
microbial tests.86  
 
One key constraint in raising milk yields is the limitations in 
the commercial availability of fodder, or feed. Agricultural dairy 
farmers, in particular, face choices of the amount of their plots on 
which to plant fodder for their dairy animals as against other cash 
 
78 Recorder Report, European Union Recognises Engro Foods’ Dairy 
Development Programme, BUSINESS RECORDER (May 28, 2019), 
https://fp.brecorder.com/2019/05/20190528481122/.  
79 Id. 
80 Farm Practices, supra note 12. 
81 Id. 
82 Nestlé Pakistan and Telenor Microfinance Bank Partner to Launch Digital 
Lending for Farmers, NESTLÉ (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nestle.pk/media/pressreleases/nestle-pakistan-and-telenor-
microfinancebank-partner-to-launch-digital-lending-for-farmers.  
83 Tahir et al., supra note 20, at 8. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 See id at 9–10. 
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and food crops.87 For livestock farmers the equation, of course, is 
different given that they rely on purchasing the necessary feed from 
agricultural markets. Overall at the national level there is a: 
  
15 to 30% deficit in total digestible nutrient 
requirements for livestock.88 On average, livestock 
obtain about 50% of their nutrients from green 
fodder, 38% from crop residues and the remainder 
from grazing vacant lands and cropping land post-
harvest [in original], and cereal by-products and oil 
cake/meals.89 Such estimates highlight the 
limitations in digestible energy and protein supply at 
a national level.90  
 
Not only is this a major hurdle in raising dairy cattle that 
produces consistently high yields, but given that these are national 
averages, more localized research is needed to develop an 
appreciation of incentives as they operate on the farm level. As the 
Australian dairy mission pointed out, to sustainably increase yields, 
there is need for more localized assessments of feed availability for 
different agro-climatic zones.91 Without such granular research, it 
will be difficult to design effective policy that addresses the choices 
farmers are faced with on a daily basis.   
 
C. Women and the Production of Milk 
 
Women are active workers whose labor and knowledge is 
vital to the agricultural economy, it employs 67% of the female 
workforce and they are involved in most tasks from the planting of 
crops to their harvesting.92 Small ruminants and animals (goats, 
buffalo, and, cows) are a part of the household’s food basket whose 
primary care, milking, and feeding duties fall to women along with 
 
87 Muzaffar Iqbal & Munir Ahmad, An Assessment of Livestock Production 
Potential in Pakistan: Implications for Livestock Sector Policy, 38 PAK. DEVELOP 
REV. 615, 615–16 (1999).  




92 Ruqayya Khan, Women in Pakistan Agriculture, PAKISSAN.COM (Dec. 12, 2018, 
9:58 pm), https://www.pakissan.com/2018/12/12/women-in-pakistan-agriculture/; 
see DURRE SAMEE ET AL., FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WOMEN 
IN AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN 1 (2015), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-
i4330e.pdf.Women in Agriculture in Pakistan, Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), Islamabad, Pakistan, 2015, http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4330e.pdf [hereinafter 
WOMEN IN AGRICULTURE]. 
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responsibilities related to other agricultural tasks.93 Women’s role in 
household and farm livestock management is particularly extensive. 
Ranging from the daily watering and milking needs of cattle to 
making and forming the dung cakes to be used as fuel for household 
cooking. Essentially, working with livestock is seen as an extension 
of chores related to the household.94 Meanwhile, about 60% of their 
work remains unpaid and to correct this disbalance, extensive 
mobilization will have to be undertaken.95  
 
Because of women’s involvement in livestock management, 
development agencies have funded training programs aimed at them 
by NGOs and private companies.96 For example, USAID financed 
the training of 5,000 women as extension workers under its Dairy 
Project.97 These training programs are conducted by more formally 
educated and trained women. This enables easier access by 
overcoming cultural and communication barriers with the women 
farmers being trained.98 As the rationale for the training emphasizes, 
when women’s work becomes the means through which the family 
can earn a regular income, their status in both the family as well as 
the community is enhanced.99 USAID’s internal audit of the project 
found that its targeted material gains along with enhanced incomes 
for the female extension workers did not materialize because of 
social and cultural barriers.100 Clearly, the structural barriers to such 
development projects are limited. Meanwhile, the actual work of 




93 See SAMEE ET AL., supra note 92, at 38–39, 94. 
94 See Ansari et al., supra note 64, § 3.1. 
95 Khan, supra note 92.  
96 See Gender Equality and Female Empowerment, USAID, 
https://www.usaid.gov/pakistan/cross-cutting-themes-good-governance-and-
gender-equity (last updated Sept. 28, 2020). 
97 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., AUDIT REPORT NO. G-
391-16-002-P, AUDIT OF USAID/PAKISTAN’S SMALLHOLDER DAIRY PROJECT 3–5 
(2015), available at https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2018-06/g-391-16-002-
p.pdf. 
USAID’s Dairy Project aims to “[t]rain and support 6,000 female livestock 
extension workers on improved farming practices and establish them as self-
employed dairy extension service providers.” Dairy Project, USAID, 
https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/usaid-funded-
dairy%C2%A0project (last updated July 12, 2016). 
98 See Gender Equality and Female Empowerment, supra note 96. 
99 Id. 
100 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 97, at 4–5. 
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 V. Developing Markets: Firms and Finance 
 
While the change that occurs through dairy management 
practices improves yields and the welfare of animals to the extent 
that they get easier access to water, shade and feed. It also accelerates 
the market forces operating on farms to consolidate, increase herd 
size, improve herd quality through imported crossbreeding, and to 
change attendant farm practices.  With the pressures to increase 
efficiencies, significant changes have occurred to date in the herd 
stock, crossbreeds now make up 13% of Pakistan’s cattle 
population.101 The crossbreeds have higher yields, longer lactation 
periods, and shorter carving intervals making them ideal for more 
intensive dairying practices.102 The MPMC’s are particularly keen 
for their adoption and to move farmers toward intensifying dairying 
practices.103 MPMC’s are leveraging their strong corporate and 
financial positions to partner with banks. This allows them to tap into 
the government’s economic development and lending schemes to 
unlock loans to dairy farmers who want to grow their businesses, but 
are hampered by the lack of access to formal channels of credit.104 
For instance, Nestle  has partnered with JS Bank, a major local bank 
and financial conglomerate, to provide dairy development loans 
under the Prime Minister’s Youth Business Loan (PMYBL) scheme 
to farmers in its network at 6% interest with whom it’ll work to grow 
farms along professional lines.105 JS Bank has extended its provision 
of financing for dairy farmers to procure machinery and livestock 
through a partnership with Engro and bring loans to their network of 
farmers under the PMYBL.106 Under the terms of the loans, farmers 
are eligible to borrow for up to 8 years. During that time, the 
understanding is they will remain part of their respective company’s 
network, while also being able to access the latest information and 
guidance to be able to grow their businesses along professional 
lines.107 Additionally, Nestle has partnered with a major private 
 
101 Tahir et al., supra note 20, at 7. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1. 
104 See, e.g., JS Bank Partners with Nestle Pakistan under the Prime Minister’s 
Youth Business Loan (PMYBL), JS BANK (Dec. 5, 2017), https://jsbl.com/js-bank-
partners-nestle-pakistan-prime-ministers-youth-business-loan-pmybl/ [hereinafter 
JS Bank Nestle]; see, e.g., Staff Report,  JS Bank Partners with Engro Foods to 
Empower Dairy Sector, PAK. TODAY (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/03/29/js-bank-partners-with-engro-foods-
to-empower-dairy-sector/; see, e.g., Livestock Financing for Dairy Farmers, BANK 
AL HABIB, https://www.bankalhabib.com/livestock (last updated 2020). 
105 JS Bank Nestle, supra note 104. 
106 Staff Report, supra note 104.  
107 Id. 
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sector bank, Bank Al Habib, under a State Bank of Pakistan Policy 
to support the financing of small and medium-size enterprises.108 
Under the scheme, farmers who have been working with Nestle for 
at least two years are eligible to apply for financing to meet their 
operational costs. (i.e., purchase animals, purchase livestock or dairy 
equipment and machinery, or pay distribution and transportation 
expenses).109 The State Bank of Pakistan defines small enterprises as 
having up to 50 employees and a minimum annual sales turnover of 
PKR of 150 million.110 At the time of writing, the USD to PKR 
exchange rate is approximately 1 = 160 which would mean a small 
commercial dairy farm would have close to USD 938,000 in annual 
sales.111 A medium enterprise meanwhile may have up to 250 
employees and annual sales of PKR 800 million,112 which in USD 
would be an annual turnover of approximately USD 5 million.113 
Given these are huge sums of money and nowhere near what any, but 
perhaps a handful of the large to very large commercial dairy 
operators, may be achieving. We can certainly question the policy 
rationale for having such financing available for the dairy sector. 
More importantly, for our purposes, the very existence of the policy 
indicates a certain kind of vision. A vision showcasing the 
desirability of large, commercially operated dairy farms supported 
by both international and national development policy-makers plus 
investors. These large commercially operated dairy firms have the 
right model for the development of the sector.   
 
Let us recall that the MPMC’s started out by paying dairy 
farmers for milk sales weekly – these were by necessity, relatively 
small amounts.114 Over the years, they’ve amassed a vast trove of 
working knowledge about the dairy economy and have now turned 
into conduits for much larger infusions of financing into the dairy 
economy. In order to transform and build it in the forms most 
profitable for their corporate objectives of encouraging the transition 
to larger more professionally managed dairy operations. It helps that 
these interests are also supported by national goals of economic 
 
108 Livestock Financing for Dairy Farmers, supra note 104. 
109 Id. 
110 SME Banking, BANK AL HABIB, https://www.bankalhabib.com/sme-banking 
(last updated 2020). 
111 See Pakistani Rupee, MARKETWATCH, 
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/currency/usdpkr (last updated Jan. 27, 
2021) (set the time field to “1Y” to see when the conversion rate was 1 USD to 
160.55 PKR).  
112 SME Banking, supra note 110. 
113 Pakistani Rupee, supra note 111. 
114 See supra note 41 and text accompanying notes 35–44. 
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development supported in turn by the expertise and enabling finance 
of international development agencies.  
 
A. Dairy Companies and the long path to the Sector’s 
Transformation 
 
In India, the milk value chain was formalized beginning in 
the 1960’s through the world’s largest dairy development 
cooperative, Amul, under its ‘white revolution’ in which the farmers 
are the owners.115 In Pakistan the creation of the dairy value chain is 
led by the private sector.116 The members of the Pakistan Dairy 
Association, an industry association headquartered in Punjab, are 
drawn from some of the country’s largest MPMC’s, such as Nestle, 
Engro, and Fauji Foods.117 Recognizing the growing viability of milk 
as an investment vehicle, the country’s military has also entered the 
formal milk market with its acquisition of the Nurpur brand of milk 
and other dairy products such as butter.118 While the advertising for 
its UHT full cream milk follows the norm of an aspirational middle 
class119 morning as seen in advertisements for other brands.120 Their 
introduction of a low-fat milk for fitness conscious individuals broke 
from the norm by showing an intense workout featuring a female and 
male model.121 Fauji Foods is a division of Fauji Foundation, the 
welfare organization formed in 1954 for the benefit of retired army 
personnel serving nearly 9 million beneficiaries.122 With such big 
 
115 See generally White Revolution, AMUL DAIRY, 
http://www.amuldairy.com/index.php/white-revolution (last updated 2017).  
116 See Alam, supra note 10. 
117 List of Executive Committee Members 2019-2020, PAK. DAIRY ASS’N (May 12, 
2020), http://pda.com.pk/ (Navigate to cachedview.com; then 
enter www.pda.com.pk/list_of_executive_committee_members_pda.htm in the 
search bar and search the Google Web Cache). 
118 Our Story, FAUJI FOODS, https://www.faujifoods.com/our-brands/house-of-
nurpur/ (last updated Oct. 5, 2020). 
119 By 2011, approximately half the country’s households were estimated to be 
within the middle class category. Pasteurized, supra note 3; Jawaid A. Ghani, The 
Emerging Middle Class in Pakistan: How it Consumes, Earns, and Saves 3–4 
(Karachi Sch. For Bus. & Leadership, Working Paper Series No. 2014-11, 2014), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262248885_The_Emerging_Middle_Cla
ss_in_Pakistan_How_it_Consumes_Earns_and_Saves.  
120 A mother and two children prepare breakfast with beautiful shots of milk being 
poured into tea. House of Nurpur, Nurpur TVC 2018, YOUTUBE (May 15, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyPMmlu2Z_w&feature=emb_logo.  
121 Creative Ads, Nurpur Low Fat Milk! TVC 2017 | Nurpur Milk Ads | Creative 
Ads, YouTube (Mar. 29, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7dH6tFnCr4.  
122 ‘Fauj’ means ‘Army’ in Urdu, Pakistan’s national language. The Fauji Group 
was formed in 1954 as a welfare trust for ex-servicemen and their families. It has 
since grown to a massive listed and traded conglomerate with holdings as diverse 
2020] MILK VALUE CHAIN IN PAKISTAN 247 
 
players entering the market for the profit potential, we can expect to 
see significant changes in the sector in the years ahead. These 
changes will most affect the livelihood potential, nutritional status of 
livestock farmers, and small farmers who are agriculturists from the 
sale of their cattle’s milk. Activists and NGO’s have warned of the 
potential harm to rural households for years.123 As they’ve identified 
a main problem of desperately poor livestock farmers and small 
farmers being forced to sell that very source of nutrition their families 
need for nutritional safety.124 This causes their families’ income to 
be insufficient for them to be able to purchase food that provides 
them with a better source of nutrition.125 Regardless, the financial and 
technical support of the international development community and 
private sector led formalization of the dairy chain in the country 
continues unabated.  
 
A coffee table book, Drops of the Divine, produced by Nestle 
tells the story of packaged milk in Pakistan including the company’s 
entry into the milk sector.126 The foundations of the country’s first 
packaged milk brand, MilkPak, were laid in 1974.127 It formed a 
lasting partnership with Nestle in 1988 because it saw the need for 
the foreign company’s expertise.128 The Swiss conglomerate 
formally took over its operations in 1992.129 The formalization of the 
milk value chain in Pakistan through a framework, that at its core 
supports the development of markets, developed by the private sector 
is undergirded by the policy and financial support of bilateral donors 
such as the United States Agency for International Development 
 
as selling milk and butter under Fauji Foods Ltd., to fertilizer manufacturing and 
marketing as well as operating power plants. See generally The Fauji Group, FAUJI 
FOODS, https://www.faujifoods.com/the-fauji-group/ (last updated 2020). While 
the process of allocating land and resources towards military purposes is an ancient 
one, the particular form of the Army’s present involvement in the rural agricultural 
domain can be traced to land grants to the military during British colonial rule of 
the Indian Sub-continent. See ALI, supra note 54, at 109–57. 
123 Nadeem Iqbal, Development-Pakistan: ‘Milk Economy’ Hurts Rural 





126 See generally NOOR SHEIKH, DROPS OF THE DIVINE: A STORY OF MILK IN 
PAKISTAN (Raisa Vayani ed., 2017), available at 
https://www.nestle.pk/sites/g/files/pydnoa361/files/asset-
library/documents/press_releases/nestle-dairy-book-pdf.pdf.  
127 Id. at 40. 
128 Id. at 42. 
129 Id. at 41. 
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(USAID).130 Nestle’s Agricultural Services conducts trainings for 
farmers and has developed farming manuals with IFC’s support.131 
In 2017, IFC provided $145 million in financing to the Dutch dairy 
company FrieslandCampina for its acquisition of a majority stake in 
Engro Foods. (‘Engro’)132 It reiterated that the investment would 
have significant developmental impact including: “Food Safety 
improve product quality and safety standards; Farmer Benefits: 
Increased benefits to small-holder dairy farmers; Job Creation and 
Inclusive Growth; Improved  Competitiveness: Enhanced supply-
chain efficiencies in milk collection; [and] Promote FDI to 
Pakistan.”133 In short, international development agencies base their 
support of the private-sector led development of the country’s dairy 
sector because of the potential for dual impact in both the rural areas, 
through an improvement in farmer incomes, and the country’s urban 
areas, for consumers’ ability to access high quality milk. Engro’s 
market share for its flagship Olper’s brand stands at 45% of the 
market for packaged milk.134 Together, with Nestle, the two 
companies control just over 90% of Pakistan’s market for packaged 
milk.135 In the creation of this value chain, there are significant gains 
for the private companies that create the brands on which consumers 
rely. I suggest, limited gains for livestock farmers and small farmers 
coupled with significant detriments to their interests.  
 
Accompanying this positive assessment is an evaluation by 
MPMC’s, namely Nestle and Engro, with their dominance of the 
packaged milk sector.  The MPMC’s are responsible for the sector’s 
formalization and development of markets that connect farmers to 
urban markets in the context of the more traditional marketing 
functions they know well through the development of brands and 
advertising targeting various segments of the markets they create and 
 
130 USAID’s Dairy Project is aimed at supporting 49,000 dairy farmers in Punjab 
province by providing them with information to upgrade their dairy practices. The 
project also aims to train 6,000 female extension workers and 2,500 male artificial 
insemination workers so that they can become self-employed workers in the 
agricultural value chain in the province. Dairy Project, supra note 97. 
131 News Desk, How is Nestle Pakistan Empowering Dairy Farmers?, GLOBAL 
VILLAGE SPACE (July 17, 2019), https://www.globalvillagespace.com/how-is-
nestle-pakistan-empowering-dairy-farmers/.  
132 Jim Cornall, IFC Helping FrieslandCampina with $145m Package for Engro 





133 MOSES, supra note 60, at 17. 
134 Alam, supra note 10. 
135 Id. 
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serve. For the most part, it is these commercial companies that are 
doing the work of creating the forms of the market and the dairy 
industry that is taking shape. Given the critical role of companies in 
creating the overall structures of the dairy industry, and this is in 
sharp contrast to India, their actions need careful scrutiny of both the 
actions they choose to undertake and the tasks they leave unattended 
as functions they believe are the proper domain either of 
governments or the responsibility of farmers themselves. To give an 
example of neighboring India, functions such as “animal breeding, 
animal nutrition, and animal health and hygiene” are all the 
responsibility of the cooperative.136  While the companies have 
developed training programs with donor support that are meant to 
enhance animal health and hygiene137 they leave unattended other 
key areas such as animal breeding as well as animal nutrition – a key 
contributor to low yields.138 For instance, in an interview the Engro 
CEO made clear that as far as the company is concerned the problem 
of low yields can be addressed if farmers give a proper feed to their 
cattle: “That is the biggest issue in getting affordable (packaged) 
milk to people.”139 The problem however may be more complex than 
what Engro’s CEO identified. On a major study mission of Pakistan’s 
dairy sector, Australian experts identified the problem of inadequate 
feed leading to low dairy yields as a complex problem by situating 
dairy animals and their roles in rural life beyond the evaluation of a 
single metric – low yields being linked to inadequate nutrition.140 
Their analysis bears quoting at length:  
Between 1990 and 2005, there has been a trend 
towards reduced areas of fodder crops, while 
production per ha has remained static. At the same 
time, the livestock population has increased, 
circumstances that suggest nutrient requirements for 
maintenance have increased, reducing availability 
for production. This critical constraint of 
insufficient feed consumed by dairy animals is 
recognized by scientists, as is the fact that this is 
aggravated by continuous increases in the milking 
animal population. Why are these trends occurring? 
Do farmers not understand basic principles of 
 
136 White Revolution, supra note 115. 
137 See MOSES, supra note 60, at 20 (“We are grateful to IFC for the technical 
expertise. . . . The knowledge we received has 
been very useful. We hope that the value additions will prove beneficial for the 
farmers who will receive the knowledge and insights.”). 
138 See Alam, supra note 10. 
139 Id. 
140 See WYNN ET AL., supra note 31, at 5–8. 
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requirements for maintenance and production? Are 
there other factors at play, such as risk management 
because of high mortality or opportunities in meat 
and livestock trading to commercial milk producers? 
Clearly, large ruminants have traditionally provided 
milk for household consumption in Pakistan and 
will continue to do so. However, they also fulfil 
other roles, such as: 
•providing supplementary income from milk, 
•being an easily liquidated asset, thus providing 
security against crop failure, 
•providing manure important to maintaining soil 
fertility, 
•meat production, 
•sale of milking or breeding cows to commercial 
milk producers, 
•an avenue to convert crop by-products into saleable 
foods, 
•gainful employment of available family Labour, 
and 
•in some systems, providing draft power.141  
 
To address the issue of nutrition as it leads to milk 
production, a host of incentives that go beyond those operating on 
feed markets, and of what Engro has identified perhaps simplistically 
as sub-optimal behavior on the part of farmers, will need to be 
addressed. This also raises the question of the role and capacities of 
various levels of government responsible for the regulation and 
development of the dairy sector more broadly. Given Pakistan’s 
federal constitutional structure, agriculture and thereby dairy, is a 
provincial subject142 with a potentially very significant role for 
provincial governments and NGO’s within the context of the broader 
financing interface of the federal government with bilateral donors 
and international development finance institutions.143 The interplay 
of the two levels of government has a significant impact on 
developments on the ground in a given province especially since the 
 
141 Id. at 7. 
142 Agriculture is a residuary provincial power in the Constitution of Pakistan. 
Understanding Agriculture’s Constitutional Arrangement, BUSINESS RECORDER 
(Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.brecorder.com/news/561266/.  
143 USAID for instance funds an NGO, the Dairy and Rural Development 
Foundation for its project in support of the Government of Punjab. See Shumaila 
Jamil, USAID DRDF Dairy Project Corporate Documentary, YOUTUBE (Jan. 28, 
2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XyBTecw5v74 (explaining that 
USAID, for instance, funds an NGO, the Dairy and Rural Development 
Foundation for its project in support of the Government of Punjab). 
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federal government is the ultimate guarantor of development loans 
and the primary arranger of such international development 
financing.144 The most significant impacts of the relations between 
the federal government and any particular provincial government 
arise in cases in which the provincial government is from a party that 
is not an ally or is in opposition to the federal government in a given 
province.145 This is especially the case because the federal 
government is often the conduit for channeling development 
financing for the overall skill development and enhancement of the 
dairy sector in a particular province.146 Without such access to 
financing for provincial development initiatives, farmers and the 
overall state of the dairy and livestock sector within a province end 
up suffering.      
 
The particular form of actions that the two largest MPMC’s, 
Nestle and Engro, adopt impacts not just the operations and 
incentives of the dairy farmers within their networks, but also the 
actions of other commercial entrants into the dairy sector. Fauji 
Foods as a significant, new operator in the milk and dairy value chain  
launched a dairy creamer Dostea, a play on the Urdu word for 
 
144 See Centre-province Ties, DAWN (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1462149 (explaining that center-province relations 
under the present government have been getting progressively more protracted 
especially in relation to when a particular provincial government is from the 
opposing party to the party in power at the center); see Mishal S. Khan et al., How 
do External Donors Influence National Health Policy Processes? Experiences of 
Domestic Policy Actors in Cambodia and Pakistan, 33 Health Pol. Planning 215, 
215–23 (2018) (explaining that while the influence of donors on actual policy 
development and outcomes is complex, because donors are perceived as being 
policy experts who can also unlock financial resources for a country, policy 
makers at lower tiers of government find it relatively challenging to engage with 
them for the purposes of policy formulation and implementation). For a mapping 
of Pakistan’s significant donors and the geographic scope of their projects, see 
generally UNITED NATIONS PAK., PAKISTAN DONOR PROFILE AND MAPPING (2014), 
available at http://climateinfo.pk/frontend/web/attachments/data-
type/UN%20(2014)%20Pakistan%20Donor%20Profiles%20and%20Mapping.pdf. 
The US in particular has been Pakistan’s top donor of on-budget, grant-based 
assistance that is directed via the federal government. See generally U.S. 
Assistance to Pakistan, U.S. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN PAK., 
https://pk.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/policy-history/us-assistance-to-
pakistan/.  
145 This is the case with the current provincial government in Sindh province being 
from the PPP – the party of the assassinated former Prime Minister, Benazir 
Bhutto while Imran Khan the former cricket star turned philanthropist and 
politician is now the prime minister with his party, PTI in power at the federal 
level. See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 14.  
146 Id. at 9. 
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friendship147. Now they are working to build their brand through 
heavy advertising, in ways that are very familiar to consumers of 
packaged milk.148 The series of launch advertisements show an 
unusual and progressive family that breaks gender norms – e.g., the 
wife is a doctor and the husband is a chef and many such interesting 
turns in the extended family.149 In addition to this trio of large 
companies, dozens of smaller companies have cropped up to mimic 
this transformation of the dairy value chain supplying their brands, 
mainly in smaller towns which may not be the primary focus of the 
bigger firms and not worth extending their distribution network to 
particularly given the higher price point for their brands.150  
 
As can be expected with the presence of these heavy hitters 
seeking profits from the dairy sector, rural practices are changing 
rapidly. In this process the country’s dairy farmers are being tied to 
the increasing demand for milk and branded milk products of the 
growing middle class by the actions of large companies. These 
include, but are not limited to, extremely sophisticated and well-
funded corporate media advertising and branding operations.151 The 
MPMC’s work with extensive advertising budgets to make packaged 
milk desirable to the aspirational urban consumer.152 The level and 
scale of the television, print, and outdoor media advertising the 
MPMC’s have undertaken is stunningly large. Created with very 
high-quality production values, through the use of trusted household 
actors and singers drawn from the country’s media industry.153 
Advertising agencies, including the local partner agencies of 
international firms headquartered in New York City, have taken the 
lead in developing the marketing campaigns of all the country’s 
major brands.154 These are elaborate productions telling the tale of a 
nation. The biggest thematic campaigns are organized around several 
themes: the safety and health that mothers can give their children by 
 
147 See Our Story, DOSTEA, https://www.faujifoods.com/our-brands/dostea/ (last 
updated Oct. 5, 2020). 
148 See id. 
149 Dostea, Restaurant - #Rishton main bharo #Dostea key rang!, YOUTUBE (June 
2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlF3Pqc6dwI&feature=emb_logo; 
see Dostea, Rishta - #Dostea se banain apnay ghar ko #DosteaGhar, YOUTUBE 
(June 2, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w-
Q4t3DxE44&feature=emb_logo.  
150 See generally Ansari et al., supra note 64, § 4. 
151 See Andrew, supra note 22; see Shoaib Pervaiz & Farooq Tirmizi, The Next 
Phase of the Milk Wars, PAK. TODAY (Jan. 14, 2019), 
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2019/01/14/the-next-phase-of-the-milk-wars/.  
152 Andrew, supra note 22; Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. 
153 See Andrew, supra note 22; see Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. 
154 See Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. See generally About, OGILVY, 
https://www.ogilvy.com/about#ogilvy.  
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giving them packaged as opposed to unhygienic loose milk; the role 
of milky tea (chai) in gatherings of family and friends, which plays 
on and updates the traditional role of young women of marriageable 
age serving tea to a prospective groom and his family who have come 
to seek her hand in marriage;  enlightened husbands serving their 
wives tea after she comes home from work; and the biggest annual 
advertising campaigns of the year capitalize on the idea of piety 
associated with the Muslim holy month of Ramzan, the month of 
fasting and feasting in which the morning and evening cups of tea 
are major desirables.155 Whereas MPMC’s started out by positioning 
their respective milk brands as providing their customers with the 
highest quality of milk, guaranteed to be free of the impurities 
normally associated with loose milk. Loose milk, as we’ve seen, 
retains its overwhelming share of the milk market despite years of 
efforts to the contrary.  To get a full sense of their promise about the 
quality they hoped to convince consumers of, one need only look at 
their lavish advertising campaigns. These are centered around 
television commercials with high production values, featuring 
national celebrities in glamorous settings, custom background 
scores, and songs.156 It has become the norm for milk brands to 
release new, big budget advertising campaigns around the Muslim 
calendar month of Ramzan (Ramadan in Arabic) that is followed by 
the festival of Eid as occasions for fasting followed by feasting.157 
The idea is to capitalize on special occasions and build and reinforce 
customer loyalty around family holidays.  Only big brands can do 
that, whereas the small farmer or loose fresh milk category does not 
advertise. Additionally, there is no consortium on its behalf, such as 
 
155 See Andrew, supra note 22; see Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150; see The 
Vision Factory, Olper’s – Ramzan IV, Directed by Asim Raza (The Vision 
Factory), YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2009), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kf3fybQaL8o.  
156 A look at illustrative television commercials (TVCs) from some of the major 
brands gives us a flavor of broad themes presented by MPMC’s. For instance, an 
ad for Haleeb Milk shows a perfect mother getting her kids ready for the day by 
giving her two young children glasses of milk while her husband in an early 
morning scene of domestic bliss hands her a cup of tea. Benetone Films, Haleeb 
Milk, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5pKl1YaXcwc. The ad continues with the 
mother-in-law making dessert with the help of her grandson by using Haleeb milk. 
Id. The day ends with a party in their garden serving the desserts they’ve made 
together as a family at a moment in which the mother-in-law is clearly proud of her 
daughter-in-law and they are showing receiving the appreciation of their guests. Id. 
A particular form of an aspirational life dominates. See id. 
157 See The Vision Factory, supra note 154. An Olpers ad opens with a craftsman 
from Brunei, an artist from Pakistan, an engineer from Morocco, a dervish from 
Turkey, a doctor from Dubai and a scientist from Egypt highlighting their common 
Muslim bond and invitation of peace towards all in the holy month. See id. It 
closes with scenes of people opening the fast together in a mosque. Id. 
254 JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY [Vol. 16 
 
a dairy council or cooperative, that would engage in promoting fresh, 
raw milk as a category.  
 
One other aspect to consider is the form of the market that is 
being created through the operations of the commercial MPMC’s in 
the dairy value chain. Particularly, the procurement of milk from 
dispersed farmers by tying them to corporate distribution networks. 
A large exogenous factor may be needed for farmers to move outside 
of these commercial dairy value chains. This is especially the case 
due to the newer forms of commercial financing being in-network 
enables for the farmers. In addition, small farmers are by definition 
geographically limited and depend on local, traditional milk sellers 
or MPMC’s to buy their milk since they are unable to sell to non-
local procurers.158 Once assured of relative price stability within an 
established value chain, farmers would consider taking on the 
potential risk of self-organizing in cooperatives. This is particularly 
so because the small farmers and landless agricultural workers, we 
are primarily concerned with, have little financial capacity to 
undertake any investments which could result in future gains. 
Clearly, government is not ready to intervene in any such 
organizational effort, given its demonstrated reliance on donors and 
corporates to create the dairy value chain.159 This leaves little room 
for the introduction of a potentially disruptive, exogenous factor. 
Small farmers already living on the margins don’t have much choice, 
particularly in the form of market they wish to participate in.     
 
As indicated above, unlike neighboring India with its iconic 
post-independence Amul dairy cooperative, in Pakistan there is no 
large-scale discernible movement towards forming dairy farmers’ 
cooperatives with their own milk processing and acquisition 
facilities.160  
 




158 ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 19. 
159 See id. at 9; see CVS NESTLÉ, supra note 6, at 28–29. 
160 While there are nascent trends of small-scale dairy cooperatives being 
developed around smaller urban areas in parts of Punjab province, the bulk of 
formal market development is being undertaken by the MPMC’s; on the 
emergence of cooperatives. See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 9; see Co-operatives 
Are Empowering Dairy Farmers in Pakistan, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE (July 
21, 2015), https://www.ica.coop/en/media/news/co-operatives-are-empowering-
dairy-farmers-pakistan.   
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The prevailing understanding of how important agriculture 
and dairy are in the makeup of the country is one, among many 
illustrations of how trends, far away in time and place, continue to 
have a major impact on livestock and small farmers. As per the 
Government of Pakistan:  
 
Besides its importance and share in the national 
economy, the history of livestock raising is 
embedded in the rural life since inception of our 
civilization. It is still a sign of prestige for the people 
associated with agriculture sector. It is an integral 
part of socio-economic activities of the rural areas 
and plays a very supportive role in mitigating the 
effects of poverty by providing essential items of 
daily use.161  
  
In addition, multilateral organizations, such as IFC, are 
committed to the development of the private sector in developing 
countries and are a primary driver of the huge structural shift 
underway.162 IFC situates the development of dairy as a key theme 
of its agribusiness agenda.163 It also conceives the existence of 
smallholders in the dairy supply chain as a challenge for the 
development of the sector, and diversified ownership as a barrier to 
investment.164 Moreover, in identifying reasons why projects fail, it 
highlights cooperatives (owned by farmers) as a paradigmatic 
example.165 In the popular discourse around the higher quality milk 
that is now more easily accessible to middle class Pakistani families, 
these connections are neither made explicit nor acknowledged.166 For 
our purposes, however, it is critical to situate the significant changes 
in Pakistan’s dairy sector within the broader international 
development financing framework that has enabled and continues to 
support the changes underway.  
 
Given the IFC has a significant commitment to what is the 
growing field of bottom-of-the-pyramid inclusive businesses, but 
 
161 Livestock Census 2006, supra note 38, at XVII. 
162 See About IFC, INT’L FIN. CORP., 
https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_sit
e/about+ifc_new (last visited Sept. 28, 2020). 
163 See generally MOSES, supra note 60, at 3. 
164 Id. at 8. 
165 Id. at 12. 
166 See FrieslandCampina Enters Fast Growing Pakistani Dairy Market Through 
Engro Foods, FRIESLANDCAMPINA (July 3, 2016), 
https://www.frieslandcampina.com/news/frieslandcampina-enters-pakistani-dairy-
market-engro-foods/.  
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does acknowledge it is difficult to find a solution to the challenge of 
nutrition for base of the pyramid consumers.167 Let us pause here for 
a moment to acknowledge that having dairy cattle, plus access to 
milk within the household, is a key source of animal protein for 
landless dairy farmers and smallholders. One view is that precisely 
when they enter the market to sell any surplus their nutritional safety 
is impaired due to the low prices farmers receive, preventing them 
from purchasing foods of higher nutritional value.168 It is at this point 
when we must make the underlying presumption of development 
agencies explicit. Such that it is accepted as true, developing and 
sustaining robust markets meets the twin goals of either: reaching the 
poor with services; or somehow raising the conditions of their lives 
by giving them access to markets. The markets are a means by which 
they can increase their earnings. An important study by a local 
grassroots NGO, Punjab Lok Sujag,169 reached the conclusion that 
the operations of large MPMC’s, such as Nestle, were in fact the 
result of farmers being forced by market pressures to sell their 
“surplus” milk and their sales were “poverty driven.”170 Large 
companies are thus hugely profitable, but their profits result from 
deep, rural misery and rising nutritional insecurity.171  
 
If the goal of “development” becomes the development of 
markets, then theorists, policy makers, and citizens should, or must, 
ask whether the market-primacy presumption is acceptable, or 
desirable. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then a 
follow-up question needs to be asked:  What particular form should 
those markets take? It is a comparative question that meets the 
broader goal of the symposium of which it is a part. The aim of this 
comparative project is to learn from the ways in which developments 
in the dairy sectors of other countries have occurred and to draw 
lessons for the directions which Pakistan’s dairy sector may develop. 
For the sake of argument, if the commitment was to design a milk 
procurement and marketing supply-chain in Pakistan. Then the 
particular forms the process takes, particularly because of its 




167 MOSES, supra note 60, at 13; see BETH JENKINS ET AL., INCLUSIVE BUSINESS 
SOLUTIONS: EXPANDING OPPORTUNITY AND ACCESS AT THE BASE OF THE PYRAMID 2 
(Int’l Fin. Corp., 2010).  
168 Iqbal, supra note 123. 
169 Meaning people’ awareness/awakening. 
170 See PUNJAB LOK SUJAG, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MILK IN PUNJAB: A 
PEOPLE’S PERSPECTIVE 6–7, 13, 15 (2003). 
171 Id. at 11–12. 
2020] MILK VALUE CHAIN IN PAKISTAN 257 
 
 C. Hormonal Injections – and Claims to Quality and Purity 
 
In addition to what may be relatively benign changes in 
overall animal welfare (free access to drinking water and shaded 
stalls to house cattle instead of tying them inside hot brick rooms as 
advised by company representatives), there is a related and under-
studied aspect of the goal to increase milk yields. The concern is with 
the unregulated use of hormonal injections given to cattle. Milk 
sellers in Karachi, when faced with a ban on recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST172) pointed to its approval by the FDA, based on 
which it was given subsequent approval in Pakistan in 1998.173 This, 
they claim, is justification for the injection’s safety and hence regular 
use in the country.174 However, the Drug Regulatory Authority of 
Pakistan eventually banned three previously authorized hormonal 
injections (including rBST and rBGH).175 Health officials, however, 
admitted that rBST’s excessive use started after its approval.176 At 
the hearing before the Supreme Court bench, a senior advocate 
assisting the court submitted that not only was the hormone harmful 
to human health, but  also had detrimental effects on cow and buffalo 
health.177 There is also the significant threat of potential harm to 
human health later in life from consuming milk from animals that 
receive these injections, including breast and prostate cancer178. This 
shows that there are both negative effects on livestock health and 
lifespan, as well as on human health.179 The push for greater yields is 
pushing the limits of regulation – with the forces for higher yields 
continuing to push the limits of regulation. 
 
Another hormone is oxytocin. More commonly known as the 
cuddle hormone, or in Urdu and Hindi as the ‘doodh ki dawa’ or 
 
172 Dairy Farmers Seek Time to Implement SC Ban on Hormonal Injections, THE 
CATTLE SITE (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.thecattlesite.com/news/52527/dairy-
farmers-seek-time-to-implement-sc-ban-on-hormonal-injections/ [hereinafter THE 
CATTLE SITE].  
173 See generally Bovine Somatotropin (bST), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 21, 
2020), https://www.fda.gov/animal-veterinary/product-safety-information/bovine-
somatotropin-bst.  
174 THE CATTLE SITE, supra note 170. 
175 Drap De-lists Three Hormone Injections, DAWN (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1381717 [hereinafter Drap]. 
176 Hasan Mansoor, Sindh Slaps Ban on Hormonal Injections, DAWN (Feb. 20, 
2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1390418. 
177 APP, Import and Sale of Hormone Injections Banned, DAWN (Jan. 7, 2018), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1381337; see Drap, supra note 173. 
178 See Dangerous Hormones, DAWN (Jan. 12, 2018), 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1382316. 
179 See id. 
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‘milk medicine,’ is also given to cattle to increase milk yields.180 
Administered into the neck or leg of the animal before milking, up to 
twice a day on a regular basis because of its impact on milk 
production. It has the effect of not only making milking easier, but 
also releasing the milk normally stored in the udders and retained 
there for use by calves thus depriving calves of the important anti-
bodies found in mother’s milk.181 This effect in itself will increase 
milk production overall by a few liters.182 In addition to depriving 
calves of a valuable food source, because it causes uterine 
contractions (gynecologists may administer it to women during labor 
to induce contractions under specific conditions), it causes 
significant pain to the livestock.183 This experience of pain 
undergone at each milking must become the norm for the livestock 
that have to endure it on a regular basis. It is quite likely that livestock 
treated this way also become barren in as little as 1-3 years, leading 
them to be sold for their meat.184  Not only does the hormone have 
significant harmful effects on animal welfare, it also has negative 
effects on human health. These effects come in the form of early 
onset menstruation, via early puberty, weight gain, and an increase 
in dark facial hair in girls at a time in their lives in which they are 
particularly vulnerable to the physical and psychological effects of 
such changes.185 While the unregulated use of oxytocin is banned in 
Pakistan, as in neighboring India, with significant fines as well as 
prison time for its administration. The unlicensed use as the 
undercover operation from India, likely remains a problem.186  
 
The problem of quality of the milk supply such that concerns 
are not just limited to loose, fresh milk available at neighborhood 
 
180 Given the similarity of conditions between South Asia’s two largest countries, 
we can safely look to India for the unregulated use of oxycontin in cattle and 
assume that similar practice may be occurring in Pakistan. A significant 
undercover operation in cattle markets outside Mumbai, India was undertaken by a 
Mid-Day team. See Vinod Kumar Menon & Ranjeet Jadhav, Banned Drug Injected 








186 Id.; see Fakhir Rizvi, Use of Lethal Oxytocin to Milk Cattle Continues 
Unabated, URDUPOINT (Nov. 11, 2018, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.urdupoint.com/en/pakistan/use-of-lethal-oxytocin-to-milk-cattle-
continu-478219.html.  
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milk sellers,187 but also the quality and contents of some MPMC 
packaged milk brands remains suspect.188 Approximately 97% of the 
milk sold in the country is in raw, loose, and fresh form where quality 
problems are, by the very nature of fresh and unregulated milk being 
transported without refrigeration and sold through small milk shops, 
most pressing.189 The remainder of the 3% of the milk supply in UHT 
packaged form while safer, nevertheless is not free from quality 
concerns. A recent study of eight major packaged milk brands 
marketed by the country’s major MPMC’s found chemical 
adulterants in all of them.190 These included formalin, cane sugar, 
glucose, alkalinity, and benzoic acid.191 In some ways adulterated, 
packaged milk is of greater concern since quality is a significant part 
of the positioning of the milk brands sold by the MPMC’s.192 
 
187 While loose milk remains under-regulated and thereby potentially more 
unhygienic, it is certainly the case that it is in the interests of the MPMCs to 
highlight its dangers and thereby increase their share of the milk market. Alam, 
supra note 10 (“The dairy industry is in the middle of yet another campaign 
against loose milk producers. Aesthetically appalling images of actors spitting into 
loose milk drums draw consumers’ attention to unhygienic practices of the 
commodity’s primary producers. Doctors in white lab coats proselytize viewers 
about the dangers of loose milk. ‘Those are facts. It’s not something doctors have 
made up,’ [Ali Ahmed Khan, Engro’s Managing Director] says about industry-
funded research with a whiff of frustration.”). 
188 Adeela Awan et al., A Study on Chemical Composition of Detection of 
Chemical Adulteration in Tetra Pack Milk Samples Commercially Available in 
Multan, 27 PAK. J. PHARM. SCI. 183, 184–85 (2014). 
189 Id. at 183; Anam Hakeem, Beyond UHT Milk, AURORA (May-June 2012), 
https://aurora.dawn.com/news/1141893.  
190 Awan et al., supra note 185, at 184. 
191 Id. at 184–85 (“Alkalinity measures the ability of a solution to neutralize acids 
to the equivalence point of carbonate or bicarbonate. Rideout et al. (2008) has 
reported that high amounts of carbonates and bicarbonates disrupts hormone 
signals that regulate development and reproduction. Levels of carbonates and 
bicarbonates must be kept in milk samples as higher alkalinity values can cause 
milk alkali syndrome resulting in systemic alkalosis, renal failure, high blood 
pressure, hypertension, cardiac failure and edema (Troy, 2005). Benzoic acid is a 
natural component of milk but if its concentration in preserved milk exceeds 2000 
mg/kg it can be dangerous for health (Wibbertmann, 2000). Formalin is added to 
milk as preservative but may cause vomiting, diarrhea, abdominal pain, increased 
body temperatures, shallow respiration, weak irregular pulse, unconsciousness, 
blindness and it is also a potent carcinogen (Gwin et al., 2009).”). 
192 Olper’s Milk, Olper’s Milk #SachKaSafar, YouTube (Sept. 24, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LK4OICoUFP8. In a long television 
infomercial format by Engro Foods’ Olper’s titled #SachKaSafar – the Journey of 
Truth, a questioning consumer is guided by a well-known television news talk 
show host on a journey that shows him the company’s entire milk collection and 
packaging chain as he raises questions to company representatives that are 
typically raised by consumers comparing raw milk vs. packaged milk brands. Id. 
For instance, during a tour of the factory, the main character of the ad while 
conveying common consumer concerns asks for example why milk fat does not 
rise to the surface when packaged milk is boiled which it does when raw milk is 
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Television commercials stake a claim to branded milk being clean 
and of high quality, as being free of adulteration and undergoing 
significant quality checks.193 Engro Foods, the owner of a major 
brand, Olpers amongst others, undertakes 27-28 physicochemical 
tests from point of collection to point of packaging.194 Nevertheless, 
after ordering an inquiry into reports of unchecked hormone 
injections being given to cattle the country’s Supreme Court took suo 
moto notice under its original jurisdiction powers in the 
constitution.195 They issued notices to companies selling UHT milk 
to explain their quality control policies and practices.196 To increase 
yields in cattle raised on a commercial scale, the use of rBST 
hormonal injections has become common.197 The court reiterated it 
was a matter of public health and imperative that milk be free of 
cancer-causing hormonal injections.198 The court also warned dairy 
 
boiled to which the representative responds that it is because in packaged milk the 
milk fat is dispersed throughout the milk (it is homogenized) which makes it 
nutritious and delicious. Id. He goes on to say that boiling kills harmful bacteria 
but also reduces milk’s nutrients whereas there are no harmful bacteria in 
packaged milk, and it retains its nutrients. Id. In an interaction with a well-known 
internet personality and influencer uploaded to his channel titled Doodh Ka 
Doodh, Paani Ka Paani (a play on an Urdu saying that roughly translated means 
once put to a test, what is milk will become clear and what is water will become 
clear), Haleeb Foods gives him and his friends who arrive unannounced a tour of 
its factory and shows them all the ways in which the company has a rigorous 
testing regime in place that ensures that its milk is pure and free of adulterants. 
Junaid Akram, Doodh Ka Doodh – Paani Ka Paani | Junaid Akram, YOUTUBE 
(Apr. 7, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBK0tPkezHI.  
193 Best Pakistani ADS, Manao Happy Subha With Olper’s AD – Pakistani Milk 
TVC (2018), YOUTUBE (Sept. 27, 2018), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNBwrDDT0i0. The TVC for Olper’s Happy 
Subha (morning) shows a happy cow giving high quality milk that has a high fat 
content (as a perception of quality: high fat content is linked to a nutritious and 
delicious product). Id. To make its point, in what looks like an Olper’s consumer, a 
middle-class mother, is the one who is going to a cow in its pen in the morning. Id. 
Of course, this depiction is only to make the point and we should not see it as 
being actually representative of the typical usually much poorer dairy farmer. 
194 PCSIR Declares Olper’s Milk 100pc Pure & Safe for Consumption, THE NEWS 
(Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/275061-pcsir-declares-olper-s-
milk-100pc-pure-safe-for-consumption. 
195 See Sikander Ali, Suo Moto: A Case of Judicial Overreach?, LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ACCESS PORTAL (Dec. 12, 2019), https://leappakistan.com/suo-moto-a-case-of-
judicial-overreach/.  
196 Supreme Court of Pakistan Civil Petition at 2–6, Bhatti v. Government of 
Punjab (2016) (No. 2374-L/2016 & C.M.A. No. 2702-L/2016), 
https://propakistani.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/court-order_2.pdf [hereinafter 
Civil Petition]; see Jamal Khurshid, CJP Terms Packaged Milk a Fraud with 
Masses, THE NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/268303-cjp-
terms-packaged-milk-a-fraud-with-masses.  
197 Faiza Ilyas, Banned Hormone Still in Use in Dairy Business Despite Health 
Hazards, DAWN (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.dawn.com/news/1209783.  
198 Khurshid, supra note 193. 
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farmers it would send them to “prison if they tried to pressurize the 
administration by creating artificial milk shortage.”199 For the 
moment, the competing narratives about safety continue to play 
themselves out in the court of public opinion.  
 
D. Significantly, a Turn to Imports 
 
Stepping into this vacuum, MPMC have begun to offer 
highly marketed brands of creamers, particularly powdered tea 
whiteners.200 It is critical to explore the dynamics of what may at first 
look like contrary developments, but in fact the turn to imported dry 
milk powders and efforts by MPMC’s to build successful brands 
around a new kind of manufactured product are entirely rational. 
Despite being the world’s fourth largest producer of milk, Pakistan 
remains a milk-deficit country.201 Milk without refrigeration has a 
shelf life of about four hours and is highly prone to spoilage plus 
bacterial growth without refrigeration in high temperatures.202 In this 
climate, manufactured non-dairy creamers, particularly powdered, 
have tapped into a keen consumer need. As expected, there has been 
pushback too. The country’s ex-Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
taking notice of the quality of packaged milk reiterated that tea 
whiteners are not a substitute for milk and their packaging must state 
that they are a manufactured product, not milk.203  
 
Pakistan is said to be having its own version of a "White 
Revolution."204 A revolution, that is, in milk production.205 An 
ultimate goal of this revolution is to raise the quality of milk available 
in the country while also becoming a net exporter of milk-based 
 
199 Id.  
200 Andrew, supra note 22. 
201 Alam, supra note 10. 
202 Kamran & Rizvi, supra note 68, at 910. 
203 Khurshid, supra note 193. 
204 Milking the White Revolution, Pak. Today (June 12, 2013), 
https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/06/12/milking-the-white-revolution/. As a 
director of the Pakistan Dairy Association put it, the integrated idea of “[t]his 
‘White Revolution’ has aimed at improving research facilities, training and 
capacity building of farmers, training veterinarians, improving the cold chain 
through milk chillers, promoting healthy pasteurized milk, developing model 
commercial dairy farms, focusing on breed improvement, facilitation of credit 
financing to dairy farmers, and linking rural based farmers to market mechanisms.” 
Id. 
205 White Revolution, supra note 115. This needs to be contrasted with the “White 
Revolution,” the organization of the milk production and value chain as 
established in neighboring India beginning in the 1960s through the establishment 
of the world’s largest dairy development cooperative.  
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products.206 Despite being the fourth largest producer of milk in the 
world, there has been a steady increase in the imports of dry and loose 
milk powders, both skimmed milk and whey powder, at the cost of 
local fresh milk production.207 The country remains a net importer of 
milk.208 The question is, how a stated policy commitment to 
increasing local milk production to not only be able to meet local 
needs but also to capture export markets reconcile with significant 
dry milk powder imports that are mixed with vegetable oils to make 
dairy liquids as well as whiteners for tea and coffee to meet local 
needs. Since 2007 there is a discernible shift in what the MPMC’s 
are doing such that from positioning themselves from selling pure 
milk procured from Pakistan’s dairy farmers, towards selling what 
are referred to as ‘recipe products’ – pure milk substitutes that are 
manufactured from imported milk powders mixed with vegetable 
oils.209 There has been a steady rise in the market share of tea 
enhancers to approximately one-third of the packaged milk 
category.210 These shifts in product lines are not only more profitable 
for the companies but have seen a growth as they tap into a key unmet 
need in consumption habits – that is of the fact that refrigeration for 
fresh or UHT milk boxes is limited due to the  unavailability or 
unreliability of a regular supply of electricity.211 Dry milk coffee or 
tea creamer by contrast is always handy in diverse settings across the 
country. Nestle’s Everyday -Dairy Whitener for Tea made from milk 
solids, vegetables oils and sugar is the country’s iconic brand backed 
by extensive advertising that aims to help consumers make the 
perfect cup of tea every time.212 The MPMC’s are being called out 
due to the gap between their initial stated intentions and their actual 
practices through the extensive push of manufactured dairy 
products.213 These practices are increasing profits for them, but 
 
206 Milking the White Revolution, supra note 201. 
207 POLICY PAPER, supra note 37, at 2. 
208 Milking the White Revolution, supra note 201. 
209 POLICY PAPER, supra note 37, at 2. 
210 Kamran & Rizvi, supra note 68, at 911. 
211 See Fan Zhang, What’s Keeping Pakistan in the Dark?, WORLD BANK BLOGS 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://blogs.worldbank.org/endpovertyinsouthasia/what-s-
keeping-pakistan-dark; see FAN ZHANG, IN THE DARK: HOW MUCH DO POWER 
SECTOR DISTORTIONS COST SOUTH ASIA? 171 (2019). 
212 Uzer Khan, Nestle Everyday, YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8eqFzlQEg8. In this ad, for instance, a 
husband, after returning home from work, makes a cup of tea with Everyday to 
pacify his wife who seems to be annoyed at him for having left for work without 
telling her. Id. He apologizes to her for not having called her all day either. Id. 
Milk advertising in general works on highlighting themes of blissful domesticity. 
This one aims to go beyond traditional gender roles by showing the husband as 
progressive because he is the one making a cup of tea for his wife. See id. 
213 See Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. 
2020] MILK VALUE CHAIN IN PAKISTAN 263 
 
creating less nutritionally sound products for their customers and 
harming small farmers in the process.214 
 
E. Swiss and Dutch Conglomerates in Pakistan’s 
Dairy Sector 
 
As we’ve seen, Pakistan’s two largest dairy firms are foreign 
companies committed to the professionalization of the dairy value 
chain along the lines of their (in the case of the Dutch conglomerate, 
FrieslandCampina that took over Engro Foods in Pakistan, this as 
we’ll see below is not true of its home base in the Netherlands where 
it is organized as a cooperative owned by its farmer as owners model) 
global practices.215 Nestle for instance as we saw is working with 
commercial banks to finance and upgrade the infrastructure of 
existing farms, introduce mechanization, and foreign breeds to 
produce high-yielding animals.216  
 
The particular larger operations that this model of 
professionalized and internationalized dairying privileges will be at 
the detriment of both Pakistan’s smaller dairy producers as well as 
the small-scale middlemen who operate at relatively local scale to 
bring milk from dispersed farms to market.217 Thus, when 
considering the role of private sector markets, we must distinguish 
between smaller dispersed middlemen who have traditionally been 
the conduits to bring milk to markets and the larger professionalized 
companies selling packaged milk that are moving ever-closer 
towards actualizing vertical integration within their business models. 
 
1. Engro’s Own Farm – foretelling the way forward?  
 
“[Engro] established its own dairy farm in 2008.”218 As per 
the company’s filing:  
 
[t]he farm covers an area of 557 acres (220 acres 
owned, 337 acres leased) which is sufficient to 
house 10,000 animals. It also includes cropping land 
 
214 See id.  
215 See Pasteurized, supra note 3; see Cornall, supra note 3; see Our Brands, supra 
note 3. 
216 Empowering Dairy Farms, NESTLÉ PAK., 
https://www.nestle.pk/csv/ruraldevelopment/agriculture-services/empowering-
dairy-farmers (last visited Nov. 10, 2020). 
217 See Crossroads, supra note 17, at 76–87. 
218 Engro Foods Ltd., Offer for Sale of Shares 23 (June 24, 2011) (unpublished 
corporate filing) (on file with author). 
264 JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY [Vol. 16 
 
for growing fodder. As part of the Company 
strategy, E Foods (Engro) imported cows for its 
Dairy farm as opposed to using local breeds. E 
Foods dairy farm remains one of the largest farms 
housing 2591 animals at Dec 31, 2010 (1,476 adult 
cows and 1,035 immature cows and 80 male calves 
and bulls). Currently E Foods dairy farm is 
producing more than 20,000 LPD (liters per day). At 
present, the Dairy farm milk is used in various 
ambient and powder dairy products. This highest 
quality milk can be compared to the world’s best. 
The optimal use of this milk will come when E 
Foods will enter into various infant nutrition 
products and pursue its exports strategy.219 
 
This brief corporate filing shines light on the envisaged 
future of Pakistan’s dairy sector from the perspective of the MPMC’s 
who at present have so much do with shaping it. The company 
informs us that its entire breed at its farm is imported which clearly 
shows that for the most part, it is much more efficient to import and 
house high-yielding breeds than to work with the much slower and 
uncertain efforts to increase yields of local breeds both through 
breeding programs and cattle management practices. Given the 
reliance on government efforts for the purposes of improving local 
breeds and on individual farmers for any improved management 
practices and facilities they can build, it is no wonder that corporate 
houses prefer to internalize the entire operation such that factors are 
under their control. Importantly, the size of the farm ensures that 
Engro can grow the fodder the cattle will require on its own land 
further limiting its reliance on uncertain and external fodder markets. 
Further, given the size of the average family holding of dairy cattle, 
a farm that can house 10,000 heads of cattle is clearly huge by 
comparison and can certainly be said to be organized on a 
commercial scale.220 Given the amount of high-quality milk supply 
that that gives the firm, it thereby reduces its need to collect much 
smaller quantities from a dispersed group of smaller individual 
farmers. The question for national and international development 
policy should become, when such efficiency is the main driver for 
investments, what happens to the interests of livestock farmers and 
small farmers who ostensibly are the ones that are being 
economically uplifted through their participation in commercial milk 
value chains as President General Parvez Musharraf claimed at the 
 
219 Id. 
220 See ZIA ET AL., supra note 5, at 2–3. 
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opening of Nestle’s plant.221 The stakes of this question become even 
higher when in contrast to more run-of-the-mill traditionally 
understood development studies, eliminating poverty is also tied to 
national and international security paradigms such as fighting 
extremism and terrorism.222  
 
2. The Origins of a Dutch Cooperative 
 
In 2008 the European competition authorities gave 
permission to two Dutch dairy farmer cooperatives, themselves the 
amalgamation of several local and regional cooperatives with origins 
in the 19th century, to form FrieslandCampina, now a major global 
dairy company whose products are sold in over 100 countries.223 As 
they describe the bountiful regions of the Netherlands, their main 
home (their farmer cooperatives also extend to Germany and 
Belgium), “Friesland is a region in the north of the Netherlands 
known for its green meadows, blue skies, many lakes and splendid 
Frisian dairy herds. Campina is a wooded region of grasslands and 
meadows in the south of the Netherlands, so named by the Romans 
more than 2000 years ago.”224 Explaining its origins, the company 
suggests that dairy farmers in the latter half of the 19th century 
organized themselves in cooperatives in part to help overcome the 
challenge of getting their milk supplies quickly to markets and 
customers given the lack of refrigeration.225 Another reason for the 
farmers to join forces within a structure of farmer cooperatives was 
to gain more power in the market compared to when they used to sell 
their milk to companies.226 Given their history, they claim that “the 
member dairy farmers have built an international dairy company that 
now spans the world.”227 
 
We can see their sense of importance of history and the value 
of farmer cooperatives in the dairy sector of the Netherlands. Given 
the importance of their sense of history and the value of farmer 
 
221 Press Release, Nestlé Pak., Nestlé Opens New Milk Factor in Pakistan, Its 
Largest Milk Reception Plant in the World (Mar. 16, 2007), 
https://www.nestle.com/media/pressreleases/allpressreleases/milkfactorypaskistan.  
222 Id. 
223 See Our Heritage, FRIESLANDCAMPINA, 
https://www.frieslandcampina.com.ng/organisation/our-heritage/ (last visited Oct. 
9, 2020); see Our Cooperative: For and By Farmers, FRIESLANDCAMPINA, 
https://www.frieslandcampina.com/our-farmers/dutch-heritage/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2020). 
224 Our Heritage, supra note 219. 
225 See Our Cooperative: For and By Farmers, supra note 219. 
226 Id. 
227 Id.  
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cooperatives in the overall organization of the dairy sector within the 
Netherlands. It is important to note that since the company’s 
formation as a corporation, and its attendant overseas expansion, it 
has not adopted a strategy of organizing the dairy sectors of the 
countries in which it operates into the cooperative structure of its 
founding, nor continuing present structure in the Netherlands.228 The 
reason it is important to note the difference in the organization of the 
company in its home jurisdiction and in its overseas operations. In 
the home jurisdiction, it is owned by the members of the cooperative 
whose interests it operates. In its overseas operations it is organized 
as a commercial, for-profit company, engaged in the procuring of 
raw milk from independent farmers and selling it commercially 
under its own brands (after its takeover of Engro Foods’ milk 
brands). This illustrates how the company does not extend the 
cooperative model to the countries they expand their operations to. 
The disjunct between the organization in the ‘home’ jurisdiction 
whose value, in its own words, it clearly recognizes and the non-
extension of that beneficial model in Pakistan, makes clear in whose 
primary interests the firm operates. Highlighting this disjunct is not 
at all to make the claim that somehow it is the responsibility of the 
conglomerate to extend the cooperative model to its overseas 
acquisitions or that only a cooperative model can best serve the long-
term interests of small farmers. But, noting the difference in the 
corporate structure is surely important along the lines of what’s good 
for the goose . . . .  
VI.  Encouraging Consolidation 
 
“The dairy industry makes no secret of its objective to have 
the consumption of loose milk banned altogether. So what should the 
hundreds of thousands of ragtag milkmen do to get out of the hair of 
a handful of corporate Goliaths?”229 A major thrust of IDFA 
education and training programs is to motivate farmers to improve 
their cattle management practices, and to consolidate or increase the 
size of their cattle holdings and dairy farm operations.230 USAID’s 
funding for a project with the provincial DRDF does just that through 
a combination of field trainings, arranging for farmer visits to model 
farms, and  training or advertising videos with consistently framed, 
standardized messages to reach farmers.231 Through the development 
 
228 See About FrieslandCampina, FRIESLANDCAMPINA, 
https://www.frieslandcampina.com/about-frieslandcampina/ (last visited Oct. 9, 
2020). 
229 Alam, supra note 10. 
230 CVS NESTLÉ, supra note 6, at 28–29. 
231 Id. 
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of these forms of media in which experts, or villagers, who have 
obtained prior training and are thereby held up as having more 
knowledge impart teachings to farmers who need to be educated in 
improved dairy practices. They can be motivated by the new forms 
of learning and internalize goals for the development of themselves 
and the industry. In addition, a particular thrust of the videos is how, 
through improved cattle management practices, the farms can 
become larger.232 For instance, one farm improvement practice is to 
keep livestock under a roof in well-ventilated sheds that are open on 
all four sides. While exploring their farms for installing such a shed, 
farmers are encouraged to plan for expansion such that to construct 
with an eye for expanding their cattle holding.233 The videos and 
training models recommend a host of other improvements, but all 
without any discussion of the costs of such expansion. As if the 
additional capital investments can be made without any 
consideration of where and how livestock farmers, or small farmers, 
could access such financing.234 As we’ve seen, the MPMC’s have 
enabled themselves, through partnerships with banks, the very 
mechanisms via which large investment capital can move into the 
dairy sector, but of course that capital is only accessible by farmers 
deemed investment worthy. This highlights the fundamental 
disconnect between what the programs purportedly aim to do (uplift 
the existing bulk of livestock farmers and small farmers) versus what 
they essentially do (encourage private capital at scale to move into 
dairy development).  
 
A. The Price Gap and Some Tentative Conclusions 
 
An example of the gap between the gains by livestock 
farmers and small farmers, compared to the growth of dairy company 
revenues is illustrative. Engro estimates that an average small farmer 
provides it with 1,000 liters of milk annually for which the farmer is 
paid the equivalent of $480 annually that equals PKR 6,300 or 
approximately $40 per month.235 In 2019 meanwhile, the company 
reported annual revenues of PKR 28.9 billion or just over $180 




234 See id. 
235 INT’L FIN. CORP., IFC INCLUSIVE BUSINESS COMPANY PROFILE: ENGRO FOODS 
LTD. 4 (2014), available at https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/61d3609d-cb53-
4b8d-8797-07a62adbfee6/Engro.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=lv2IlJ8. The 
United States Dollar (USD) to Pakistan Rupee (PKR) conversion rate being 
utilized is 1 USD = 160 PKR.  
236 FrieslandCampina Engro posts Rs321m profit for third quarter, PROFIT BY 
PAKISTAN TODAY, October 16, 2020, 
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regulatory question to ask is: whether this particular developmental 
model of the state and market, is in fact operating in the best interests 
of the farmers, or of consumers and society more broadly. 
 
In essence, there is a significant difference in the average 
price at which MPMC’s buy milk from farmers (Rupees 80 per liter) 
and the retail price of packaged milk, which is approximately double 
what the companies pay to farmers.237 This approximately 100% 
price markup, the increasing gains to be had from consolidation, and 
introduction of manufactured non-dairy products may lead the bigger 
players, either the MPMC’s or larger farmers, to move to setup large 
dairy farms with fully in-house vertical production units. As we’ve 
seen this process was initially begun by Nestle.238 Or, it might enable 
other private capital to move into intensifying dairy production for 
which the large companies become the exclusive buyers. Given their 
larger size, as well as greater ability to procure adequate and 
nutritious feed, it is clear that larger players will have the ability to 
move beyond the capacity constraints of small farmers. There are 
already indications these companies are moving to structure feed 
markets to meet the higher food needs of livestock presently 
constrained by the green fodder farmers can, and for the most part 
have to, grow on their land.239 Almost certainly, they will also move 
towards greater mechanization of their large farms with its attendant 
impacts on animal welfare and the accompanying process of driving 
smaller farmers out of business because they will be increasingly less 
able to find ready buyers for their milk supplies. Larger farmers who 
have the ability to avail of the financing the MPMC’s have thus far 
enabled will likely do well in the formalized dairy value chains that 
are being created.  
Without their own consolidation in the form of cooperatives, 
as done in India in the early years after Independence in 1947,240 it is 
unclear how easy small farmers will find it to survive on even the 
lowest rungs of commercial dairy production. Perhaps a true White 
Revolution can only begin through the collective efforts of small 
 
https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2020/10/16/frieslandcampina-engro-posts-
rs321m-profit-for-third-quarter/ (last visited Jan 28, 2021). 
237 Aamir Shafaat Khan, Packaged Milk Producers Increase Prices, DAWN (Feb. 
27, 2020), https://www.dawn.com/news/1536951. A price-tracking site was used 
for this comparison. See Nestle-MilkPak: Live Price Tracking, SHOPPINGUM, 
https://www.shoppingum.com/search_t/nestle-milkpak/ (last visited Nov. 10, 
2020). 
238 Pervaiz & Tirmizi, supra note 150. 
239 Field visit observations (notes on file with author).  
240 Anbu Seilan, Dairy Cooperatives and Dairy Development in India, in NON-
FARM SECTOR AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT 428, 431 (Palanisamy Sundararaj ed., 
2011). 
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farmers. For as Pakistan’s experience shows us, anything else may 
be less than revolutionary.  
 
 
Herding History: Law and Collective Subjectivities in the 
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  Abstract 
 
  In response to the limitations of socialism and capitalism in 
meeting basic needs, this article explores the alternative version of 
modernity offered in post-Soviet Ukraine and its agriculture. Tracing 
a century of fundamental transformations through the story of milk, 
it finds a history that troubles universalized framings of indigeneity 
and colonialism. This article argues that under socialism milk 
became a product of collectivized effort and a reservoir of household 
resilience; and then, with post-Soviet disintegration of some forms 
of collective life and emergence of others, that milk has come to 
delineate spheres of both collective action and individual striving. 
This research finds in Ukrainian farming communities a tale of two 
privatizations, one concentrating wealth and the other, distributing it 
in more equalizing ways. In the dispersed structure that results, much 
Ukrainian milk production avoids some of the more environmentally 
harmful forms for which the contemporary milk economy is famous 
elsewhere. This study reveals the pragmatic play of gender dynamics 
within legal disputes and social transformation. Though now 
enmeshed in global economic networks and policy agendas, milk has 
remained the ground of specific social networks; this article shows 
the resilience of intimate relationships between dairy cows and their 
keepers and the political strength, untapped nationally but salient 
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  I. Introduction 
 
  In 1992, the milkmaids of Gruzenske village in northern 
Ukraine1 demanded a meeting with their collective farm director to 
discuss the alarming number of cattle gone missing from the village 
herd.  With the Soviet Union recently dissolved2 and its structures of 
command economy and Party discipline evaporating, the milkmaids 
suspected the director of selling off the farm's herd and pocketing the 
profits.  They were furious both with the apparent theft of an asset 
and with the disappearance of cows whom they had nurtured and 
spent hours with, daily, since calfhood.  Thus it was, in a scene 
repeated across Ukraine (and a decade before legislation instituted 
rural decollectivation de jure), that each village family went home 
with a cow and the milkmaids decollectivized the dairy holdings of 
Gruzenske.3  Although commonly glossed as a national matter of 
economic policy,4 "privatization" here is revealed as a local dispute 
 
1 This paper follows disciplinary conventions in anthropology for protecting 
confidentiality of interlocutors in the field.  See, e.g., MARIANE C. FERME, THE 
UNDERNEATH OF THINGS:  VIOLENCE, HISTORY, AND THE EVERYDAY IN SIERRA 
LEONE ix (2001) (foregrounding the anthropological practice of concealing 
identities of specific interlocutors).  Accordingly, throughout this article, I have 
anonymized names of people and places in references to my own fieldwork; 
"Gruzenske village" is an example. Names of publicly recognized historical events 
and places, or contemporary officials, public figures, or works of published 
authors, however, are referenced without alteration.  Translations, except as noted, 
are the author's. 
2 Decree of the Parliament of Ukraine [hereinafter PVRU],"On the Declaration of 
Independence of Ukraine," № 1427-XII, Aug. 24, 1991 in VIDOMOSTI 
VERKHOVNOI RADI [RECORD OF THE PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE, hereinafter VVR] 
1991, № 38, at 502, adopting DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF UKRAINE, 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Aug. 24, 1991 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1427-12 (declaring Ukraine independent by 
act of Parliament); Belavezha Accords, Dec. 8, 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia 
(agreement signed by heads of three Soviet Republics -- of the four original 
signatories to the 1922 treaty establishing the U.S.S.R. -- proclaiming the Soviet 
Union ceased to exist); Alma-Ata Protocol, Dec. 21, 1991 (agreement signed by 
representatives of eleven of twelve then-remaining U.S.S.R. republics, confirming 
extinguishment of the U.S.S.R.). 
3 Interviews with Tyotya Doyarka, head dairy maid of Gruzenske village collective 
farm, Sept. 15-19, 2009. 
4 See, e.g., First Plenary Session of U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission, Joint 
Statement of the Kuchma-Gore Commission, May 16, 1997, reprinted at 
http://www.ukrweekly.com/old/archive/1997/219724.shtml (showing that 
privatization was seen as both a national project and an economic matter for 
Ukraine);  see also, e.g., Law of Ukraine, "On the Privatization of State Property"] 
№ 2163-XII, March 4, 1992 in ВВР, 1992, № 24, at 348, Art. 1 
http://www.spfu.gov.ua/en/documents/3050.html (describing privatization as the 
alienation of state property in exchange for payment and specifying privatization 
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within gendered domains of practice over emergent norms and 
divergent practices:  the director's alleged action, pursued in secret 
and publicly reviled, and the milkmaids', carried out in public view, 
permitted at the time and valorized in the retelling.   
 
  The dissolution of dairy collectives in Ukraine was part of a 
vast national political and economic transformation.5  As the episode 
from Gruzenske shows, post-Soviet "privatization" in Ukraine has 
involved disputes over legitimacy; norm formation in real time; 
conflicts settled within the parameters of legal conduct that may go 
on to reshape the basic grounds of legality itself;6 and assertions of 
agency alongside the re-formation of legal subjects within shifted 
modes of power.  As dairy cattle became a part of a village economy 
reestablished around households, multinational food processing 
companies organized morning milk collection throughout rural 
Ukraine7 and administrative measures introduced health and safety 
regulations to make Ukrainian dairy products compatible with 
European markets.8  Presidential decrees ordered dissolution of 
collective farms and legislation instituted private property ownership 
of collective farm assets.9  Law reestablished the conditions of 
possibility for dairy production.  Ukrainian milk has become big 
business and, with daily milk sales one of the steadiest sources of 
cash for otherwise autarkic-tending households, milk has become a 
point of articulation into an international economy. 
 
  At the same time, milk remains deeply local.  In fact, 
contemporary Ukraine and the place of milk in it presents a puzzle to 
 
as a national project undertaken "with the aim of improving the socio-economic 
efficiency of production and raising funds for structural adjustment of the national 
economy").  
5 For work describing its complex of legal, economic, political, and social effects, 
see Monica E. Eppinger, Property and Political Community:  Democracy, 
Oligarchy, and the Case of Ukraine, 47 GEORGE WASHINGTON INT'L L. REV 825 
(August 2015).   
6 See Monica E. Eppinger, On Common Sense:  Lessons on Starting Over from 
post-Soviet Ukraine, in STUDYING UP, DOWN, AND SIDEWAYS:  ANTHROPOLOGISTS 
TRACE THE PATHWAYS OF POWER (Rachael Stryker and Roberto Gonzalez eds., 
2014) (outlining contestations of legitimacy and reshaping the grounding of 
legality in post-Soviet Ukraine). 
7 See text infra notes 173-175 below. 
8 See generally Monica E. Eppinger Nation-building in the Penumbra:  Notes from 
a Liminal State, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2009) (giving an overview 
of legal aspects of European integration). 
9 See text infra notes 137 - 146 below. 
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some analytic frameworks10 in which milk has come to be understood 
as emblematic of settler-colonialism.11 As elsewhere, in Ukraine the 
milk economy may, in part, index market hegemony,12 but 
colonialism is a different matter.  Debate over how to characterize 
Ukraine's past, either within Russian or Austro-Hungarian empires13 
 
10 See, e.g., Kelly Struthers Montford, Securing Animal-Based Ontologies in 
Canada, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 48 (2020) (seeing milk in the Canadian context as 
sign and perpetrator of settler-colonialism); Maneesha Deckha, Something to 
Celebrate?: Demoting Dairy in Canada’s National Food Guide, 16 J. FOOD L. & 
POL’Y 11 (2020) (viewing milk's presence with a healthy skepticism).  See also 
Merisa S. Thompson, Milk and the Motherland? Colonial Legacies of Taste and 
the Law in the Anglophone Caribbean, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 135 (2020) 
(analyzing the place of milk among colonial legacies in the Anglophone 
Caribbean). 
11 "Settler colonialism," a term coined by Australian anthropologist Donald 
Denoon, describes an imperial formation distinct from the "de-development" 
typical of colonialism.  Donald Denoon, Understanding Settler Societies, 18 
HISTORICAL STUDIES 511 (1979).  Though also premised on exogenous 
domination, setter colonialism "seeks to replace the original population of the 
colonized territory with a new society of settlers ... ."  Tate A. LeFevre, Settler 
Colonialism, in OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (May 29, 2015) 
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-
9780199766567-0125.xml.  In it, "the colonizers came to stay," making "invasion 
... a structure, not an event."  PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY:  THE POLITICS AND POETICS OF AN 
ETHNOGRAPHIC EVENT 2 (1999).  For further discussion of this analytic, see also 
Monica Eppinger, The Challenge of the Commons:  Beyond Trespass and 
Necessity, 66 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 1 (June 2018).  For extension of metaphors of 
milk and power to critique of post-colonialism, see, e.g., FRANZ FANON, BLACK 
SKIN, WHITE MASKS 28-30 (Richard Philcox trans., 2008 (1952)) (calling 
colonized peoples' identifying with whiteness a pathological "striving for 
lactation":  at the expense of "'the originality of that part of the world in which they 
grew up,'" they try to "save the race" by "ensur[ing] its whiteness"). 
12 Xiaoqian Hu, "A Glass of Milk Strengthens a Nation":  Global Markets, State 
Power, and the Rise, Collapse, and Restructuring of China's Dairy Farms, 16 J. 
FOOD L. & POL’Y 78 (2020) (looking at milk as both a sign of market intrusion and 
as indexing state power in contemporary P.R. China); Erum Sattar, Can Small 
Farmers Survive?: Problems of Commercializing the Milk Value Chain in 
Pakistan, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 228 (2020) (examining market incursions and 
transformations of the "traditional" in regard to milk in Pakistan).  But see 
Mathilde Cohen, Toward an Interspecies Right to Breastfeed, 26 ANIMAL L. REV. 
1, 13–14 (2020) (analyzing ideologies and practices, such as rights, that would 
limit markets and reconfigure the bases for circulation and exchange in regard to 
milk). 
13 On Ukraine as a "colony" or zone of exploitation of the Russian empire, see 
generally OREST SUBTELNY, UKRAINE:  A HISTORY 268-269 (1988) (summarizing 
social critics' and historians' analysis of Ukraine under the Russian empire), 
quoting, e.g., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, "it [Ukraine] has become for Russia what 
Ireland was for England:  exploited in the extreme and receiving nothing in 
return," cited in Lénine et la question ukrainienne en 1914:  le discours 
'séparatiste' de Zurich, 25 PLURIEL 83 (Roman Serbyn ed., 1982); and citing, e.g., 
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or under Soviet governance,14 is largely beyond the scope of this 
article, but in order to assess dairy in Ukraine as a "colonial" import, 
in Part II the body of the Article starts with a very brief treatment of 
origins in order to reconsider and argue for milk's indigeneity. 
 
  Even if indigenous, milk in Ukraine does not figure in a 
simple or straightforward story, as succeeding sections of the Article 
show.  It is laden with power and inequalities that take some 
background understanding of context to recognize, and the Article 
brings to bear sources and methods of both history and anthropology 
(including my own fieldwork conducted 2002-2019)15 to decipher 
the present.  Milk provides a through-line through which to follow 
the transformation of subjectivities and structures via some of the 
 
Mykhailo Volobuev, Do problemy ukrainskoi ekonomiky, in DOKUMENTY 
UKRAINSKOHO KOMMUNIZMU 132 (1962) (characterizing Ukraine within the 
Russian empire as a "European" rather than "Asiatic" type of colony, industrially 
well-developed and yet deprived not so much of its resources as of its capital and 
potential profits).  For those arguing contra, see SUBTELNY, id., citing IVAN 
HURZHYI, UKRAINA V SYSTEMI VSEROSIISKOHO RYNKU 60-90KH ROKIV XIX ST. 168-
78 (1968).  On Western Ukraine under the Austro-Hungarian (Habsburg) Empire 
during the same period, see SUBTELNY, id. at 212-219 (summarizing reforms that 
raised the status of peasants in what is now Western Ukraine, but still left them in 
an "oppressed and backward state"). 
14 For a view of Soviet governance as a version of colonialism, see, e.g., 
SUBTELNY, id. at 537 (describing Soviet Ukraine's situation as "the Great 
Discrepancy," with Ukraine playing a large economic role and boasting a 
"numerous, well-educated population," but "still unable to decide its own fate").  
For scholarship recognizing roles that Ukrainians played in the Soviet project, see, 
e.g., Orysia Maria Kulick, When Ukraine Ruled Russia: Regionalism 
and Nomenklatura Politics after Stalin, 1944-1990, doctoral dissertation, Stanford 
University, 2016; MAYHILL C. FOWLER, BEAU MONDE ON EMPIRE'S EDGE:  STATE 
AND STAGE IN SOVIET UKRAINE (2017).  See also, e.g., Orysia Maria Kulick, Soviet 
Military Production and the Expanding Influence of Ukrainian Regional Elites 
under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, 25 UKRAINA MODERNA (2018) 
http://uamoderna.com/images/archiv/25-2018/UM_25_texts/UM-25-Kulick_120-
142.pdf. 
15 I conducted field research over several periods of longer duration, for fourteen 
months over 2006-2007 and for five months in 2017, as well as several intense 
shorter periods in summer 2002, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2019, and in autumn 2009 
and 2016.  My fieldsites included an agricultural consulting enterprise in Kyiv, and 
former collective or state farms in northern Ukraine (Sumy oblast'), western 
Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk oblast'), central Ukraine (then-Kirovohrad oblast'), and 
southern Ukraine (Kherson oblast' and Crimea).  My methods included interviews 
(with farmers, agricultural experts and consultants, managers in agricultural 
holding companies, agricultural traders, food processing concerns, policy-makers, 
members of parliament, and consumers), life histories, and participant-observation 
(both on farms and among agricultural experts in Kyiv).  I use statistics, 
journalistic reporting, experts' assessments, private consultants' and government 
advising documents, official reports, as well as legal and regulatory material to 
inform the account I draw from the qualitative data. 
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most formative social experiments of the past century, through the 
present day. 
 
  The Article thus turns to its main focus, tracing processes of 
collectivization and decollectivization of agriculture in Ukraine 
through the story of milk.  In Part III, the Article follows how Soviet 
law and practice collectivized agricultural production in Ukraine, and 
how milk production figured in the new rural register.  It relates how, 
as a part of a household economy within collective agriculture, milk 
production provided a residual source of nutrition and income that, 
through periods like the Great Famine and the Nazi occupation, 
proved crucial to family survival.  It further explores how, against 
vast state practices in applying science to agriculture, milk 
production resisted mechanization and industrialization.16  In Part 
IV, it traces Ukraine's post-Soviet transformation through the story 
of milk.  Building on the approaches of Sol Tax, Sidney Mintz and 
Laura Nader,17 it situates study of micro-practices within the context 
of national laws, international trade, and global shifts in modes of 
power, following the reach and limits of multinational corporations 
into the daily routines of remote villagers.  In local enactments, it 
finds both the disintegration of some forms of collective life and the 
emergent reorganization of daily life along the lines of new 
collectivities,18 including gendered dynamics within legal disputes 
and social transformation.  The Article concludes that milk has 
served as the ground of specific social relationships and networks, 
and analyzing it as such, this Article brings to light the resilience of 
relationships between dairy cows and their keepers, and the 
organizational power of dairy maids.   
 
  II. Origins and Indigeneities 
   
  The record is clear that dairying on Ukrainian territory, or 
milk in Ukrainian diets, is neither of recent nor "external" origin.  
Archeological evidence places dairying in the earliest sites of human 
occupation on the territory of Ukraine thus far uncovered there, from 
the 4th millennium B.C.E., making it perhaps the earliest practiced 
in Europe.19  Historical linguistics corroborates the early and 
 
16 See Part III below. 
17 See, e.g., SOL TAX, PENNY CAPITALISM:  A GUATEMALAN INDIAN ECONOMY 
(1953); SIDNEY MINTZ, SWEETNESS AND POWER:  THE PLACE OF SUGAR IN MODERN 
HISTORY (1985); LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY (1990). 
18 See Part IV below. 
19 For evidence of dairying as early as the 4th millenium B.C. in "mega-sites" of 
the Tripillya culture of Neolithic Ukraine, see Olive E. Craig, The Development of 
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enduring presence of dairy with words in Slavic (a linguistic group 
believed to have originated in the vicinity of Ukraine in roughly the 
5th century B.C.E., and still the native language family of most 
current-day residents of Ukraine) for "cow" and for "milk" traceable 
from contemporary Ukrainian and Russian through proto-Slavic 
(approximately 2500 B.C.E.-500 C.E.) to Indo-European 
(approximately 4500-2500 B.C.E.) origins.20   
 
  Moving from prehistory to history, in the oldest written 
records describing lifeways of the Ukrainian steppe, milk stands out.  
Herodotus distinguished its people in their "living not by tilling the 
soil but by cattle rearing,"21 famous in the ancient Greek imagination 
as the Galaktophágoi -- "Milk-eaters" -- of the northern Black Sea 
 
Dairying in Europe:  Potential Evidence from Food Residues, 29 DOCUMENTA 
PRAEHISTORICA 97 (2002) 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228581338_The_development_of_dairyi
ng_in_Europe_potential_evidence_from_food_residues_on_ceramics; R.P. 
Evershed, et al., Identification of Animal Fats via Compound-Specific δ13C values 
of indiviual fatty acids:  assessments of results for reference fats and lipid extracts 
of archeological pottery vessels, 29 DOCUMENTA PRAEHISTORICA 73, 
https://revije.ff.uni-lj.si/DocumentaPraehistorica/article/view/29.7.  See also J. 
Chapman and B. Gaydarska, The Provision of Salt to Tripolye Mega-Sites, in 
TRIPOLIAN SETTLEMENTS-GIANTS:  THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM MATERIALS  
(National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Institute of Archeology, 2003) at 203 
http://community.dur.ac.uk/j.c.chapman/tripillia/pdf/Chapman_and_Gaydarska_20
03.pdf.  See also Oliver E. Craig et al., Did the First Farmers in Anatolia and 
Europe Produce Dairy Foods? 79 ANTIQUITY 882 (Dec. 2005) 
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/antiquity/article/did-the-first-farmers-of-
central-and-eastern-europe-produce-dairy-
foods/284138196CFD83FA06340C061EDF5F93 (identifying even earlier 
evidence for dairying in Ukraine, dating back to the Early Neolithic (5900-5500 
B.C.)); RENATE ROLLE, THE WORLD OF THE SCYTHIANS 100-101 (F.G. Walls trans., 
1980) (describing later populations of Bronze Age Cimmerian people (predating 
the Scythians) among whom horse-, sheep-, and especially cattle-rearing 
predominated). 
20See, e.g., entries for:  корóва укр./р. ["korova (Ukrainian)/(Russian)"], or "cow," 
traced back to the Proto-Slavic *korva, meaning "cow," in turn traced to the Indo-
European root *ker- [horn]; and молокó укр./р [moloko (Ukrainian)/(Russian)], 
"milk," to the Proto-Slavic *melko, in turn traced to the Indo-European root 
*melg-, "to milk," in M.F. VASMER, ETYMOLOGICHESKIY SLOVAR' RUSSKOGO 
YAZYKA (1964-1973), entries available respectively at 
https://endic.ru/fasmer/Korova-6357.html and https://endic.ru/fasmer/Moloko-
8234.html.  See generally MARIJA GIMBUTAS, THE PREHISTORY OF EASTERN 
EUROPE. PART I:  MESOLITHIC, NEOLITHIC AND COPPER AGE CULTURES IN RUSSIA 
AND THE BALTIC AREA (1956) (locating the Proto-Indo-European homeland 
between the Bug and Volga Rivers, with center around the Dniester and Don in 
present-day southern Ukraine). 
21 HERODOTUS, THE PERSIAN WARS, vol. II, Book IV, chapter 46, at 247 (Loeb 
Classical Library edition, A.D. Godley trans., 1920 (first written around 425 
B.C.)).  
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littoral.22  Southern steppe nomads' reliance on milk supported an 
admired reputation for practical, virtuous austerity,23 impressing 
ancient Greeks as "the lordly Hippemolgi [literally, 'mare-milkers'], 
they that drink the milk of mares."24  Pastoral impressions continued 
to dominate later travelers’ accounts of verdant Ukraine; one in 1651, 
for example, was struck by grain "growing uncultivated" and that 
dairy products were "no less abundant there than grain, whether 
because of the great number of pastures or the abundance of ponds."25  
 
22 HOMER, THE ILIAD, VOL. II, Book XIII, Ch. IV, Section I (Loeb Classical Library 
edition, Augustus Taber Murray trans., 1924) (describing 
Γαλακτοφάγοι Galactophagoi, the "milk eaters" of the southern Ukrainian steppe).  
See also Claudia Ungefehr-Kortus, Galactophagi, in BRILL'S NEW PAULY (Hubert 
Cancik and Helmut Schneider eds., English edition Christine F. Salazar ed., first 
published online 2006) https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-
pauly/galactophagi e417740?s.num=27&s.start=20; STRABO, THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
STRABO, Book VII, Ch. III, Sect. VII (Hans Claude Hamilton and William 
Falconer trans., 1903 ed. (est. 7 B.C. or 17-18 A.D.) 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0198
%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D3%3Asection%3D7 (attesting that, four hundred 
years after Homer, on the northern Black Sea littoral "even now there are Wagon-
dwellers and Nomads, so called, who live off their herds, and on milk and cheese, 
and particularly on cheese made from mare's milk, and know nothing about storing 
up food").    
23 D. Braund, Greeks, Scythians, and Hippake, or 'Reading Mare's Cheese,'" in 
ANCIENT GREEKS WEST AND EAST (Gocha R. Tsetskhladze ed., 1999) 521, 527 
("Hippake [mare's milk cheese consumed by Scythians of the southern Ukrainian 
steppe] was austere alterity at its best.  For Greek audiences, it combined practical 
utility with a localised simplicity of lifestyle").  See also, e.g., THEOPHRASTUS, 
ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS VOL. II, Book IX, Ch. XIII, Sect. 2 , 281,  (Loeb Classical 
Library edition, E. Capps, T.E. Page, D. Rouse eds., Arthur Hort trans., 1916 (350 
B.C.-287 B.C.))   
https://archive.org/stream/enquiryintoplant02theouoft/enquiryintoplant02theouoft_
djvu.txt (boasting of Scythian milk and stamina that they could, relying only on the 
liquorice-plant related "Scythian root" and mare's milk cheese, "go eleven or 
twelve days without drinking").  See also IGOR' KHRAPUNOV, THE CRIMEA IN THE 
EARLY IRON AGE:  AN ETHNIC HISTORY (Nikita Khrapunov trans, 2012) at 71, 
http://открытаяархеология.рф/sites/default/files/Igor_Khrapunov._The_Crimea_i
n_the_Early.pdf (describing osteological finds on Crimea evidencing cattle-, 
sheep-, and goat-raising among the pastoralist pre-Scythian Kizil-Koba (Tauris) 
culture).   
24 HOMER, supra note 22, at Book XIII, Ch. IV, Sect. I.  See also Aeschylus,  
Prometheus Unbound [Promētheus Lyomenos], in AESCHYLUS,  AESCHYLUS II: 
AGAMEMNON, LIBATION-BEARERS, EUMENIDES, FRAGMENTS  at Fragment 111 
(Loeb Classical Library edition, Herbert Weir Smyth trans, 1926 (5th century 
B.C.), https://www.theoi.com/Text/AeschylusFragments2.html (referring to the 
law-abiding, "well-ordered Scythians that feed on mares' milk cheese"). 
25 Venetian Michele Bianchi served as envoy from a papal nuncio in Warsaw to 
Ukrainian military-political leader Bohdan Khmel'nits'kyi in 1651 and then 
published a book of traveller's notes under the pseudonym Alberto Vimina.  The 
quoted excerpt comes from ALBERTO VIMINA, HISTORIA DELLE GUERRE CIVILI DI 
POLONIA 7-9 (Venice, 1671), quoted in Frank Sysyn, Framing the Borderland: The 
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The archeological, linguistic, and historical records concur in finding 
milk and milk products a part of Ukrainians' production patterns and 
diets for millennia prior to empires and colonial projects.  Present-
day Ukrainians -- as it turns out, with scholarly corroboration -- 
consider milk indigenous.   
 
  Though the settler-colonialism critique has made crucial 
interventions in the social analysis of food systems and power, its 
application to the Ukrainian context in regard to milk is not as apt a 
fit.  Ukraine thus offers a compelling contrast case of milk holding a 
firm place in the consumption of the contemporary and, as Part III 
shows, in the construction of the modern, but not as a dietary 
transplant.  It is in part in this dually situated position -- its 
indigeneity and its modernity -- that the story of milk in Ukraine may 
offer some insights of broader interest. This Part has argued a 
relatively straightforward case for indigeneity based on origins.  The 
next Part examines milk in modernity, some features of which may 
deromanticize the story and trouble any simple assertion that 
indigeneity precludes hegemony. 
 
   
III. Cows and Collectives 
 
  A. Land of Milk, Honey, and Tragedy  
 
  Post-Soviet Ukrainian milk production was built out of the 
system of collective farming that independent Ukraine inherited 
upon dissolution of the Soviet Union.  Understanding the post-Soviet 
requires some understanding of Soviet precursors.  This Part offers a 
short historical overview of the Soviet system of collective farming, 
attempting to outline both its cataclysmic beginnings and the 
modernization it achieved over a seventy-year span,26 in order to 
understand some of the social, legal, and affective structures that still 
frame dairy in present-day Ukraine. 
 
 
Image of the Ukrainian Revolt and Hetman Bohdan Khemel'nyts'kyi in Foreign 
Travel Accounts, in FROM MUTUAL OBSERVATION TO PROPAGANDA WAR:  
PREMODERN REVOLTS IN THEIR TRANSNATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS (Malte Griesse 
ed., 2014) at note 32. 
26 For discussion of building collective life, see Eppinger, Oligarchy, supra note 5.  
For discussion of the association of tragedy with collectivization, see  Monica 
Eppinger, Cold-War Commons:  Tragedy, Critique, and the Future of the Illiberal 
Problem Space, 19 THEORETICAL INQU. L. 457 (July 2018) 
https://www7.tau.ac.il/ojs/index.php/til/article/view/1579. 
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  Collectivization of agriculture, though central to Soviet 
socialism, actually got underway more than a decade after the 
Socialist Revolution of 1917.  Although abolishing private property 
was an end in itself for Bolsheviks,27 war and other emergencies 
initially sidelined it28 until Stalin's drive for rapid industrialization 
put it back on the agenda in 1927.29  Industrialization required grain, 
both to raise export revenues for purchasing industrial equipment and 
to feed urban workers;30 peasants resisted selling grain to state 
procurement agents at the state's prices;31 and so, Stalin argued to a 
Communist Party Congress in 1927, a resulting "grain crisis" 
demanded that the U.S.S.R. transition to collectivized agriculture to 
facilitate grain production and collection.32  Accordingly, 
government bodies authorized collectivizing agricultural 
production33 and the Party adopted, for the first time, a five-year plan 
for agriculture with collectivization as its central pillar in April 
1929.34  
 
27 Decree of All-Russian Central Executive Committee, "On Socialist Land 
Reform and on Measures Leading to Socialist Farming," Sobr. Zakon. i 
Rasporiazh. RKP RSFSR [hereinafter SZR RSFSR] No.4 It. 43 (1919), (reaffirming 
Soviet government’s intention to outlaw individual types of farming and set up 
collectives), reprinted in SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY 118 (Zigurds L. Zile ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY].  See also, e.g., Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 
Otvet na zapros krest'ianina, in VLADIMIR ILYICH LENIN, POLNOE SOBRANIE 
SOCHINENII 1953 (1919). 
28 Early on, the Soviets did redistribute crown and church estates (but not other 
kinds of private lands) to local peasants.  Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
Decree "On Land," SZR RSFSR No. 1, It. 3 (1917-1918), reprinted in  Zile, SOVIET 
LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27 at 116-117. 
29 Decree of U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee (CEC) and the Council of 
People’s Commissars (CPC) [otherwise known by its Soviet neologism, 
Sovnarkom] “On Collective Farms,” SZP SSSR No. 15 It. 161 (1927).  
30 On the relationship between food policy and industrialization, see Lynne Viola, 
Introduction, in WAR AGAINST THE PEASANTRY, 1927-1930, VOLUME 1:  THE 
TRAGEDY OF THE SOVIET COUNTRYSIDE 1-20 (Lynne Viola et al. eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY] (arguing that the timing of collectivizing 
Soviet agriculture was driven by demands arising from a drive for rapid 
industrialization). 
31 On the grain crisis, see, e.g., U.S.S.R. People’s Commissar of Trade A.I. 
Mikoian, “On the Progress of Grain Procurements,” Speech to Collegium of Trade 
Commissariat (October 3, 1927) (transcript available in Russian State Archive of 
the Economy, f. 5240, op. 9, d. 102, ll. 45-49), reprinted in part in Viola, id., at 27-
29.  See also R.W. DAVIES, THE SOCIALIST OFFENSIVE:  THE COLLECTIVIZATION OF 
SOVIET AGRICULTURE 1929-1930 39-40 (1980) [hereinafter DAVIES, 
COLLECTIVIZATION].   
32 XVth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik).  Stenographic 
Record. 56 (1928), cited in Viola, id., at 386 n. 24. 
33 Decree of CEC and CPC “On Collective Farms,” SZR SSSR No. 15 It. 161 
(1927). 
34 Viola, Introduction to Chapter 3, The Great Turn, 4 May 1929 – 15 November 
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  Although grain concerns propelled the change, the 
collectivization drive had deep implications for dairy as well.  
Collectivation entailed fundamental change to legal doctrines and 
Soviet law innovated to encompass socialist forms of property and 
agricultural organization,35 over time resulting in a hierarchy 
affording different forms of property differing levels of legal 
protection.36  At the top, state property such as "state farm" (sovkhoz) 
holdings, including any dairy cattle, formally belonged to "the people 
as a whole" and the resident farmers were wage-laborers.37  Slightly 
lower, collective farm (kolkhoz) assets (including the dairy herd, if 
any) belonged indivisibly to a distinct group of citizens formed into 
a collective unit.38  At the bottom, “personal property” served 
personal needs and included single-family houses, personal 
belongings, and, if any, a household cow.39  Its use for profit-making 
was largely prohibited.40  
 
  Beyond legal reforms, the process of collectivizing 
agriculture in Ukraine changed the social landscape within which 
dairying took place.  Initially participation in collective farming was 
voluntary (and in 1928, only 1.7% of Soviet peasant households were 
 
1929, in Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 122. 
35 Art. 5, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) ("Socialist property in the USSR exists either 
in the form of state property (belonging to the people as a whole) or in the form of 
cooperative and collective-farm property (property of collective farms or 
cooperative societies").  All references to the U.S.S.R. Constitution of 1936 cited 
here and hereinafter, reprinted in ISTORIIA SOVETSKOI KONSTITUTSII V DOKUMENTAKH, 
1917-1956 729 (1957) and excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 
27, at 280. 
36 VICTOR P. MOZOLIN, PROPERTY LAW IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA 10 (1993) 
(proposing a Soviet hierarchy of property rights afforded differing levels of 
protection at law). 
37 Art. 6, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) (defining state socialist property) and 
MOZOLIN, id. (explaining state property could not be used as security and was 
inalienable). 
38 Art. 7, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) ("The enterprises of collective farms and 
cooperative organizations, with their livestock, buildings, implements, and output 
are the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative 
organizations.  ...").  See also W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 169-176 (1983).  
Cooperatives were later disfavored and agricultural holding limited to state farms 
and collective farms until the re-institution of cooperatives under perestroika. Law 
of the U.S.S.R. "On Cooperatives," June 1, 1988, VED. SSSR 1988, no. 22, item 
355, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS, VOL. 28 723-753 (William G. Frenkel 
trans., 1989), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27 at 507.  See 
also Art. 8, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936) (permitting a kolkhoz to occupy its land 
free of charge and in perpetuity). 
39 Art. 10, CONST. OF U.S.S.R. (1936).  See also MOZOLIN, supra note 36, at 10-11. 
40 Butler, supra note 38, at 174. 
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members of agricultural collectives41), but by the end of 1929, the 
Party abandoned voluntary participation and kicked off a campaign 
of mass collectivization.42  In two intense months, Ukrainian 
landholding went from 16% collectivized to 64%.43   
 
  Behind these dry figures stands dramatic change involving 
widespread violence, most recognizably, acts of straightforward 
physical violence.  In January 1930 the Politburo issued a secret 
decree directing urban Party members to the countryside to effect 
"dekulakization," the “liquidation” of rural small-holders (so-called 
"kulaks") by February 20, 1930.44  Dekulakization meant seizing 
assets from small-holders who were then either put into detention, 
sent into exile or prison in Siberia, or killed on the spot.45  Some rural 
small-holders got wind and fled in so-called self-dekulakization.  
Through these processes of exhortation combined with 
dekulakization, dairying was also socialized:  by January 1, 1932 
(U.S.S.R.-wide), there were 20,811 dairy collectives with a total herd 
of 3,334,000 cattle.46 
 
  Production and distribution through the new collectives fell 
catastrophically short.47  In 1932, to address dairy shortfalls, the 
Soviet government created a new type of organization, the 
 
41 DAVIES, COLLECTIVIZATION, supra note 31, at 112, 147; KAK LOMALI NEP 2, 8 
STENOGRAMMI PLENUMOV TSK VKP(B), 1928-1929, VOL. 5 (V.P. Danilov et al. 
eds.,  2000). 
42 Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (hereinafter CC of 
CP) “On the Pace of Collectivization and State Assistance to Collective-Farm 
Construction,” Jan. 5, 1930, CPSU IN RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS OF 
CONGRESSES, CONFERENCES, AND PLENUMS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, VOL. 5, 
72-75 reprinted in Viola, WAR ON PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 201 (calling for 
'"wholesale" (sploshnaia) collectivization, meaning no less than 75% of every 
village).  
43 Timothy Snyder, Professor of Modern Central European history at Yale 
University, lecture at Yale University, New Haven, Conn. (November 8, 2005) 
(reporting the rate of collectivization between January and mid-March 1930). 
44 Politburo Decree "On Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Farms in Raions of 
Wholesale Collectivization," Jan. 30, 1930, Russian Government Archive of Social 
and Political History f. 17, op. 162, d. 8, ll. 64-69 reprinted in Viola, WAR ON 
PEASANTRY, supra note 30, at 228-234.   
45 See the implementing order of the secret police (the OGPU), OGPU Order on 
Measures for the Liquidation of the Kulak as a Class, February 2, 1930, No. 44/21, 
GARF f. 9414, op. I., d. 1944, ll. 17-25. reprinted in Viola, id. at 238-245. 
46 U.S. Dep't Agric., Bureau Agric. Econ., Div. Foreign Agric. Service, Russian 
Collective Dairy Farming, 24 FOREIGN CROPS AND MARKETS 478-79 (1932) quoting 
SOCIALIST AGRIC. (Feb. 26, 1932), cited in AGRIC. ECON. BIBLIOGRAPHY entry 385 
at page 91 (U.S. Dep't Agric., Bureau Agr. Econ., 1937). 
47 DAVIES, COLLECTIVIZATION, supra note 31, at 104–05.  
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"commercial dairy farm" (known by its abbreviation from Soviet 
Russian, the MTF).  An MTF might operate as a branch of a 
collective farm working on other kinds of agriculture and or it might 
coordinate efforts between dairy-producing collective farms.  Either 
way, the MTFs were tasked with supervising and rendering 
assistance to dairy units of the collectives.48 
 
  While on one hand Soviet authorities were attempting 
organizational innovations like MTFs to facilitate production, on the 
other, the violence attending collectivization was thwarting them.  
Beyond the physical violence of dekulakization, structural violence 
was manifest in mass confiscation of rural foodstuffs by state 
agents.49  Recall that a primary impetus for collectivizing agriculture 
was to facilitate the state collecting grain from the countryside.  In 
rural Ukraine, state agents collected grain even if it took confiscation, 
producing in rural residents "visible confusion and 'lostness'" and a 
palpable sense of "unknowability" regarding "what will become of 
them" as hunger and desperation loomed.50   
 
  Under these conditions, some rural residents hid grain and 
slaughtered their cows.  Evidence suggests it was to avoid starvation, 
although at the time the Soviet leadership suspected peasants of 
 
48 U.S. Dept. Agr., supra note 46, quoting 3 SOCIALIST RECONSTRUCTION AGRIC. 
1931, cited in AGRIC. ECON. BIBLIOGRAPHY supra note 46 at 91. 
49 For discussion of structural violence, see Johan Glatung, Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167 (1969).  On the distinction between the 
physical exertions of political and everyday violence on one hand, and structural 
violence on the other, see Philippe Bourgois, The Power of Violence in War and 
Peace:  Post-Cold War Lessons from El Salvador, 8 ISTMO (2004) 
http://istmo.denison.edu/n08/articulos/power.html. 
50 A January 1933 mission in central Ukraine, reporting back to the Central 
Committee on local reception of rural grain seizure, found that neither notification 
about impending grain seizure nor the actual carting off of grain had met "active 
protest":  "This measure is generally accepted in silence.  But," it continued, "when 
you have become more attentively acquainted with the moods of individual 
collective farmers, you see that this operation has acted upon them en masse in an 
overwhelming, depressing way.  Among a significant portion of collective farmers 
it produces a visible confusion and 'lostness,' a fundamental unknowability of what 
will happen next, of what will become of them." Grigoriev, Head of Dep't of Mass-
Agitation Campaigns of the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
(Bolshevik wing) of Ukraine (hereinafter CC CP(B)U)], Rep. of the Dep't of Mass-
Agitation Campaigns of the CC CP(B)U "On the Mood of the Population of 
Velikotokmak and Bozhedariv Districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, in Connection 
with Confiscation of the Seed Fund into the Requisitioned-Grain Account," 
Archives CC of CP Ukr., F.1. Op. 101. Spr. 1244. Ark. 2-5, Jan. 8, 1933, available 
at https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-
1933.php#nom-246, at record number 140 (translation my own). 
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killing cattle to avoid surrendering them to the new collectives.51  
Authorities used the law to clarify the situation and bring the hammer 
down.  In regard to livestock and other assets funneled into the new 
collective entities, in addition to what was literally "state property," 
collective farm or cooperative property would also be considered 
"public property"  and as such would be legally held to be "sacred 
and inviolable" and protected as strictly as if it were the state's own 
property.52  Farmers' consuming the produce they grew, livestock 
they raised, or milk they collected would be considered theft.   
  
  Severe confiscations compounded the physical violence of 
the collectivization campaign.  Within two harvests after its start, 
10% of the Ukrainian population (by conservative estimates) would 
die from famine:  of a Soviet Ukrainian population of 33 million, an 
estimated minimum 3.5 million starved to death between 1932 and 
1933 alone.53  With food requisitioned for urban consumption, 
mortality fell harder on the countryside, village death tolls far 
exceeding the 10% average. Some Ukrainian villages were 
completely depopulated in this short period that has come to be 






51 Decree of CEC and CPC "On Measures to Combat Rapacious Slaughter of 
Livestock," Jan. 16, 1930, SOBR. POST. PRAV. SSSR 1930, no. 6, item 66, reprinted 
in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 213. 
52 The CEC and CPC of the U.S.S.R. "hold public (state, collective farm, 
cooperative) property to be the foundation of the Soviet system.  They regard such 
property as sacred and inviolable, and all persons making any attempts on its 
integrity -- as enemies of the people.  In view of this, it is the foremost duty of the 
Soviet authorities to wage a decisive sturggle against misappropriators of public 
property.  ... [They hereby decree] ... To equate collective farm and cooperative 
property (harvestable crops, common reserves, livestock, cooperative warehouses 
and stores, etc.) with state property and to intensify the protection of such property 
from misappropriation."  Decree of CEC and CPC "On Protecting and 
Strengthening Public (Socialist) Property," Aug. 7, 1932, U.S.S.R. Decrees 1932, 
no. 62, item 360, reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 265, 
265-66.   
53 Total registered deaths (which likely reflects under-reporting) for 1931-33 in 
Ukraine is 3,091,809, reflected against a estimated 1930 population of 28,710,628.  
See R.W. Davies’ latest calculation at www.soviet-archives-research.co.uk/hunger.  
Davies and Wheatcroft, adjusting for statistical birth and death rates, estimate 1.54 
million “excess deaths,” i.e. people who died from famine who would not 
otherwise have died at that time, in 1932-1933 alone in Ukraine. R.W. DAVIES AND 
STEPHEN G. WHEATCROFT, THE YEARS OF HUNGER:  SOVIET AGRICULTURE, 1931-
1933 415  (2004). 
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  B.  Socialized Cows and Household Survival 
 
  1.  Milk and Famine 
 
  a.  Dairy, Distribution, and Directives 
 
  Within the context of the Famine that accompanied 
collectivization in the early 1930s, dairy took on particular 
significance in the Ukrainian countryside. Milk, like grain, was 
subject to requisition and a peculiar form of scarcity took hold in 
rural areas.54  The new collective farms introduced a compensation 
system including a unit, the normative "workday,"55 as a standard 
measure for labor effort56 and terms of trade in the new compensation 
system shifted disastrously against the Ukrainian villager. One 
"workday" of a Ukrainian collective farmer was pegged at a value57 
 
54 The Ukrainian Famine of the early 1930s was, in Amartya Sen's terms, a case of 
"food entitlement decline":  even when food was available -- farmers had grown it 
-- they were not entitled to it and thus starved.  AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND 
FAMINES:  AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION (1981). 
55 Trudoden', "workday," as a unit of measure for labor on collective farms, 
introduced in law in Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel (Collective Farm), 
approved by Decrees of CEC and CPC, March 1, 1930 and of April 13, 1930 and 
by resolution of the Kolkhoztsentr SSSR [USSR Collective Farm Center] of June 
7, 1930, USSR Decrees 1930, no. 24, item 255, reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 207 [hereinafter Model Charter] (instituting, inter alia, 
the "workday" compensation-accounting system).  
56 See text infra notes 85-88 for more full discussion of the "workday" and its role 
in post-War collectivization of dairy production. 
57 Records from the time of the Famine show one "workday" of a collective farmer 
in Ukraine evaluated as being worth roughly 3 rubles.  See, e.g., P. Lyubchenko, 
deputy head of the CPC of Ukr. S.S.R. and P. Postishev, Secretary of CC CP(B)U, 
[Resolution of the CC CP(B)U and CPC of the Ukr. S.S.R. “On the removal of 
Kamenniy Potolok village, Kremenchug district, Kharkov region from the 'Black 
Board'” Oct. 17, 1933 (archived Nov. 9, 2017) Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1, 
Op. 6, Spr. 285, Ark. 144-145, available at 
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom-
246, at record number 246.     
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insufficient to purchase a liter of milk.58  In other words, even had it 
been market-available, milk would have been beyond the purchasing 
power of the farmers on collective farms producing it. 
 
  At the height of the Famine, some local authorities in 
Ukraine attempting to save rural people from starvation officially 
turned to the dairy herd. The winter of 1932-33 had decimated 
villages.  By early spring 1933, amidst masses of people in the 
countryside so staggered by hunger that they lay where they fell, 
local officials ordered district agents to collect those "found laying 
down," hospitalize them, and try to fatten them up -- or at least stave 
off the final throes of starvation (particularly, it seems from internal 
communications, to save enough bodies to get labor into fields for 
spring planting). To do this, they temporarily suspended milk 
requisitions from collective farms.  "In view of the exceptionally 
difficult food situation in Skvyrsky, Belotserkovsky and Volodarsky 
districts," as one local government order in Ukraine in March 1933 
reads, "we hereby suspend the requisition of milk by state 
procurement agents in these areas, in order to turn it to elimination 
of the manifestation of starvation, to be used exclusively for the 
feeding of children and the hospitalized ill."59 A March 1933 order 
from Kyiv district obliged Party workers to organize assistance to 
starving children in the form of milk provision "so that each child 
would receive half a glass" daily.60  Another demanded a "norm" of 
 
58 Milk in 1933 cost 4.5 rubles per litre.  M. Khataevych, Secretary of the Oblast' 
Comm. CP(B)Ukr., Supplementary note of the Dnepropetrovsk Regional Party 
Comm., People's Commissariat of Supply of the USSR, and the CC CP(B)U "On 
Deterioration of the Food Supply of Industrial Enterprises of the Region and 
Measures for the Implementation of Plans for Centralized Delivery of Food," 
March 21, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr. F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2187, Ark. 103-107, 
available at https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-
1933.php#nom-246, at record number 198 (giving the price for a liter of milk as 4 
rubles 50 kopeks). 
59 Demchenko, Secretary of Oblast' Comm. CP(B)U, Decision of the Kyiv 
Regional Committee of the CP(B) "On the Provision of Milk Assistance to 
Children and the Ill in in Skvyrsky, Belotserkovsky and Volodarsky Districts of 
the Oblast," March 18, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2189, 
Ark. 172,  available at 
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom-
246, at record number 193. 
60 "Oblige the RPK to organize assistance to desperate children in the form of 
milk, so that each child would receive a half a glass of milk daily."  Demchenko, 
Secretary of the Oblast' Comm. CP(B)U, Resolution of the Kyiv Oblast' Comm. of 
the CP(B)U from the Resolution of the Kyiv Oblast' Comm. of the CP(B)U  "On 
Strengthening Party, Soviet, and Economic Organs, On the Rendering of Food 
Assistance to the Population and On the Responsibility of Leaders for the 
Realization of these Measures," March 19, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., 
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700-800 calories per day be reached for each child but did not 
allocate food relief, instead declaring that milk, eggs, and other 
products of animal husbandry "can and must be mobilized on site."61 
 
b. Model Rules and Milk Memoirs 
 
  Milk thus played a role in official Famine responses.  It also 
proved key to household survival strategies.  Crucially, not all cattle, 
or milk, had been incorporated into the collectives.  The state 
promulgated a Model Code for collective farms that allowed any 
rural household who had dairy cattle before collectivization to retain 
one cow for household use.62  As local authorities initiated 
emergency measures in the face of mass starvation, officials exhorted 
villagers to rely on "internal food resources," significantly among 
them local milk.63   
 
  Villagers needed little urging.  Memoirs of the Famine 
reflect the importance of that single cow to a household struggling to 
survive.  One grandmother from Zhytomir oblast, for example, 
recalls how fellow villagers, unable to withstand hunger, slaughtered 
their cows for meat and subsequently starved, while her family 
refrained and survived on their cow's milk.64  Another remembers at 
 
F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2190, Ark. 1-2, available at 
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-
1933.php#nom-246, at record number 194. 
61 Kharmandaryan, Deputy People's Commissar of Health of the Ukr. S.S.R., 
Supplemental Note of the People’s Commissariat of Health of the Ukr. SSR CC 
KP(b)U "On the State of the Health of the Population of Kyiv region in 
Connection with Food Difficulties," June 3, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., 
F.1, Op. 1, Spr. 2130, Ark. 41-47 available at 
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom-
246, record no. 232. 
62 "Milk cows of single-cow households are not socialized.  In multi-cow 
households, one cow is left in personal use; the rest are socialized ... ." Model 
Charter, supra note 55, at 207.  The 1936 Soviet Constitution reenforced this one-
cow per household allowance.  Art. 7, CONST. U.S.S.R. (1936). 
63 See, e.g., Resolution of the CC CP(B)U "On the Approach for Preparing for 
Spring Sowing and Organization of Food Aid to the Population of Kyiv Region," 
sect. 9(d), March 31, 1933, Archives of the CC CP Ukr., F.1, Op. 6, Spr. 282, Ark. 
107-110], available at 
https://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-Pyrig-1933.php#nom-
246, at record number 204 (urging Kyiv regional officials to undertake emergency 
aid, including to"strengthen local initiative . . . in the search for internal food 
resources (milk, eggs for children, etc.)"). 
64 Oleksiy Hordiev, A Cow, in “LET ME TAKE THE WIFE TOO, WHEN I REACH THE 
CEMETERY SHE WILL BE DEAD”:  STORIES OF HOLODOMOR SURVIVORS (Euromaidan 
Press, Nov. 24, 2018)  http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/11/24/let-me-take-the-
 
2020] HERDING HISTORY IN UKRAINE 287 
   
 
age ten surviving (after her mother's death and father's exile to 
Siberia) thanks only to milk from the family cow.  She and her sister 
grew so skinny that it was painful to sit because they were "all bone," 
reduced to hiding their milk jar from hunger-stricken neighbors, but 
"the milk saved me.”65  A villager from central Ukraine, Havrylo 
Prokopenko, recalls of his boyhood:   
 
 We . . . shared joint ownership of a cow with Lina 
the seamstress. We fed and milked her on alternate 
days.  The cow lived in our adobe block shed.  On the 
street side of one of its white walls was a sign written 
in red clay:  “The struggle for grain is a struggle for 
socialism.”  Zirka was a dry cow and gave little milk, 
but it was tasty and had a high fat content.  The shed 
had heavy oak doors covered with an iron grate and a 
screw lock.  . . . 
 By springtime . . . thanks to God, we were alive. 
But in the village and all around us an apocalypse was 
unfolding.  Almost every day the bodies of people who 
had starved to death were transported past our house 
on the way to the cemetery ... 
 Disaster struck the day after Easter [1933]... 
  
Havrylo opened the door of the shed and found Zirka gone.  
Half of the wall with the sign had been smashed onto the 
road.  The boy was then accused at rifle-point by the village 
council secretary of having sold the cow (which as kulak-
like behavior could have put his life in jeopardy), but was 
exonerated when, the following day, "they found Zirka’s 
head and hide, and a bucket of lard.  Our 'good' neighbours 




survivors/ (recalling a grandmother from Pylyponka, Zhytomyr Oblast, who 
survived "thanks to a cow," unlike fellow villagers who couldn't stand the hunger 
and slaughtered their dairy cow for meat but then subsequently perished from 
hunger). 
65 Hilary Caton, Holodomor Surivivor in Burlington shares famine story, 
BURLINGTON POST (Nov. 21, 2013) https://www.insidehalton.com/news-
story/4230737-holodomor-survivor-in-burlington-shares-famine-story/ (relating 
Famine survival memories from eastern Ukraine of survivor Maria Sagan). 
66 Havrylo Nykyforovych Prokopenko, Eyewitness Testimony, in HOLOD 33: 
NARODNA KNYHA-MEMORIAL 195-97 (Lidiia Kovalenko and Volodymyr Maniak 
comp., 1991). 
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  Famine memoir, an emergent genre in post-Soviet Ukraine, 
captures paradigmatic features that distinguish Ukrainian from other 
experiences of Soviet collectivization.  Soviet historiography left out 
the Ukrainian Famine; post-Soviet Ukrainian memoirs insist upon 
remembering and re-collecting it.  They relate how, within an 
increasingly dire regime of food confiscation, milk provided a 
lifeline for several reasons.  The household dairy cow was a legally 
permitted source of sustenance.  Features inherent in dairy 
production -- daily harvest, the fragmented nature of its collection 
(individual cows milked separately, with milk going into individual 
buckets) -- made milk harder to monitor.  Helping oneself was easier 
to pull off and, during severe caloric crisis, more difficult for the state 
to see and seize.67   
 
  For all of its demographic disaster and trauma, 
collectivization took hold:  by 1940, on the eve of World War II, 97% 
of Soviet farming worked collectively.68  In Ukraine, for those who 
managed to survive its inception, the village collective's herd and 
household cow allowance proved significant both in dairy production 
and household survival, as the coming years of War and occupation 
would again show. 
 
  2.  Hungerpolitik:  Dairy under Wartime Occupation 
 
  Recuperation from the Famine over the last half of the 1930s 
was interrupted by the Nazi invasion of 1941.69  All of Ukraine was 
occupied (and then, four years later, liberated), meaning that the front 
swept across Ukraine twice, first with Nazi attack and then with Red 
Army counter-attack.  In retreat, both the Soviet (1941) and Nazi 
(1944-45) command ordered a "scorched earth" policy in regard to 
Ukrainian village agriculture.  As Himmler instructed his troops, "It 
 
67 For the creation of collective farms as part of a modernist scheme of rural 
surveillance, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE:  HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES 
TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 209-220 (1998). 
68 Zvi Lerman, Karen Brooks, Csaba Csaki, Land Reform and Farm Restructuring 
in Ukraine, 270 World Bank Discussion Papers 23 (1994) 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/122021468109448366/pdf/multi-
page.pdf at 23. 
69 Adolph Hitler, Reichfuehrer Adolph Hitler’s Proclamation on War with Soviet 
Union (Berlin, Germany, June 22, 1941) 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622a.html (statement of the Fuhrer of 
Germany declaring war on the U.S.S.R.); Joachin von Ribbentrop, Statement by 
Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister, On the Declaration of War on 
the Soviet Union (Berlin, Germany, June 22, 1941) 
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1941/410622b.html (statement of the Foreign 
Minister of Germany on Hitler's declaration of war against the U.S.S.R.). 
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is necessary that in retreating from the regions of Ukraine we do not 
leave behind a single person, head of livestock or measure of grain 
... "70   
 
  Once again, in addition to overt violence, the village was an 
object of structural violence through food policy.  In areas under 
Soviet governance, the "workday" system was pressed into wartime 
service.  The law specified a minimum number of obligatory 
"workdays" devoted to collective work per year and provided 
criminal sanctions to enforce it.71  Payment in-kind, i.e. in foodstuffs, 
to farmers was suspended.  Food was once again subject to 
requisition; farmers were made to pay; and terms of trade again 
turned against rural Ukrainians.    
 
  In areas under German occupation, a different picture of 
rural-urban suffering emerged.  Nazi forces exterminated a large 
portion of the civilian population72 and pressed others into forced 
labor in Germany.  Of the remaining inhabitants, Nazi policy dictated 
that the Slavic subhumans, the Untermensch of Ukraine, would (still 
collectively) farm its steppe and feed Germany, at least for the 
duration of the war.73 
 
 
70 Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer of the SS, quoted in I. RYBALKA AND V. 
DOVHOPOL, ISTORIIA UKRAINSKOI RSR:  EPOKHA SOTZIALIZMU 366, cited in 
SUBTELNY, supra note 13, at 477. 
71 Resolution of the CPC of the U.S.S.R. and the CC of the All-Union CP(B), April 
13, 1942 cited in Trududen', VIKIPEDIYA [Russian-language Wikipedia], 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%BE%
D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%8C#cite_ref-1 (last checked Feb. 7, 2020) 
[hereinafter Trudoden' workday]. 
72 Current scholarship estimates 1.5 - 1.6 million Jewish citizens were killed in the 
Holocaust in Ukraine.  Wendy Lower, Introduction to Special Volume on the 
Holocaust in Ukraine:  Selected Articles from Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 
HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUD. 1, 2 (United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum 2014) 
https://academic.oup.com/DocumentLibrary/HGS/holocaustinukraine_intro.pdf.   
73 Reichskommisar of Ukraine Erich Koch, upon his arrival in Ukraine in 
September 1941, told his staff, "Gentlemen, I am known as a brutal dog.  Because 
of this reason I was apponted as Reichskommisar of Ukraine.  Our task is to suck 
from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration of the 
feelings or the property of the Ukrainians.  Gentlemen, I am expecting from you 
the utmost severity towards the native population." Erich Koch, German 
Reichskommisar of Ukraine, quoted in SUBTELNY, supra note 13, at 467; policy of 
adapting Soviet collective farming to German ends summarized in SUBTELNY, id. 
at 468-69. 
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  In fact, food lay behind some of the Nazis' acquisitive 
military designs on Ukraine,74 food policy and territorial acquisition 
interconnecting with Nazi racial ideologies.  A Nazi goal of reducing 
dependence on food "imports" would be reached by expanding 
Germany's borders to encompass a larger "domestic" agricultural 
base (incorporating the rich "black earth" lands of central and 
southern Ukraine into Germany), through conquest.75 Meanwhile, 
Nazi race theory considered inhabitants of Ukraine racially inferior 
"useless eaters" who, once defeated militarily, could be "dealt with" 
by lowering their food rations below subsistence levels.76  After a 
"Holocaust by bullets," food confiscation was an intentional Nazi 
strategy for feeding its army and, through mass civilian starvation, 
for clearing Ukrainian territory for eventual resettlement by 
Germans.77  As historian Gesine Gerhard puts it, the Nazis counted 
"without regret" on the "massive starvation" to come78:  under 
German occupation, food policy became Hungerpolitik, "hunger 
policy."   
 
  Indeed, of the food supplies that Nazi Germany obtained 
from the occupied U.S.S.R., an estimated 85% came from Ukraine.79  
Between military operations and starvation, the toll was beyond 
decimation:  approximately one in six inhabitants of Ukraine 
perished.80  In reverse of the pattern during the Soviet collectivization 
 
74 Gesine Gerhard, Food and Genocide:  Nazi Agrarian Politics in the Occupied 
Territories of the Soviet Union, 18 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 45, 45 (2009) [hereinafter 
Gerhard, Food and Genocide]. 
75 Id. at 55-56.  See generally GESINE GERHARD, NAZI HUNGER POLITICS:  A 
HISTORY OF FOOD IN THE THIRD REICH (2015). 
76 Gerhard, Food and Genocide, supra note 74 at 46 (outlining Backe's plans for 
feeding the German army and homeland during the war by starving Ukraine). 
77 On the "Holocaust by bullets," genoicidal massacres at the time of invasion or 
shortly thereafter in which half a million people, the majority Jews, were shot 
within the first nine months of the war, see United States Holocaust Memorial 
Museum, Einsatzgruppen:  An Overview, From Security Measures to Mass 
Murder, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA 
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/einsatzgruppen.  On starvation 
as a strategy, see Gerhard, Food and Genocide, supra note 74 at 58-59.  See also 
Alex J. Kay, Germany's Staatssekretäre, Mass Starvation and the Meeting of May 
2, 1941, 41 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 685, 685 (2006); Aktennotiz über die Besprechung 
der Staatssekretäre am 2.5.1941, partially reprinted in DER KRIEG GEGEN DIE 
SOWJETUNION 1941-1945. EINE DOKUMENTATION 44 (Reinhard Rürup ed., 1991). 
78 Gerhard, Food and Genocide, id. at 46. 
79 SUBTELNY, supra note 13 at 469. 
80 Figures are steadily revised upwards as historians do their forensic work.  To 
give a general idea of scale, as of 1988 an estimated minimum 5.3 million 
inhabitants of Ukraine perished during the War, with some estimates ranging to 7 
million, with an additional 2.3 million deported to forced labor in Germany.  As of 
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Famine, this time cities were targeted first for starvation and their 
inhabitants fled, when they could, to the countryside. 
 
  During this ruinous time, again, milk provided a crucial 
reservoir of calories for Ukrainians.  Milk did not feature 
prominently in the Nazis' schemes regarding provisions to be 
extracted from Ukraine.  The time-sensitivity of milk spoilage may 
have made it less a target for rendering back to Germany than, say, 
crop harvests.  Moreover, as during the Soviet collectivization-era 
Famine, milk was easier for peasants to conceal or consume directly 
after milking.  That did not mean that dairy was exempt from wartime 
predations; for example, per German army policy, German troops 
routinely requisitioned rural households' dairy cows in order to 
provision themselves.81  It did mean that a household's access to milk 
raised the odds of possible survival if other stars also aligned. 
 
  Legal disputes from the War years offer an intimate look into 
the lifesaving significance of milk for rural households.  Consider 
Generalova v. Shagov, a dispute that came before Soviet courts after 
liberation.82  During the occupation, German forces demanded six 
cows of a village; owners of two cows agreed that one (Ms. 
Generalova's) would be surrendered and the other (Mr. Shagov's), 
milked by the two households and the milk, shared.  After liberation 
from German occupation, Mr. Shagov refused to continue the milk-
share arrangement; the householder who had surrendered her cow to 
the occupying forces for the common good, Ms. Generalova, brought 
suit.  The parties pursued the case up to the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R. which affirmed the trial court judgment for Generalova, 
reasoning with an almost Coasian logic that villagers entered into the 
agreement "to distribute equally, to the extent feasible, the burden of 
the forcible extortion by the Germans" and thus "it corresponded to 
the interests not only of those who gave up their cow to meet the 
German demands, but also of those who kept in their possession 
cows for the benefit of the owners who had to give theirs away."83  
 
2014 historians estimated that an additional minimum of 1.5 million from Ukraine 
were murdered in the Shoah.  SUBTELNY, id. at 479 (giving casualty tolls aside 
from the Shoah); Lower, supra note 72 (giving figures of those citizens of Ukraine 
murdered in the Holocaust). 
81 On the policy for troops to feed themselves from the Ukrainian countryside, 
formulated during a meeting of top war-planning bureaucrats on May 2, 1941, see 
Gerhard, Food and Genocide , supra note 74 at 58 –59; Kay, supra note 77 at 685. 
82 The case, though from a village in Russia, offers a fact pattern illustrative of the 
Ukrainian experience as well. 
83 Case of Generalova v. Shagov, Civil Division of the Supreme Court of the 
U.S.S.R., 1943, in 4 SUDEBNAIA PRAKTIKA VERKHOVNOGO SUDA SSSR, 1943 31-32, 
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  C.  Cattle and Dairy in High Socialism 
 
  1. Collectivization in Legal Imagination and in Practice 
 
  After World War II, the structures of collectivism were 
harnessed to incentivize production for post-war reconstruction in 
new ways.  As already discussed, the state's "Model Charter for 
Collective Farms" contained a one-cow provision84 that secured the 
household milk supply to which many who made it through Famine 
and the War owed their survival.  Recall also that the Model Charter 
had introduced a unit of measure for collective farm labor, the 
trudoden', a standardized "workday," for calculating compensation, 
pegging different farm tasks to different numbers (or portions) of 
"workdays" earned based on level of difficulty, skill, or prior training 
required.85 An individual's "workdays" were recorded weekly,86 with 
collective farm proceeds divided up annually proportionate to each 
member's accrued "workdays."87  The milkmaids' "workday" aligned 
with output; in 1956, for example, a milkmaid accrued 1.8-2 
 
reprinted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, at 329. 
84 Model Charter, supra note 55.  See also text infra notes 55-57. 
85 See Model Charter, id.  Discussion here is also informed by the Trudoden' 
workday entry, supra note 71.  See also text infra notes 55-57 and infra note 71 for 
discussion of the "workday" in the context of the Famine and World War II, 
respectively. 
86 The system encouraged labor zeal by recognizing both its service to group aims 
and the individual's heroic feats of labor.  See, e.g., LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM, 
STAKHANOVISM AND THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTIVITY IN THE U.S.S.R, 1935-1941 
(1988) (describing the movement inspired by a heroic Donbas (Ukraine) coal 
miner.  See also R.W. DAVIES, THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF SOVIET RUSSIA, VOL. 2, 
THE SOVIET COLLECTIVE FARM, 1929-1930 (1980); SHEILA FITZPATRICK, STALIN’S 
PEASANTS: RESISTANCE AND SURVIVAL IN THE RUSSIAN VILLAGE AFTER 
COLLECTIVIZATION  (1994); MARY BUCKLEY, MOBILIZING SOVIET PEASANTS:  
HEROINES AND HEROES OF STALIN’S FIELDS 115133 (2006) (describing collective 
farming labor practices patterned after heavy industry).  See generally OLEG 
KHARKHORDIN, THE COLLECTIVE AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN RUSSIA (1999) (describing 
conditions of possibility within Soviet labor collectives for the development of a 
certain kind of individual).    
87 Obviously, this compensation system was disastrously disrupted by the forced 
requisitioning of foodstuffs that precipated mass famine in Ukraine.  Adopting the 
"workday" as a unit of measure obviated the need for cash to enter into the "mutual 
settlements" (взаиморасчёты) internal to the collective farm.  See Trudoden' 
workday, supra note 71.  Excluding cash payments increased the corresponding 
importance of internal grain distribution and thus increased collective farmers' 
vulnerability to external (state) grain confiscation.  See Part III.A. supra 
(describing mass commodity seizures and Famine in Ukraine 1930-33). 
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"workdays" for every 100 liters of milk (which entailed, generally, 
her milking 8-10 cows).88     
 
  These and other measures were meant to foster collectivized 
subjectivities through collective responsibility.  Another decree 
provided that a collective farmer's income be based on the 
productivity of her work "brigade" and of a new inter-brigade unit 
called the zveno, or "link,"89 predicating individual compensation on 
group performance.  Milkmaids' brigades, too, were linked; in 
collective farm milk production, they were in it together.  The law 
eventually permitted individual collective farms some latitude in 
setting compensation rates90 and the "workday" as a normative unit 
of measure was eventually replaced in 196691 by fixed compensation 
 
88 "For hand milking  in the collective farm for every 100 liters of milked milk a 
milkmaid receives on average 1.8-2 workdays (for the servicing of 8-10 cows)."  
V.A. Olenev, Yu. I. Belyaevskiy, researchers in the laboratory of the All-Union 
Scientific-Research Institute of Electrification of Agriculture, "Effectiveness and 
Benefits of "Milking Sites" (1956), reprinted at Istoriya doeniya [History of 
Milking], available at 
http://agrotehimport.ru/national_history_of_dairy_equipment_ussr/effektivnosti_i_
preimushhestva_doilnyix_ploshhadok/ [hereinafter Olenev and Belyaevskiy, 
Milking Sites]. 
89 Decrees of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. "On Measures for the 
Improvement of the Organization, Raising the Productivity, and Streamline 
Payment of Labor on Collective Farms," April 19, 1948 cited in G.A. AKSENENOK, 
V.K. GRIGOR'EV, P.P. PYATNITSKIY, COLLECTIVE FARM LAW, CH. IX Legal forms of 
organization and payment of labor on collective forms, §4 Payment of Labor, 
available at http://istmat.info/node/23766 (providing for the zveno, or "link," 
organization). 
90 Decree of CC of CPSU and Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., March 6, 
1956, cited in Trudoden' workday supra note 71  (allowing each collective farm to 
set its own minimum number of "workdays"); see also Charter of Agricultural 
Cartel, Art. 11 (1956), described in entry for Dokhody kolkhozov ["Income of 
Collective Farms"] FINANSOVIY-KREDITNIY SLOVAR' TOM I 406 (V.P. D'yachenko 
ed., 1961) 406, available at  https://economy-
ru.info/page/015051140096162202142062081044017249179120054120/ 
(allowing collective farms, after having fulfilled annual obligations to the state, 
flexibility to distribute the collective income in a manner decided by a group 
meeting of all farmers).  Some farms formed cash and in-kind funds to be 
distributed to individuals as a monthly advance, with a final settling of work 
accounts at the end of the year. Trudoden' workday, supra note 71. 
91 Decree of the CC of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., "On 
Raising the Material Interestedness of Collective Farmers in Development of 
Societal Production," May 18, 1966, discussed in Sergey Ivanovich Shubin, 
Istoriya Trudodnya (1930-1966) Kak Mery Truda I Instrumenta Yevo 
Stimuliravaniya 31, 34 (at text infra his note 10) available at 
https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/istoriya-trudodnya-1930-1966-kak-mery-truda-i-
instrumenta-ego-stimulirovaniya/viewer.  See also, e.g., Rekomendatsii po oplatye 
truda v kolkhozach Ukrainskoi SSR 107 (Kiev, 1977).  
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rates more like wages (like those already used on state farms),92 
though the "link" unit persisted.93   
 
  In milkways, such organizational forms of high socialism 
left surviving legacies.  Milking workers had long since emerged as 
a gendered cohort.  Though not exclusively performed by women, 
normatively milking was "women's work":  something women were 
considered better at and better suited to, and as a practical matter, 
under a near-monopoly of milkmaids,94 who became a distinct and 
privileged labor and social group within the collective farm.95  The 
collectivist practices of high socialism intensified relationships 
between village milkmaids working in the collective farm dairy, 
establishing and reenforcing patterns of cooperation, pressure, 
support, and self-organization that left their imprint on milkmaid 
cohorts in Ukrainian villages long after the "workday," or even the 
collective farms, had disappeared.  The "workday" also left a lasting 
legacy in its influence on the adoption of mechanized milking (or 
lack thereof), which the next subsection briefly describes. 
 
2. Milk Dreams: Reconstruction, State Science, and the 
Limits of Big Agriculture 
 
  a.  Cattle Feed and Consumption 
 
  Premier Khruschev in 1958 promised to raise U.S.S.R. 
agricultural production over capitalist countries'96 and linked 
 
92 Shubin, id. at 34-35 (decrying abolition of the workday as leading to the 
eventual demise of the collective farm) and at 32 (calling for a more "objective" 
reappraisal of the workday). 
93 On Khrushchev’s enthusiasm with “links” and further literature on them, see 
GEORGE BRESLAUER, KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV AS LEADERS 94 (1982). 
94 This gendered division of labor, with women primarily responsible for milking, 
has lasted to the present.  "Rural women are key players in milk production as they 
are largely responsible for cow milking and care."  Improving Milk Supply in 
Northern Ukraine, FAO Investment Center/EBRD Cooperation Program Report 
Series, no. 18 at xiii (September 2013), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3346e-pdf 
[hereinafter FAO/EBRD Report No. 18]. 
95 Soviet Ukrainian milkmaids typically earned more than their counterparts in the 
intellegentsia and, like (mostly male) tractor and combine drivers, were privileged 
to purchase cars and imported clothes at special stores in the district center 
reserved for nomenklatura.  Oksana Hasiuk, personal communication, Jan. 3, 
2020. 
96 Control Figures for the Economic Development of the U.S.S.R., 1959-1965:  
Theses of N.S. Khrushchov's Report to the Twenty-First Congress of the CPSU, at 
7-8, 9-10, 11-12 (1958), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 27, 
383, 384. 
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increasing production with restoring consumption.  As the Program 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of 1961 promised, "In 
the current decade (1961-70) the Soviet Union ... will surpass the 
strongest and richest capitalist country, the U.S.A. ... ; everyone will 
live in easy circumstances; all collective and state farms will become 
highly productive and profitable enterprises ... "97 
 
  Where before and during the War collectivization had 
organized the countryside in a way visible to the state and thereby 
facilitated seizing foodstuffs,98 in decades after the War, emphasis 
switched to facilitating delivery of knowledge and other inputs, 
including applied agricultural science, considered crucial to the drive 
to enrich Soviet consumption.  One example is cattle feed.  During 
World War II, Soviet scientists had begun large-scale production of 
single-celled protein (SCP)99 from microbial biomass to meet human 
protein needs.100  The Soviet Council of Ministers decided in 1960 to 
pursue SCP as a source of protein-rich animal feed additive101 and 
set up a new administration, the Main Administration of the 
Microbiological Industry, to organize efforts.102 By 1990, U.S.S.R.-
wide production of SCP was reported at 1,680,000 tons, roughly 
equivalent to the addition of 8.4-11.8 million tons of grain to feed 
supplies.103    
 
  b. Mechanization: Losing Time, Losing Touch 
 
 
97 Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Adopted by the Twenty-
Second Congress of the CPSU, Oct. 31, 1961, excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 384, 385. 
98 See Parts III.B.1. and III.B.2, supra; see also SCOTT supra note 67 (interpreting 
measures like collectivization as ways of making the countryside legible to the 
state). 
99 Single cell protein was called in Russian "protein-vitamin concentrate," (belok-
vitamin konsentrat, or BVK for short). 
100 Anthony Rimmington, Soviet Biotechnology:  The Case of Single Cell Protein, 
in TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 76 (R. Amann and 
J. Cooper eds., 1986). 
101 A.E. Humphrey, Soviet Technology:  the Case of Single Cell Protein, 23 
SURVEY 102:81 (1977-78). 
102 Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., "On the Development of 
Microbiological Industry and on the Administration of that Industry," Feb. 18, 
1966, in 6 DECISIONS OF THE PARTY AND GOVERNMENT ON AGRICULTURAL 
QUESTIONS (1968) at 19-21. 
103 ANTHONY RIMMINGTON & ROD GREENSHIELDS, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSITION:  
A SURVEY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY IN RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND THE BALTIC STATES 12 
(1992). 
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  While the state intensively applied science and industry to 
livestock husbandry in attempt to expand meat and milk production, 
the milking process itself remained stubbornly un-industrialized.  
Although engineers designed devices to mechanize milking,104 even 
disseminating detailed disinfection instructions,105 milking machines 
themselves remained rarely used and dairying remained literally in 
the hands of milkmaids.  As of the mid-1950s, compared with an 
estimated 50% use in the West, only 30,000 milking machines had 
been procured for 3 million dairy cows across the U.S.S.R. -- and of 
those, less than an estimated one-fifth (that is, a maximum 6,000 
machines for 3 million cows) were in actual operation.106   
 
  Why did milking resist mechanization?  In 1956, two 
agricultural machinery designers from the All-Union Scientific-
Research Institute of Electrification of Agriculture undertook to 
answer that very question.107  Their analysis is a remarkable resource, 
affording a contemporaneous view of sociological and organization 
features of Soviet dairying under high socialism and revealing how 
bovine subjectivity --  considerations like cow comfort, preferences, 
or well-being -- feature in their situational awareness.  A few 
exemplary points: 
 
• Machines made milkmaids' and cows' lives worse, imposing 
a "whole series of manual operations" that milking by hand 
did not entail108 while failing to accommodate adequate care 
for cows.  For example, on a mass-production line a 
 
104 See, e.g., Milking system Milk pipeline-100, Milk pipeline-200 ''Daugava'' 
brand:  Operation and maintenance manual (1966) (operation and maintenance 
manual for a milk machine for 100 head of cattle produced in the Latvian S.S.R. 
intended for use in milk operations across the U.S.S.R.), description of holding in 
Russian State Library available at https://search.rsl.ru/ru/record/01008921371.  
See also, e.g., Milk pipeline 100 head restored, 
https://molservis.com.ua/p1267456-molokoprovod-100-golov.html (showing 
images of a restored "Milk pipeline-100" system, the piping system for a milk 
machine serving 100 head, currently for sale on the used agricultural products 
market in Ukraine) (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
105  See, e.g., Sanitary Rules for Care of Milking Stations, Apparatuses, and Milk 
Dishes, for Monitoring their Sanitary Condition and the Sanitary Quality of Milk, 
confirmed by the Head of the Veterinary Administration of the Ministry of 
Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and with the agreement of the Head of the Sanitary-
Epidemiological Administration of the Ministry of Health of the U.S.S.R., Jan. 12, 
1967 available at http://www.alppp.ru/law/hozjajstvennaja-dejatelnost/selskoe-
hozjajstvo/62/sanitarnye-pravila-po-uhodu-za-doilnymi-ustanovkami-apparatami-
i-molochnoj-posudoj-kontrol.html. 
106 Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.   
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milkmaid could no longer wash her cow's udder with clean, 
warm water as soon as she was finished milking, but rather 
washed udder after udder "out of the same bucket of rapidly 
cooling water."109 
• Existing spatial arrangements catered to cows and 
milkmaids, not machines.110  Making architecture work for 
the piping systems, washing rooms, and other parts of the 
mechanized milking system would reconfigure space in 
ways less cozy, comfortable, or convenient for cows and 
milkmaids.  
• Mechanization violated rhythms and temporality best suited 
to cows and milkmaids.  Tending multiple cows at a machine 
required a milkmaid interrupt herself and cow to empty milk 
from bucket, adversely affecting "both the process of 
uniform milking and the condition of the animal."111  
Milkmaids milking by hand worked in rhythm and cows fed 
in rhythm; machines meant some finished earlier, throwing 
the work collective out of sync and "violating the general 
feeding rhythm of the herd. . . "112  Moreover, a stationary 
milking installation "[could not] be used in summer camps 
or in pastures," keeping all indoors during the glorious 
temperate months.  
• Machines played havoc with milkmaid compensation.  
Equipment could malfunction; the electricity supply, prove 
inconsistent; or milkmaids, "lose a lot of time on transitions 
and downtime,"113 all of which, along with measuring 
malfunctions, occurred at the expense of milkmaid 
compensation.114  Mechanization would decrease 
compensation-per-liter by a third (from 1.8-2 "workdays" 
accrued for every 100 liters hand-milked115 to 0.6-0.4 
"workdays" for every 100 liters machine-milked).116  Despite 
techno-optimists urging slow transition in "workday" 
evaluation norms117 lest milkmaids simply refuse to adopt 
milking machines,118 milkmaids and machines got off on the 
 
109 Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. (which entailed, generally, "serving" 8-10 cows). 
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wrong foot, and at least some of that seems attributable to 
milkmaids' understanding of machines' future effects on 
compensation. 
• Mechanized milking could thus create perverse incentives 
for the milkmaid-turned-machine operator, resulting in 
discomfort the cow and depressing production.  For best 
results, a "pulsator operating mode" should be set at 45-50 
pulsations per minute,119 but some milkmaids, seeking to 
speed up the process, would increase pulsations to 80-90 or 
more,120 a frequency at which "the milk-issuing process is 
not accelerated, but rather, slows down as the sucking cycle 
is shortened."121  A second example: machine-inexperienced 
milkmaids would fasten the apparatus too high, causing "the 
exit of milk from the nipple canals to become difficult ... ."122  
A third:  one milkmaid working simultaneously on eight 
devices "can not manage to serve her cows in good time, 
overexposes the udder to the apparatus, and cannot properly 
monitor the milking process."123  In addition to reducing milk 
yield,124 these glitches also sound painful to the cow.  When 
hand-milking, a milkmaid knew that the typical cow would 
not tolerate being mishandled; she could kick over the pail, 
switch her tail at the milkmaid, or step on or kick the 
milkmaid.  When contact with the cow was mediated 
through machine, and moreover when the milkmaid had to 
attend to multiple cow/machines simultaneously, she could 
not stay attuned to the comfort of each.   
 
  That leads to the overall problem the Soviet machine 
designers identified:  even if operating flawlessly, milking by 
machine created "depersonalization in caring for cows," and of all 
Soviet animal-tenders, they singled out Ukrainian milkmaids as 
particularly rejecting depersonalized cow care.125  Dairy cows in 
Ukraine, I would add, had an expected lifespan of around 25 years; 
the cows in question were at most one or two generations removed, 
the calves or grand-cows, of those milk-producers who had seen 
 
119 Id. 





125 Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88.  The word the authors 
use here, obezlichka, is very interesting.  It can mean "depersonalization," 
"anonymity," or "a lack of personal responsibility."  
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villagers through Famine and War.  Of those state farms in Ukraine 
that tried it at all, most dropped mechanized milking after but brief 
experiments.  Even advocates attributed rejection of mechanization 
to a problem they could not design a way out of, "depersonalization" 
of the interaction with the cow.126  
 
  The last decades of Soviet governance saw a few forays into 
mass milk production and mechanization,127 but these examples 
remained relatively uncommon.128  Whatever its theoretical 
advantages, machine milking actually "depresse[d] the 
interestedness of cattle-tenders, which often, instead of being 
champions of mechanization, impede[d] its implementation" or 
hastened its abandonment.129  The features identified as reasons for 
this still echo in Ukraine today, and Soviet Ukrainian milkmaids' 
largely successful rejection of machine milking130 portends their 
political potency on post-Soviet farms.   
 




127 In 1970, a Ukrainian agricultural research specialist pointed to the example of 
the "Kutuzovka" farm on which cows were not, primarily, pastured, and were 
milked in "milking parlors."  I. A. Danilenko, The Technology of the Production of 
Milk on an Industrial Basis (1970), reprinted at Istoriya doeniya, available at 
http://agrotehimport.ru/national_history_of_dairy_equipment_ussr/texnologiya_pr
oizvodstva_moloka_na_promyishlennoj_osnove/  This same technology was the 
centerpiece of several new dairy operations, enormous by the standards of Soviet 
dairying practice, in Ukraine -- 800 cows each (on the "Red Army" sovkhoz in 
Kharkiv oblast' and the "Karl Mark" kolkhoz in Donetsk oblast') and 1000 cows 
(on the "Banner" sovkhoz in Luhansk oblast') -- on which construction began in 
1970.  Id. 
128 Consider the milking "carousel," for example, common in U.S. dairy operations 
since the 1960s.  See George Frisvold, The U.S. Dairy Industry in the 20th and 
21st Century, 16 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 197 (describing technology employed, 
including dairy carousels, in U.S. dairy production).  Nearly unknown in the 
U.S.S.R., the only exemplar failed to increase production and, in fact, was blamed 
for high mortality rates of cows brought to it.  Viktor Madison, Invent a "Wheel" 
for Livestock Raising, DairyNews.ru, April 29, 2014, 
http://www.dairynews.ru/news/izobresti-koleso-dlya-plemennogo-skotovodstva-k-
10.html (describing an early 1980s Moscow-region dairy complex with German 
technology designed to support 2,000 cows, "the only [such modern] enterprise in 
the USSR," and reporting that milk production at this "palace" with its 
"unprecedented milking-'carousel,' . . . began to fall below the level of those 
households from where heifers had hurriedly been collected for [it]"). 
129 Id. 
130 Olenev and Belyaevksiy, Milking Sites, supra note 88 (attributing the rarity of 
milking machines in Soviet dairy production to the pre-existing organization of the 
work and to milkmaids). 
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  One indicator of how limited large-scale big-science 
interventions (like the feeding program) were in transforming the 
intimate codes of the dairysphere comes from a small amendment to 
the criminal law of the Russian Federation of 1963.  "In order to stop 
the feeding of bread and other grain products to cattle and poultry," 
it reads, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.F.S.F.R. makes 
punishable by incarceration for a second offense, "The buying up in 
state or cooperative stores of baked bread, flour, groats, and other 
grain products for feeding cattle and poultry . . ."131  Farmers, we can 
infer, had taken to supplementing livestock feed with bread and other 
products meant for human consumption.  The need for this 
amendment may speak to unmet demand for richer fodder, but it also 
points to a feature to which my post-Soviet fieldwork attests:  the 
intimacy of the relationship between caretaker and cow, such that 
each cow's food preferences are known and, when possible, catered 
to. 
 
  Whether a cow belonged to a rural household or was part of 
a collective or state farm herd, the act of milking remained part of a 
close and tactile relationship between milkmaid and cow.  The part 
milk played in the survival of rural households through the tumult of 
the 1930s and 1940s if anything strengthened appreciation for the 
place of milk in village diets and cows in village life and deepened 
affective bonds between villagers and their dairy cows.  To this day, 
Ukrainian villagers take their cows personally.132 
 
  That said, while the relationship of cow to milkmaid 
remained personal, affective, and tactile, the surrounding rural milieu 
became the object of intense modernization.  After violent 
beginnings, collectivization -- the pooling of resources, labor, and 
know-how and the forging of a collective rural subjectivity133 -- 
became the social idiom through which modernity came to the 
Ukrainian countryside, from rural electrification to tractor stations, 
combines, and mechanized harvesters, to scientific interventions.134  
While the act of milking itself was not mechanized, milk processing 
was, and milk in excess of its rural producers' uses was trucked to 
industrial facilities for processing, bottling, and distribution, whence 
 
131 "On Increasing the Liability for Feeding Cattle and Poultry Bread and Other 
Grain Products," Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R., 
May 6, 1963, 11 SOVIETSKAIA IUSTITSIA 7 (1963), excerpted in Zile, SOVIET LEGAL 
HISTORY, supra note 27, at 447. 
132 See fieldnotes from periods of observation cited supra note 15. 
133 For explanation and description of the forging of collective subjectivities, see, 
e.g., Eppinger, Oligarchy, supra note 5.  See also generally KHARKHORDIN, supra 
note 86. 
134 See text infra notes 98 - 126 supra. 
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milk linked villagers to urban consumers in anonymous networks of 
production and consumption.   
 
  The processes described in the foregoing overview trouble a 
simplistic description of milk in Ukraine as "indigenous."  Over a 
century of revolution and experimentation, war and self-cultivation, 
milk production and consumption in Ukraine were the object of 
intense interventions.  In milk, the indigenous, tactile, and personal 
became enmeshed in the modern, industrial, and impersonal. 
 
  IV. From Sheds to Stalls 
 
  A. Decollectivization by Law:  Land in the Limelight 
 
  Beginning in the late Soviet period, the collectivized 
landscape would face vast transformation anew.  Reformers 
associated with Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the first steps towards 
decollectivizing agriculture through a late-Soviet law allowing 
“private farming” on a 99-year leasehold; though response was 
limited and by 1991, only 3,000 farmers across the U.S.S.R. had 
availed themselves, the idea was germinating.135 
 
  After Ukraine became politically independent in 1991, the 
new Ukrainian government introduced measures towards bringing 
private ownership of herds and lands to Ukrainian farming.136  
However, even initiatives instituting private property rights were 
shaped by conceptual categories, allegiances, and habits from 
collectives.  One 1995 presidential order divested the state of 
agricultural ownership, converting all state farms into collective 
farms (collectively but undividedly owned by the residents of the 
farm).137 A second provided that each member of a collective farm 
 
135 Interview with Bohdan Chomiak, director of agricultural programs for USAID 
Kiev (June 20, 2002). 
136 Decree of Cabinet of Ministers of Ukr. "On the Privatization of Land Plots,"  
Decree No. 15-92, Dec. 26, 1992, reprinted in PRAVO VLASNOSTI NA ZEMLYU TA 
IOHO ZAKHIST:  ZBIRNIK NORMATIVNIKH AKTIV 168-169 (2002) (allowing late-
Soviet leaseholders to purchase their plot outright from the government and 
permitting them to resell it).   This would, incidentally, be the last time that the 
post-Soviet Ukrainian government permitted legal sale of agricultural land for 
nearly three decades, until at least 2020.  See, e.g., Verkhovna rada pristupila k 
obsuzhdeniyou zakona o rinkye selkhozzemel, Tass news service (tass.ru) Feb. 7, 
2020, reprinted in The Dairy News, https://www.dairynews.ru/news/verkhovnaya-
rada-pristupila-k-obsuzhdeniyu-zakona-.html. 
137 Order of the President of Ukr. “On the Parcelization of Land, Given into 
Collective Ownership to Agricultural Enterprises and Organizations,” Order No. 
720/95 of Aug. 8, 1995 reprinted in ZAKONODAVSTVO UKRAINI PRO ZEMLYU 162-
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be issued a “land and asset certificate” documenting the person’s 
ownership share (including in dairy cattle).  Entitlement to a 
certificate, in principle based on one's belonging to the collective, 
would be determined by a “Land Committee” set up by the farm.138  
This measure introduced the concept of divisibility and created an 
exercise by which farmers imagined division of assets, including the 
collectively-owned herd.  On the other hand, it also reinforced some 
of the bonds within the collective by forcing local committees to 
consider who "belonged" to the farm and who did not.  Further, it did 
not change the governance structure of the collective farms and the 
director (a Soviet-holdover role), not the farm shareholders, still held 
sway.139  The government depended on collective farm directors to 
distribute collective farm assets, leaving them significant 
discretionary power.140  In regard to dairy cattle, this structural power 
and de jure authority set the stage for further showdowns between 
milkmaids and directors like the one recounted above.141   
 
  Passage of a new constitution for independent Ukraine 
ensured that private ownership in land was not per se illegal and 
brought the right to own land under constitutional protection.142  In 
the executive branch, President Leonid Kuchma's team experimented 
with issuing land share certificates to collective farmers late in his 
first term, and when they proved electorally popular, Kuchma 
disbanded agricultural collectives entirely as a matter of law.143  In 
the legislative branch, a new Land Code providing for private 
ownership of land passed the parliament in October 2001.  The 
record on public reception of privatization shows some ambivalence.  
Six months after the new Code passed into law, 41% of eligible 
 
163 (2002) [hereinafter UKR. LAND LEGISLATION] (converting state to collective 
farms and reserving 10% of each state farm's landholding to be retained in state 
ownership and administered by the village council (silska rada)). 
138 A Temporary Order for Carrying Out Work of Given Government Acts to 
Collective Agricultural Enterprises, Agricultural Cooperatives, Agricultural Joint-
Stock Companies, and those formed on the Basis of Sovkhoz and Other 
Governmental Agricultural Engerprises, on the Right of Collective Ownership to 
Land, confirmed by Order of the State Committee of Ukraine on Land Resources, 
No. 18, March 15, 1995 reprinted in UKR. LAND LEGISLATION, id., at 162-163. 
139 Interview with Steve Dobrolovic, Kiev lawyer working for Chemonics on 
national land titling project, (July 3, 2003). 
140 Interview with Chomiak supra note 135. 
141 See INTRODUCTION, supra. 
142 CONST. UKR. Art. 41 (1996). 
143 "On the Uninvested Means concerning Accelerating Reform of the Agrarian 
Sector of the Economy," Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 1529/99, Dec. 3, 
1999 reprinted in UKR. LAND LEGISLATION, supra note 137, at 85. 
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farmers had already claimed a land parcel,144 but within five years, at 
least 20% of the overall population, roughly 10 million people, 
nearly all rural out-migrants, had left their homes and farms.145   
 
B. Decollectivization by Act:  Disappearance and 
Democracy in the Dairy 
 
  1.  Mystery Meat 
 
  My introduction to some of the puzzles of cows and cattle 
within the context of the privatizing Ukrainian landscape came in the 
summer of 2007.  Coming across a word unfamiliar despite decent 
proficiency in Ukrainian and Russian languages, govyadina, 
("beef"), made me aware that in twelve years of working in and on 
Ukraine, I could not recall encountering the word for "beef" in meals 
at friends' homes or on restaurant menus.146  Alerted, I subsequently 
systematically took note in my fieldwork and documented, indeed, 
not encountering the word for "beef" in normal daily life,147 a striking 
absence in a culinary culture that otherwise reveled in meat.  Also 
striking, when traveling through the Ukrainian countryside, is the 
pervasively derelict state of large cattle sheds.  Nearly every village 
has a long shed for cattle, and, by the summer of 1995 when I first 
observed the rural landscape, nearly every one gave (and still gives) 
every appearance of having been abandoned.148   
 
  A connection between these two observations eventually 
became clear through interviews with investors in Ukrainian 
agriculture.  While not able to verify the story of beef they tell, I have 
now attested repeated versions across Ukraine.  The story is, in the 
last year or so of the Soviet period and the first year or so of 
Ukrainian independence, two brothers (usually described as hailing 
from Lebanon, explaining or perhaps exoticizing the exogenous 
element of the story) traveled the Ukrainian countryside, village by 
village, buying up the cattle.  They would strike a deal with the local 
collective farm director, transfer the cattle from the collective farm's 
 
144 A Good Deed Indeed for Owners of Farmland, KYIV WEEKLY, June 14, 2002 at 
21. 
145 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION KYIV MISSION, LABOUR 
MIGRATION ASSESSMENT FOR THE WNIS REGION (October 2007). 
146 Field observation, "говядина" [govyadina, beef], sandwich-board menu in front 
of beachfront restaurant, Sudak, Crimea (June 9, 2007). 
147 Field notes, supra note 12. 
148 Observations during author's period of diplomatic service at U.S. Embassy 
Kyiv, 1995-1997, and thereafter, periods of anthropological fieldwork as noted id.   
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pasture to the nearest truck or train transport depot, get them loaded 
up, transported to the port of Odessa, and shipped out by sea.  No one 
knew if they went to populate herds elsewhere, or if they were 
destined for slaughter for meat or leather goods.  The collective farm 
director would pocket the proceeds; the two brothers would move on 
to the next village.  In different villages, locals would point to a 
satellite dish or a post-Soviet automobile at the home of the former 
collective farm director -- expensive goods that no one else could 
afford -- and tell me, "That's our herd."149   
 
  The apocryphal tale of the sell-off of Ukraine's beef herd, 
whether accurate in its details or not, reflects local causal 
explanations of an observed phenomenon, the disappearance of beef 
cattle, that is borne out in official statistics.  The numbers are 
astonishing.  The number of head of beef cattle in Ukraine, estimated 
at 25,195,000 in 1990 (the year before the dissolution of the 
U.S.S.R.), fell to 4,100,000 by 2015.150  Beef production by 
agricultural enterprises (as opposed to households) crashed from 
1,808,000 tons in 1990 to 97,000 tons in 2011.151 
 
  As related in the Introduction, a second part of the tale -- also 
fitting a narrative pattern, but this time related by eyewitnesses or 
participants rather than hearsay -- involves the milkmaids of the 
collective farm dairy noticing the disappearance of local beef cattle, 
organizing to confront the collective farm director in a group 
meeting, and "decollectivizing" the village dairy herd by each 
milkmaid taking home a cow.  In addition to descendants of the 
household cow allowance under collective farming,152 the 
milkmaids' action swelled the ranks of cow-owning post-Soviet 
Ukrainian households.  Village architecture came to include, in the 
small outbuilding behind each home previously built for a pig, a new 
stall for each cow.    
 
 
149 Field notes, id. 
150 Rob Cook, Ukraine Cattle Inventory (1988-2015), Beef2live, October 15, 2019, 
http://beef2live.com/story-ukraine-cattle-inventory-1988-2015-85-122064 (report 
by a market analyst published by a beef grower's association).  The figures given 
are illustrative of the estimated crash in numbers of beef cattle, but I offer them 
without claim to exactitude.  Beef cattle statistics vary somewhat from source to 
source.  See, e.g., S. Bohdanko, Nevtishni realii, 2 2 AGRO PERSPECTIVA 40 2009, 
cited in O.G. Kukhar, Suchasni Tendetsii Rozvitku Tvarinnitstva v Ukraini, 8 
EFEKTIVNA EKONOMIKA 2013, http://www.economy.nayka.com.ua/?op=1&z=2267 
(giving the figures as falling from 21,083,000 to 1,511,000 in 2011) [hereinafter 
Kukhar, Current Trends]. 
151 Kukhar, id. 
152 See Part III.B.1.b. supra. 
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  2.  Milking Machines and Moral Obsolescence 
 
  The story of the local revolt of village dairy maids that 
reached me from participants and eyewitnesses raises the question, 
How widespread was such action?  As with the story of beef cattle, 
the dairy maids' tale of confrontation and village herd 
decollectivization is confirmed more widely, at least in its effects, by 
statistics.  Against a backdrop of mass bovine export and slaughter 
which reduced the beef herd to 1/5 of its late-Soviet ranks, the 
holding of dairy cows by households skyrocketed over the same 
period both in absolute numbers and as a percentage relative to 
agricultural enterprises.  In 1990, dairy cows husbanded by 
Ukrainian households amounted to 3.54 million cows, and by 2000 
that number had increased to 4.38 million cows.153  Between 1990 
and 2000, the number of dairy cows raised in individual households 
increased from 14.4% to 46.5%.154  By 2010, 65% of the total cattle 
population (and thus, an even greater percentage of total dairy cattle) 
was concentrated in household ownership.155    
 
  In many villages, this shift has resulted in a new informal 
"recollectivization" of cow herding duties.  Back in Gruzenske 
village, after the confrontation with the collective farm director, each 
milkmaid returned home with a cow.  Rather than duplicate pasturage 
duties, the milkmaids organized cow-owning families into a 
cooperative effort, each family taking a turn tending to the group of 
village cows for a day (multiplied, in the case of a multiple-cow 
family, by the number of cows a family owned).  By 2009, 18 years 
later, this arrangement had stabilized into a set routine, both for 
dairy-owning households and for cattle.  Cattle leave their own 
family's courtyard each morning and join the herd heading up the 
central dirt road of the village out to the nearest pastures.  Locals 
jokingly refer to this as "the morning commute," and the 33 head of 
cattle plodding together are indeed the most traffic the village road 
will see in a day.  At the end of the day, a member of each family 
waits at the entrance of the family courtyard to open the gate and let 
the family's cow or cows in.  There is no need to direct or herd the 
cow; each cow knows her home and trots in at a brisk pace.  The joke 
is, in fact, that one needs to look sharp and get out of the way or a 
cow could run you over in her eagerness to get back to her stall, 
where she is fed her favorite foods and her owner-milkmaid attends 
to her milking.156 
 
153 Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Field observation, Gruzenske village, Ukr., Sept. 2009. 
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  Taken in sum, the results of these processes -- monetization 
of the beef herd and decollectivization of the dairy herd -- are 
profound.  Practically every village in Ukraine ended up with some 
households who kept, and still keep, their own dairy cow.157  Beef, 
in village diets and urban menus, is largely absent158 and correlated 
statistics concern those fixated on beef over dairy.159 These shifts 
have also transformed the rural landscape.  Nationally, acreage 
devoted to growing forage has fallen160 as villages convert to 
pasturing dairy cattle rather than fattening up beef.161  Nearly every 
village has a large cattle shed, part of the former collective farm 
buildings, that by 1995 was emptied of animals, by 2000 looked 
abandoned, and by 2020 is largely dilapidated.162 
 
  Household cows are milked by hand.  Some current 
proponents push for retooling and marketing anew milking machines 
of the Soviet era that were designed for smaller-scale operations; 
 
157 Of 5.3 million rural households in Ukraine in 2013, nearly 2 million keep their 
own dairy cow.  Milk Supply in Northern Ukraine, FAO/EBRD Report No. 18, 
supra note 94 at xiv. 
158 In the words of a USDA report of 2017, "Beef cattle numbers will remain 
insignificant."  Alexander Tarassevych, Ukraine Livestock and Products Annual 
Report 2 (September 1, 2017), U.S.D.A. Foreign Agricultural Service Global 
Agricultural Information Network, 
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Livestock%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_9-1-2017.pdf 
159 See, e.g., Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150 (fretting as an agronomist 
over data that might indicate a problem in beef production but not in dairy, such as 
in 2000, the average daily increase of cattle amounted to 255 grams/day, 40% less 
than in 1990, although admittedly the average daily increase in 2011 reached 481 
grams/day, exceeding 1990 rates).  See also, e.g., legislative attempts to promote 
breeds with greater potential to put on weight as in Law of Ukraine "On the 
Breeding Business in Animal Husbandry," passed into law by PVRU № 3773-XII, 
Dec. 23, 1993, in VVR 1994, № 2, at 7-8, 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3773-12, and as subsequently amended in 
1999, 2003, 2010, 2012, and 2015, final amended text available at 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/3691-12. 
160 Between 2009-2011, the number of hectares devoted to growing forage fell by 
an astonishing 80%, from 11,999,000 ha to 2,477,000 ha.  TVARINNITSTVO 
UKRAINI ZA 2011 RIK. STATISTICHNII ZBIRNIK (N.S. Vlasenko ed., State Committe 
of Statistics of Ukraine, 2012), as analyzed by Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 
150. 
161 As of 2013, feed for cattle in Ukraine was composed of 19-20% silage, 18% 
hay and straw, 30% "green forage" of sown grasses, natural meadows, and 
pastures.  O.M. Ribachenko, Osnovni problem rozvitku kormo virobnitstva v 
Ukraini, 10-12 AGRO INKOM (2011)  
http://archive.nbuv.gov.ua/portal/chem_biol/agroin/2011_10-12/RYBAHENK.pdf, 
cited in Kukhar, Current Trends, supra note 150. 
162 See notes 12 and note 156 supra. 
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however, say skeptics, both the layout of current facilities and the 
social organization of villages are unsuited to them, or rather, as one 
specialist from Russia, Vladimir Kirsanov, recently concluded, the 
old equipment is "morally obsolete."163       
 
  Regarding household acquisition of dairy cattle, the most 
notable legal point here, it bears emphasizing, is the absence of 
formal law:  milkmaids' confrontations with local authority, namely 
their collective farm director, happened largely before presidential 
decrees had turned state farms into collective farms, turned collective 
farms into joint stock companies, or specified procedures for 
dividing assets, or even before parliament had passed privatization 
laws.  Likewise, they did not wait for law to bring accountability or 
official new governance structures, but rather collectively decided on 
a solution they found fair (or at least, fairer than the risk of the dairy 
herd disappearing) and brought it into realization.  Local experience 
with holding authority accountable -- in particular, a gendered 
confrontation between village dairymaids and the nearly all-male 
collective farm directors -- became a defining feature of early post-
Soviet rural political life.  Prior experience with milkmaid brigades, 
understanding the significance of dairy to village diets and incomes, 
and the kinds of bonds between milkmaid and cow provided 
organizational, intellectual, and affective grounds for action. 
  
  C.  Corporations, Consumption, and Caretaking 
 
  Ukrainian cuisine boasts a rich variety of milk products, 
including many forms meant to preserve milk for later consumption:  
sour cream, cottage cheese, kefir, a baked whey concoction called 
"ryazhenka," and other products for which there is no direct English 
translation.164  Village dairy maids are adept at preserving milk and 
extending the period in which it may be consumed.165  Nonetheless, 
 
163 Vladimir Byacheslavovich Kirsanov, Strukturno-Tekhnologicheskoye 
Obosnovaniye Effektivnovo Postroyenniya i Funktskionirovaniya Doilnovo 
Oborudovaniya, doctoral dissertation (2001), at 1, relevant portion available at 
https://www.dissercat.com/content/strukturno-tekhnologicheskoe-obosnovanie-
effektivnogo-postroeniya-i-funktsionirovaniya-doiln. 
164 Entries in UKRAINIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (University of Toronto press, C.H. 
Andrusyshen comp., 1955). 
165 In households, "[m]ilk is produced for family needs and for sale in neighboring 
urban centers in either fluid milk form or processed into traditional basic dairy 
products such as soft cottage cheese, sour cream and cream."   USDA Foreign 
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nearly every cow produces more milk than can be consumed or 
bartered by village households locally.166  The demise of the Soviet 
system interrupted former modes and networks for getting milk to 
food processors and thence to consumers, and a patchwork of 
practices and new routes and methods arose.  
 
  A detailed recounting of the post-Soviet history of food 
processing is beyond the scope of this article,167 but several features 
bear noting.  Despite the introduction of milking machines, 
carousels, and "milking robots" to the imaginary of specialists in the 
Ukrainian milk-production sphere,168 most milking of cows is still 
done by hand, in villages, largely by women, and now largely by 
women of the family that owns the cow.169  Processing the milk into 
 
me=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf. 
166 The Soviet term for "commercial dairy farm," known by its abbreviation MTF 
(see text infra note 48 supra), is still used to refer to commercial enterprises in 
Ukraine today that specialize in producing raw milk for milk processers and 
bottlers.  Of raw milk sent to dairy processers, 78% is from MTF and 22%, from 
personal farms.  Analysis of the Dairy Industry in Ukraine, MilkUA.info, 
September 26, 2019.  The average milk yield per cow from household dairy cows 
is 4480 kg.  Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, 2017 STATISHICHNIY ZBIRNIK 144 (Kyiv, State 
Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2017), 
http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/druk/publicat/kat_u/2018/zb/05/zb_tu2017pdf.pdf 
[hereinafter Tvarinnitstvo Ukraini].  Compared with the 4480 kg/cow of milk 
produced annually, average annual consumption of milk per person in Ukraine is 
110 kg of fluid milk (second in the world only to Belarus). Global Per Capita 
Consumption of Fluid Milk in the World, By Country (Statistica Research 
Department (Jan. 22, 2020) 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/535806/consumption-of-fluid-milk-per-capita-
worldwide-country/   
167 The latest annual figures (from 2018) show that 26% of the the agricultural 
sector is involved in animal husbandry, including dairy, and 74% in crop 
production. Sotsial'no-ekonomichno pokazniki 2018:  Sil'ske hospodarstvo, State 
Service of Statistics of Ukraine, http://ukrstat.gov.ua.  For an excellent overview of 
the Ukrainian food processing sector as regards milk, see Anna Gereles and László 
Szöllösi, The Current State and Latest Trends of the Ukrainian Dairy Sector, 
ANNALS OF THE POLISH ASS'N OF AGRICULTURE AND AGRIBUSINESS ECONOMISTS, 
June 3, 2019. 
168 See, e.g., V mire doilnoi mekhaniki – traditsii i sovremennost', NOVOE SELSKOE 
KHOZYAISTVO (April 9, 2009), reprinted at THE DAIRY NEWS, DairyNews.ru, 
https://www.dairynews.ru/news/v_mire_doilnoj_tehniki--
tradicii_i_sovremennost.html (describing circa 2009 the latest in milking 
technology in Western Europe, including futuristic "milking robots" that would 
eliminate the human hand from the work of milking). 
169 A Dairy Revival in Ukraine, Chemonics report, June 12, 2019, 
https://chemonics.com/impact-story/a-dairy-revival-in-ukraine/.  That is not to say 
dairy enterprises with large herds do not exist at all.  See, e.g., Zarplata doyarki 20 
tis. hrn ta rivni dorohi:  yak zhive hromada na Cherkashchiny, Fakty ICTV 
broadcast of April 23, 2018 available at https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/9259 
 
2020] HERDING HISTORY IN UKRAINE 309 
   
 
a variety of products for home and village consumption falls first to 
rural women.170  Milk beyond that needed for family consumption or 
for barter within the village, or home-processed for sale in markets 
in nearby urban areas, 171 is collected, largely in metal containers 
(although increasingly in plastic), and sold to milk processing 
concerns that operate on the supra-village level.172  Some milk 
processors have, since Ukraine gained independence, put together 
fleets of refrigerator trucks that travel through villages every morning 
after cows are milked and sent to pasture, to collect each contributing 
household's container(s) of milk.173  The income provides 
supplemental cash to village households.  It is not atypical for a 
household to be self-sufficient in regard to unprocessed foodstuffs, 
stove-fuel firewood, and winter silage.  Cash from milk sales 
supplements pensions and off-farm wages to pay for gas heating (if 
the village is connected to the gas grid); for electricity; for other 
processed foods like flour and sugar; for clothing and other small 
consumer goods; for taxes; and, notably, for contributions to family 
members' education.  In other words, in regard to foodstuffs, the 
village household of independent Ukraine is remarkably autarkic.174  
Milk, providing a residual source of cash for necessities that the 
household does not produce or barter for locally, is a primary nexus 
 
(reporting on a rural community that manages its own cattle herd of 1,800 cows, 
with its milkmaid-employees earning up to 20,000 hryven/month.  (compared with 
official average monthly salaries across all employments, nationally,of UAH 8480. 
Nominal'na ta real'na zarobitna plata u 2018-2019, State Service of Statistics of 
Ukraine, http://ukrstat.gov.ua.)).  Such large dairy concerns, however, are the 
exception rather than the rule.  See Part V below. 
170 FAO/EBRD Report No. 18, supra note 94, at xiii and 69. 
171 Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167, at 72 ("Household milk is processed by 
families into basic, cheap, dairy products and sold on open-air markets without any 
statistical record"). 
172 Food processing enterprises, including those specializing in dairy, were 
privatized at a much faster clip than agricultural enterprises early in Ukraine's post-
Soviet history.  By January 1, 1996, 63 percent of food processing plants legally 
subject to privatization had been privatized and by mid-1996, that included 55 
percent of Ukraine's dairy and cheese plants.  Yuri Yekhanurov, The Progress of 
Privatization, 38 EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMICS 77, 80 (2000) (describing the 
fast pace of privatization of food processing industries early on in the post-Soviet 
Ukraine, in contrast to agricultural enterprises, which resisted privatization).  Raw 
milk that needed a destination found one in a privatized enterprise. 
173 Described briefly in USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – 
UP1824 – Dairy and Products Annual 2-3 (October 16, 
2018) https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?
filename=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf 
174 Interview with Tytotya Doyarka, September 17-21, 2009; see also Serhiy 
Moroz, Rural Households in Ukraine:  Current State and Tendencies, 60 
ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE 565 (March 2017) at Table 7, Structure of Total 
Resources of Rural Households. 
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to the national and international cash economy for many village 
households. 
  
  The food processing companies dealing in dairy products 
include enterprises built on the foundations of Soviet-era food 
processors, new Ukrainian enterprises, and foreign corporations who 
have entered into business in Ukraine since the end of the U.S.S.R.175  
Dairy processors produce for domestic consumption (largely urban 
consumers) and for export.176  The reach of the state contracted at 
independence; subsequent years saw the state setting up, anew, legal 
parameters for food production and processing.  Basic legislation 
regulating food safety was passed in 1998,177 seven years after 
independence, and it has been subsequently amended and expanded 
upon in measures, for example, aimed at consumer protection and 
information.178 Although the state's capacity for oversight is 
limited,179 there are multiple and overlapping state institutions and 
 
175 Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167.  The chart of the top ten dairy companies 
in Ukraine by market share in 2017 is particularly illuminating.  Id. at Fig. 3.  See 
also Chain Comparison of the Dairy Sector in Ukraine and in the Netherlands, 
Ukrainian Agribusiness Club, October 31, 2017, 
https://www.agroberichtenbuitenland.nl/binaries/agroberichtenbuitenland/documen
ten/publicatiens/2017/10/31/2017---dairy-comparison-study-nl-
ua/2017++Chain+comparison+of+the+dairy+sector.pdf (listing the top 20 
producers of dairy products in Ukraine in 2015). 
176 Gereles and Szöllösi, supra note 167. 
177 Law of Ukraine, "On Basic Principles and Requirements for Food Safety and 
Quality," № 771-97, December 23, 1997, in VVR, 1998, № 19, at 98, 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/771/97-%D0%B2%D1%80. 
178 See, e.g., Law of Ukraine, "On Food Information for Consumers," № 2639-
VIII, December 6, 2018, in VVR, 2019, № 7, at 41, 
https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2639-19.  Ukraine dropped the Soviet system 
of standards (acronymed GOST) after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and 
subsequent Russian support for armed secession in southeastern Ukraine.  Ukraine 
Scraps Soviet GOST Standards, UNIAN News Service, Dec. 16, 2015, 
https://www.unian.info/economics/1213976-ukraine-scraps-soviet-gost-
standards.html  However, state regulators still use GOST as a frame of reference.  
Enterprises must comply with them if they want to label dairy products 
"manufactured in accordance with GOST," or alternatively must indicate the 
technical conditions of their non-compliance in product labeling.  Mykola Moroz, 
Director General of the Directorate for Food Safety and Quality, quoted in Olena 
Holubeva, Milk Market of Ukraine: EU Standards vs. Peasant’s Income, 112.ua, 
Dec. 18, 2018, https://112.international/article/milk-market-of-ukraine-eu-
standards-vs-peasants-income-23732.html. 
179 A "moratorium on verification" puts sole responsibility for compliance with 
dairy product regulations on the manufacturer.  Vitaliy Bashynsky, head of the 
Public Council under the State Consumer Protection Service, quoted in Holubeva, 
id. ("Today, the responsibility for the conformity of food products to the marking 
is borne by the manufacturer alone").  See also, e.g., Borys Kobal, director of the 
Food Safety and Veterinary Medicine Department of the State Consumer 
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structures concerned with regulating dairy and other food 
products.180  
 
  Exports of dairy products have been affected by two 
countervailing forces.  First, over the last two decades, the national 
government has promoted the export of Ukrainian dairy products 
within an overall effort towards bringing Ukraine into membership 
with international trade organizations and customs unions.  In regard 
to dairy, this has entailed legislation regulating production and 
bringing safety and quality into conformity with international 
standards.181  Regulations on milk products were legislated and 
subsequently amended in conformity with Ukrainian commitments 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO).182  Popular support for 
membership in international trade and customs unions is strong.  In 
the winter of 2013-2014, massive street protests urged the Ukrainian 
government to stay the course in regard to integration with European 
structures, and subsequently, the Ukrainian government agreed to a 
roadmap, the European Accession Agreement, which sets out policy 
measures Ukraine must adopt in order to be considered for EU 
membership,183 among them standards for raw milk and for dairy 
products meant for export.184  Measures to integrate Ukrainian dairy 
products into world markets are succeeding.   The European 
Commission, for example, has begun granting permission to 
Ukrainian milk products companies to export their goods to the EU 
 
Protection Service, complaining that inspections of milk collection points and of 
dairy products manufacturers take place only once every two years, and then with 
ten days' notice, and thus are insufficient.  Kobal, quoted in Holubeva, id. 
180 For example, food safety is controlled by a number of governmental authorities, 
including but not limited to the State Committee for Technical Regulation and 
Consumer Policy, the State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service, the State Plant 
Quarantine Service, the Ministry of Health, the State Sanitary and Epidemiological 
Service, the Ministry of Agricultural Policy and Food, and the Ministry for 
Environmental Protection. 
181 Law of Ukraine "On Milk and Dairy Products," № 1870-IV, June 24, 2004, in 
VVR, 2004, № 47, at 513, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1870-15, 
English translation available on the website of the World Trade Organization, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/ukr_e/WTACCUKR147_LEG_1.pdf. 
182 See id. as amended by Law of Ukraine, № 402-V, Nov. 30, 2006, in VVR, 
2007, № 4, at 37, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/en/1870-15 (specifying 
amendments "entering into force on the day of Ukraine's accession to the World 
Trade Organization"). 
183 Association Agreement Between the European Union and Its Member States, of 
the One Part, and Ukraine, of the Other Part (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/yevropejska-integraciya/ugoda-pro-asociacyu. 
184 See, e.g., E.U. Regulation No. 853/2004 (April 29, 2004), setting requirements 
for the quality of dairy raw materials, conformity with which implementation of 
the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU would demand. 
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market.185  As of 2019, agricultural and food exports from Ukraine 
amounted to $22.2 billion, 44% of Ukraine's total exports.186  
Ukraine is a net exporter of food, with food exports dwarfing food 
imports (which amounted to $5.7 billion in 2019).187  Ukrainians 
prefer local milk, but are developing a taste for foreign cheese, as 
cheese was one of the rare areas in which imports grew between 2018 
and 2019.188 
 
  Trade triumphalism should, however, not obscure one of the 
most significant developments for Ukrainian dairy products 
exporters:  disruption of relations with Russia, previously Ukraine's 
largest trading partner in foodstuffs, since the 2014 annexation of 
Crimea by Russia and war with Russian-affiliated forces in 
southeastern Ukraine.  The government of Russia imposed a ban on 
importing Ukrainian dairy products on August 1, 2014.189  Although 
 
185 The European Commission announced the first Ukrainian milk product 
companies granted permission to export to the EU market in December 2015.  10 
Ukrainian Milk Companies Allowed Exporting Products To EU, 112.ua, Dec. 29, 
2015, https://112.international/ukraine-and-eu/10-ukrainian-milk-companies-
allowed-exporting-products-to-eu-1973.html.  Twenty-seven companies are 
licensed to export dairy products to China.  Another Nine Dairy Companies are 
Licensed to Export to China, Ukrinform, June 22, 2017, 
http://agroconf.org/en/content/another-9-ukrainian-dairy-companies-licensed-
export-china.  In 2018, Ukraine opened 85 export markets for various types of 
products and increased the number of enterprises that received the right to export 
food products of animal origin. A total of 126 producers of the country can export 
food products to EU countries.  Ukraine Agrees on Vet Certificate for Dairy 
Export to Saudi Arabia, Ukraine Open for Business, June 26, 2019, 
https://open4business.com.ua/ukraine-agrees-on-vet-certificate-for-dairy-export-
to-saudi-arabia/. 
186 Ukraine Agribusiness Club, In 2019 Agri-food Export from Ukraine Increased 




188 Livestock products were one of the few areas of food import growth, due to a 
growth in cheese imports (as well as fresh and frozen fish) which together totalled 
$153.5 million.  Id. 
189 For the list of Ukrainian enterprises banned from exporting dairy products to 
Russia, see  Rosselkhoznadzor (the Federal Service for Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Surveillance of the Russian Federation), Ukraine:  Enterprises 
Licensed to Export to the Russian Federation (Food:  Milk and Milk Products) 
http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/importExport/ukrain/enterprises.html?product=26&prod
uctType=5&_language=en (last visited February 7, 2020).  See also USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1425 –  Ukraine Stops Many 
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some workarounds were found, the effects were profound, 
particularly on cheese exporters (to the extent that Russia's ban was 
referred to as the "cheese war").190  In 2013, exports of Ukrainian 
dairy products totaled $458.6 million, of which $308 million worth 
went to Russia; in the first 10 months of 2015, the first calendar year 
after the war started, total dairy exports decreased to $163.4 million, 
of which only $10.9 million worth found their way to Russia.191  
Against a background of milk as a base of empowerment for village 
milkmaids, the two countervailing trends described here -- growth in 
exports to a variety of foreign markets, disastrous contraction with 
Russia under conditions of war -- also reveal milk as a point of 
integration, making local milk producers vulnerable to political and 
structural forces often beyond their control. 
 
  D. Foreign Investment and Local Dairy Power  
 
  By 2009, some foreign investors, noticing its absence from 
Ukrainian markets and diets, had become interested in reintroducing 
beef cattle husbandry to Ukraine,192 harnessing economies of scale 
and American production models to create an industry that would 
out-compete local sources of meat and international competitors in 
beef.  One such firm, working closely with a local labor force of 
former collective farmers, had established a beef operation outside 
of Kyiv which I went to observe.  Ralph M., an expert from Kansas 
brought in as a consultant, commented as we approached the cattle 
sheds, "These are the four-year-olds.  You will not even recognize 
these as the same animals you're used to seeing."193  The cattle were 
hefty and healthy -- no surprise there -- but none had been gelded and 
all still had horns.  In the U.S., he noted, beef cattle of that age would 
be considered aggressive enough that their horns are typically 
removed, lest they harm farmhands or each other.  "These animals 
are completely docile.  They're more like dogs,"194 which Ralph 
attributed to the extent and gentleness with which they are handled 
 
190 Interview with Lina Dotsenko, Director, CNFA, June 15, 2019. 
191 Anastasiya Zanuda, ZVT z ES: skladnii vibir neminuchovo, BBC Ukraina, Dec. 
30, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/business/2015/12/151223_free_trade_ukraine_eu_
az.   
192 The following section reports from field research conducted among U.S. 
investors in Ukrainian beef production over the first two weeks of November, 2009 
in Kyiv oblast'. 
193 Interview with Ralph M. (U.S. beef consultant to Ukraine-based beef start-up), 
Nov. 14 2007. 
194 Id. 
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by the workers.195  The farmhands in charge of tending to the beef 
cattle were uniformly men.  Even among a large herd of several 
hundred cattle destined for beef, the workers knew each one, 
including where it liked to be scratched.196   
 
  Even more pronounced was the relationship of care and 
intimacy between the milkmaids and the business' dairy cattle.  In the 
milking shed, each dairy cow had its name hand painted on a placard 
at the front of its stall.  The milkmaids -- to a person, the dairy cattle-
tenders were female -- knew each cow's peculiarities.  To avoid 
causing the cow undue anxiety, they tried not to rotate between cows 
but rather devoted the same milkmaid to the same cow, day in and 
day out.  Just as in the village with the household cows, a milkmaid 
knew how her cow preferred to be milked, the rhythm and strength; 
how long milking would normally take; how much milk the cow 
would normally give.197  John S., the American manager, read my 
thoughts and answered my obvious question before I had even posed 
it.  "You may wonder why we even have dairy cattle.  We are not a 
dairy operation and we have no aspirations to dairy."198   
 
  This kind of phenomenon, of dairy as a sideline, shows up 
more widely in general reports; as one recent report puts it, industrial 
dairy is small and "currently existing dairy farms . . . function as 
subsidiaries of larger agricultural companies oriented towards crop 
production."199  Why would crop producers engage in dairy 
production?  In the jargon of U.S. experts, "Livestock farms are 
utilized more as social employment projects rather than profitable 
businesses."200  The U.S. investors in beef, carrying a dairy operation 
in which they had no interest, put it in more human terms.  "We 
wanted to get rid of them, but the milkmaids threatened to riot.  If we 





198 Interview with John S. (U.S. owner/manager of Ukraine-based beef operation), 
Nov. 14, 2007. 
199 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1824 – Dairy and 






2020] HERDING HISTORY IN UKRAINE 315 
   
 
insurrection on our hands.  It's easier, and cheaper just to keep the 
dairy cows and keep the milkmaids happy."201 
 
  E.  Farm to Table 
 
  Over the nearly thirty years of Ukrainian independence, 
getting dairy to urban markets has depended on the introduction of 
new networks of food processors.  Some are coops, composed of 
associations of local milkmaids; increasingly, large foreign concerns 
are involved.  How products then get to consumers is in flux.  Cities 
over the past five years have begun phasing out the open markets 
from which dairy products, like other produce, used to be sold to 
urban consumers who were allowed to try (a spoonful on the back of 
the hand) milk, sour cream, or other dairy products before purchase.  
During the same period, with a rise in urban real estate prices, the 
corner milk and produce stores are disappearing, replaced by 
supermarkets.  Milk products increasingly get from processor to 
consumers via grocery stores,202 where single-use plastic bottles and 
tetra paks have replaced the reusable glass containers that urban 
consumers used to fill from dairy-product sellers at open markets.   
 
  There are two significant points of resistance to the 
hegemonic rise of supermarkets in food retail.  One is a new trend 
towards small urban outlets selling organic products from known 
individual producers.203  The other is the village resistance, an 
autarkic dairysphere in which households serve their own needs or 
barter with neighbors.204  Regardless of how milk reaches consumer, 
the system of dairy production rests on the stall behind many 
villagers' homes in which the cow and her caretaker go through their 
daily milking routine. 
 
  V. Conclusions: On Herds and Humans   
 
 
201 Interview with Ralph M. (U.S. beef consultant to Ukraine-based beef start-up), 
Nov. 14 2007. 
202 Consumption of industrially processed milk as compared with household milk 
was 3,829,820 tons of processed versus 3,414,460 tons in 2016.  European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Ukraine's Milk Production Balance, 
Table 4.6 Milk Balance (2016), at Milk Supply and Demand Balance System:  
Public-Private Policy Dialogue in the Ukrainian Dairy Sector Project, 
milkbalance.org.ua. 
203 Field observation, Moloko vid Fermera, ul. Volodymyrska 38, Kyiv city, June 
2019. 
204 See text infra note 198 supra. 
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  Today, roughly 4 million small family dairy operations and 
rural households produce 75% of Ukraine's dairy output, and they do 
so almost exclusively milking by hand.205  Industrialization of food 
production has not subsumed the dairysphere.  Without 
romanticizing the situation, and acknowledging some of the systemic 
problems inherent in human consumption of dairy, it is worth noting 
that having most of the milk produced in small-scale household 
operations in Ukraine has several environmental implications.  
Experts decry the "inefficiency" of household milk production,206 its 
average annual milk yield per cow at 4480 kg compared with 6025 
kg per enterprise cow.207  However, with its "inefficient" household 
dairy production, Ukraine has avoided some of the environmental ills 
associated with modern dairy production elsewhere.  Yield is lower 
in part because dairy cattle feed more on pasturage than silage,208 
giving Ukrainian dairying a lower carbon footprint.  In addition, 
pasturing cows over large tracts of former collective farm land also 
means that manure is dispersed, fertilizing fallow fields, rather than 
concentrated in the sewage ponds common in North American dairy 
production.    
 
  In addition, milk production is dominated by individual 
relationships between caretaker and cow.  Milk cows are tended to 
 
205 In 2017, enterprises produced 2,765,700 tons of milk while households 
produced 7,514,800 tons.  Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 26.  A Dairy 
Revival in Ukraine, Chemonics report, June 12, 2019, 
https://chemonics.com/impact-story/a-dairy-revival-in-ukraine/ (reporting the 75% 
figure).  Other current estimates are that some 80% of Ukrainian milk production 
comes from small-scale producers.   USAID Report, Ukraine Dairy Coops Get 
More Competitive:  Improved processing, lower costs, more sales for dairy 
farmers, https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/results-data/success-stories/project-makes-
dairy-cooperatives-competitive. 
206 See, e.g., USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, GAIN Report – UP1824 – Dairy 
and Products Annual (Oct. 16, 2018) 
https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filena
me=Dairy%20and%20Products%20Annual_Kiev_Ukraine_10-16-2018.pdf  
("Households practice a low-cost, low productivity approach").   
207 Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 144. 
208 See Phil Durst, Michigan State University Extension dairy educator, describing 
feed as a factor in "quality" and yield of Ukrainian household milk production, 
quoted in Addy Battel, Can Ukraine Regain Its Reputation as the Breadbasket?  
Improving Dairy Cattle Efficiency on Former Collective Farms in Ukraine (Aug. 
30, 2017), https://www.canr.msu.edu/news/can-ukraine-regain-its-reputation-as-
the-breadbasket-improving-dairy-cattle-efficiency-on-former-collective-farms-in-
ukraine.  But regarding perceptions of "quality," see Gereles and Szöllösi, supra 
note 167, at 72 ("There is widespread belief that household milk and dairy 
products are 'organic,' healthier,' of 'higher quality,' or even 'safer' than industrially 
processed products"). 
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by caretakers who, in most cases, care for four cows or fewer;209 they 
not only know each cow's milk production norms, but her name, food 
preferences, preferred milking style, tolerance for proximity to 
strangers, need for warmth or preference for cool, how long milking 
will take, how the cow should smell, the usual rate of her 
breathing.210 The relationship between milkmaid and cow is more 
intimate in some of its embodied and affective dimensions than 
industrialized production allows. 
 
  Though socialism rendered the means of production a public 
resource, I propose that connections between cow and caretaker, if 
anything, grew stronger in the earliest days of collectivization of 
agriculture in Ukraine.  Gaining milk cows for shared use was one of 
the first tangible benefits to the rural poor of the Communist Party's 
collectivization campaign and the physical struggle against rural 
smallholders, the so-called "kulaks."  Famine that accompanied 
collectivization in Ukraine intensified the bond between village and 
cow.  Milk, perishable and easily consumed, was less confiscable by 
state authorities than grain stores.  Rural Ukrainians that survived the 
Famine understood milk's importance to their survival, and that 
significance grew during the years of privation during World War II 
and its aftermath.  The insertion of science into agricultural 
production may have extended into livestock feed but did not reach 
extensively into the tactile relationship of milk production between 
milkmaids and cows.  Teams of milkmaids worked with state and 
collective farms' jointly owned or managed herds, but milkmaids 
specialized by subgroups and knew each cow with whom they 
worked.  For families that kept their own dairy cow, the bond was at 
least as strong. 
 
  The relationship between caretaker and cow remained strong 
during the period of dissolution of the U.S.S.R.  Soviet structures -- 
such as the command function of a command economy, the ethical 
commitments of Party membership and socialist futures, and the 
control exerted by incentives and monitoring systems -- dissolved.  
 
209 71.1 % of rural households do not keep dairy cattle.  21.7% have only one cow; 
5.9% have two; 0.9% have three; and only 0.4% have four or more. Serhiy Moroz, 
Rural Households in Ukraine:  Current State and Tendencies, 60 ECONOMICS OF 
AGRICULTURE 565 (March 2017) at Table 4, Distribution of Rural Households, by 
Number of Selected Types of Livestock (in %). 
According to state statistics, in 2017, agricultural enterprises held 484,600 head of 
cattle, compared with 1,624,300 held by households.  The number held by 
agricultural enterprises is 466,600 (as of 2018).  The total number held by rural 
households is 1,551,200 (2018).  Tvarinnitsvo Ukraini, supra note 168, at 144. 
210 Field observation, Gruzenske village, Ukraine, September 2009, summer 2016, 
May-November 2017. 
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State ownership of property, the keystone feature of state socialism, 
became a central problematic of the post-Soviet era.  Amidst legal 
incrementalism, parliamentarians debating and policy-makers taking 
centipede steps towards divesting the state and introducing private 
property ownership, some village assets were treated locally as up 
for grabs.  Beef cattle disappeared.  Milkmaids, canny to the extent 
to which milk provided a reserve for village sustenance and income 
and emotionally invested in the cows, took matters into their own 
hands to prevent the dairy herd from being "liquidated," monetized 
and pocketed by one local opportunist.  Milkmaids saved the village 
herd by decollectivizing it.  The social cohesion of dairymaids on the 
local level has proved salient; the fact that this was not an organized, 
national movement makes its patterning nationwide all the more 
striking.  "Privatization" in beef versus dairy thus appears in 
contrasting forms, secretive and wealth-concentrating versus 
transparent and wealth-distibuting. 
 
  Considering law and milk in Ukraine opens up several 
insights.  It reveals how, during the Soviet period, milk production 
provided households with a reserve of calories, income, and power 
within overarching collectivization of agricultural production.  The 
moral of the Soviet story, however, is not one of triumphant 
individualism or hardy family holdouts.  Rather, it shows how 
household and individual practices found a place within collective 
structures.  Looking at the post-Soviet experience, the story of milk 
and law in Ukraine reveals some of their continuities, as well as 
micro-practices at work within the frameworks of national laws, 
structures of international trade, global shifts in modes of power, and 
the press of security concerns.  Multinational corporations, 
increasingly involved in dairy processing in Ukraine, have both 
reached into the daily routines of remote villagers and found their 
limits; village norms are also reshaping corporate production.  In 
local performances of power, the dairysphere finds both the 
dissolution of some forms of collective life and the reorganization of 
daily life along the lines of new collectivities.  Milk production also 
reveals the pragmatic plays of gender dynamics within local disputes 
and vast social transformations.  Milk has remained a reservoir of 
calories and a ground of social networks; its story shows the 
resilience of intimate relationships between dairy cows and their 
keepers and the political strength, untapped nationally but salient 
locally, of dairy maids.   
 
 
